THE COAL ISLAND MAIL CASE.

Otago Witness, Issue 2004, 21 July 1892, Page 33

THE COAL ISLAND MAIL CASE.

Sullivan and Eglin v. Sundstrom. — In this previously-heard case, in which Mr Finch appeared for the plaintiffs and Mr Sim for the defendant, his Worship delivered the following judgment at the Dunedin R.Mt*Court on Monday: — If the plaintiffs have suffered any loss through the steamer Invercargill not having carried an outward mail from Coal Island in May last, the plaintiff, Mr Eglin, has him self very largely to blame. It seems xhat for the 18 months or s>o during whicli he was postmaster at Coal Island he allowed a practice to grow up, without objection on his own part, 'dispensing with the written notice of departme required by section 35 of "The Post Office Act 1881." On April 22 Captain Sundstrom, following his usual custom, gave verbal notice that ou his next trip he would be at Coal Island on May l'.i. The Invercargill arrived there punctually on that clay, and the inward mail was delivered to Mr 'Eglin, the postmaster, at 7 o'clock that morning. Mr Eglin inquhed when the vessel was going away, and the mate told him at 11 o'clock. This was the usual manner in which the busineob was arranged at each trip. Mr Eglin made no objection either to the absence of a written notice or to the time of departure. At 11 o'clock f hat morning the mate applied for the mail, but Mr Eglin informed him that it was not ready— that ho had his ownlctteis to write. The vessel was detained waiting for the mail with the steam whistle blowing on and off to bring it on board. Two other applications were made for the mail— the last about half-past 1 o'clock; but they were unsuccessful, and the vessel steamed away without any mail. Captain Sundstroin committed a technical error in not giving written notice of his intended departure as the law required, and he should have applied to the postmaster to substitute for the maximum L-ngth of notice such shorter notice as the ciirurnstanccs required. Mr Wilkin, the postmaster at Invercargill, under who.se geneial supervision the Coal Island post office was placed, said in his evidence that in his opinion four hours' notice was sufficient — as much as is usual under similar circumstances. The conclusion I come to is that if four hours' written notice of departure had been given to the postmaster and an application to sanction that length of notice, that the post-

master would havo given his sanction. It is truo that it is within the discretion of a postmaster to accede to or refuse such an application, but where a discretion is vested in a public oificer, it must be exercised in a reasonable manner, and lassumo Mr Lglin would have done that. The position then is this: that if Captain Sundstrom and Mr Eglin had both done their duty the outward mail would have been ready by 11 o'clock, whether Mr Eglin's private correspondence was ready at thut time or not ; and, therefore, the fact that he did not get his private letters carried by the Invercargill did not happen iv consequence of defendant's omhsion to give written notice, but from ' his own wilf ulness or supincness. There is another point in the evidence I will mention. Mr Eglin's evidence is that his letters contained an indent for merchandise, and in consequence of the letters not going, the goods did not come, and ho lost the profits that would have accrued from their sale ; but the evidence also shows that Mr Sulliyan was negotiating to sell their busiuess at Coal Island— the stock ou hand at cost price landed. Under such circumstances It seems to me very doubtful whether, if Mr Sullivan had received tho indent, he would have sent the goods ; if not, there would be no loss. I think upon the merits the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, even if Couch v. Steel ?(3 Ellis and Blackburn, page 400) meets the fact the plaintiffs attempted to sunport ; but I also think Mr Sims' contention Is right — that as no specific right is created and vested in any individual or class for his or their benefit orad vantage, under section 35 of "The Tost Office Act 1831," the case is widely distinguishable from the one mainly relied upon by the other side. Judgment for the defendant, with costs of court (6s), witnesses' expenses (L 4 15s), and professional Co9te (425).