Opinion of Counsel as to Application of Standing Orders to Mayor Received

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27091, 27 May 1949, Page 3

Opinion of Counsel as to Application of Standing Orders to Mayor Received

NORTH OTAGO NEWS

The opinion of counsel of the Municipal Association, Mr J. O’Shea, on the question raised by the Oamaru Borough Council as to the application of the Standing Orders to the Mayor was received at the monthly meeting of the council last night. The question raised was: “Is the Mayor like other councillors bound by Standing Orders of the council or may he without their consent, tacit or by resolution, decline to accept the application to himself of any particular Standing Order? ”

He could find nothing in the standing orders bearing on this question, apart from standing order No. 366, Mr O’Shea said. This order read: "Whenever the Mayor rises during a debate any member then speaking, or offering to speak, is to sit down, and the council is to be silent so that a Mayor may be heard without interruption." “ In my opinion, the Mayor is bound by the standing orders in the same manner and to the same extent as other councillors," Mr O'Shea said. " Certain powers in duty are specifically vested ir, and imposed on him by statute and the standing orders." The Mayor, however, by the indulgence and courtesy of the council, was usuall> given a wide extension of the right tc speak in order to clear up disputed ques tions of fact and to facilitate the opera tions and business of the council. Th. power given by Order No. 366 to th' Mayor to speak had to be interpreted b\ the Mayor, who might interpret the ordei as giving him extensive powers to speak The position of a mayor refusing to pul a resolution to the council when th< resolution had been duly put and seconded, and discussed by the council, if the council so desired, was fully discussed in the case “ The Mayor, etc., oi Dannevirke v. Ries.” In this case tht Mayor ruled certain resolutions out oi order. It was contended for the Mayoi that so long as a mayor acted in gooi faith he had an absolute discretion t( say that in his opinion the burgesses or a majority of them, did not desin the particular matter to be considered b> the council, and that, therefore, he woulc not allow any motion to be put, as, i it was put, a majority of the counci’ might carry it and thus defeat the wishe: of the ratepayers. The court held tha' the corporation was entitled to a mandamus in respect of three out of tht four resolutions. The mandamus was refused in respect of the other motion on**'technical grounds. This decision was a very valuable one and should be carefully studied by the Mayor or the council and its officials. “It has to be remembered that the council is not actually bound by its standing orders. Except in cases where such action would conflict with statutes or regulations made thereunder I think that the council can waive its standing orders," Mr O’Shea said. "In very formal proceedings such as proceedings on loan proposals or special order, I do not think it would be advisable to depart from the standing orders.” The opinion was received.