ARABS’ DILEMMA

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26782, 27 May 1948, Page 5

ARABS’ DILEMMA

Effect of Accepting Trace

“ TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL” ' New Zealand Press Association—Copyright Rec. 10 p.m. LONDON, May 26. The special correspondent of The Times in Amman says the Arab League’s Political Committee which is now discussing the Security Council's proposal for a Palestine truce are in a difficult position, especially in view of the British advice to the Arabs to accept the cease-fire on the grounds that in the long run it will be advantageous to them to accept. Although it is not stated in' what way it will be advantageous the Arabs’ attitude is clear that they want to refuse to recognise the Zionist State. The Arab armies have entered Palestine “ to preserve the Arab character of Palestine.” Public opinion in Arab countries overwhelmingly supports both this attitude and the measures taken to implement it. What, asks the League, will be the result of accepting the truce, and who will benefit? Will it not merely give the Zionists another badly-needed breathing space? For there is no indication whatsoever that the Zionists will modify their position or undo what they already have done. The Arabs are being asked to make concessions, to relax their pressure on the Zionists, to make armistice with a ' State against whose existence they are fighting, and it seems to them that to accept the truce .would be tantamount to recognition.

What the Arabs ask. is this nebulous advantage that will accrue to them if they cease fighting? They are being asked to buy a pig in a poke and not see why they should. Yet if they refuse the truce they will be accused of raising an obstacle to peace in the Holy Land. To the Arabs it seems most unfair and it will be no surprise if the Arab League insists that it be made quite clear that acceptance of the truce will not prejudice either their present position or their general policy. To put it bluntly, the Arab States have a minimum of faith in U.N.O. Their

are weighted against them. They believe that they are being asked to give, with no assurance that they will receive, and especially they resent being put morally in dock by what appears to them to be an unscrupulous manoeuvre. ‘ In the House of Commons the Foreign Secretary, Mr Ernest Bevin, replying to Mr Churchill, said that the Government was still waiting to hear whether the Arab Governments agree to the cease fire. “ Inquiries are being made to confirm that tne undertaking covers all the Jewish forces, as on a previous occasion the Jews broke the cease fire in Jerusalem, thus leading to the present fighting. I will keep the House fully informed.” , , , ~ Mr S. Segal (Lab.) asked whether it was not a little hard to call upon the Arabs to cease fire after Britain had supplied them with arms. Mr Bevin: I ask the House not to prejudice the position. I think Mr Segal wants peace. Well, let us pursue it. . Commenting on a New York report that Britain and the United States were negotiating a plan for peace m Palestine, involving the recall of British officers from the Arab Legion and the ceasing of British military supplies to Arab countries under the treaties, a British Foreign Office spokesman said in London that no bilateral negotiations were taking place. Britain would make her own decisions on Palestine, but would continue contacts with America. Britain would stand by her treaties with the Arab States unless the United Nations declared those obligations were illegal. Britain had strongly advised the Arab States to carry put the United Nations cease-fire order. Britain had supported the Arab request for a delay, because it seemed a reasonable requst.

experience has been that every recommendation of that organisation on Palestine has had the result, calculated or otherwise, of strengthening the Zionist position. The Arabs feel that upon their “ yes or “no ” hangs the fate of Palestine, and equally they feel that the scales