SECRET BALLOTS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26531, 5 August 1947, Page 6

SECRET BALLOTS

Law Governing Strikes and Lock-outs NEW ANOMALIES FORESEEN Industrial Correspondent WELLINGTON, Aug. 4. The Government’s proposed amendment to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act making provisioon for secret ballots within industrial unions where strikes or lock-outs are contemplated has thrown existing legislation on industrial disputes into further confusion. In the terms of the Act which the Minister of Labour, Mr McLagan, proposes to amend, a strike or lock-out is already illegal where a union is operating under an award of the Court of Arbitration; yet it is now to be provided that secret ballots shall be taken on the issue whether this illegal action should occur. This provision would at first appear to give to unions something they have not had before—the right to take a ballot and strike while they are governed by an award of the Court. The Government, however, apparently with the aim of safeguarding itself against the danger of making strike action legal in terms of the Act, has added a clause which states that nothing ir. the amendment shall render legal any strike or lock-out which would otherwise be unlawful.

The Act, if amended as proposed, will say: “It is unlawful to strike or to lock-out your employees, but if you contemplate taking such unlawful action then you must take a secret ballot of your membership: . .j and, further, if you do take a ballot of your membership and it favours a strike or lock-out, even so, such strike or lock-out is still in terms of the Act unlawful.” , The amendment then provides for a penalty not exceeding £2O for every member of an industrial union who is party to a strike which takes place where a secret ballot has not returned a majority in favour of, it. Similarly, every member of a union of employers who is party to a lock-out in like circumstances is liable to a penalty not exceeding £ 1000. Penalties for officers of unions are also provided—£2o in the case of a strike contrary to the amendment, and £4OO in the case of a lock-out. The amendment thus provides for penalties for persons who do not take secret ballots before breaking the existing law. The confusion that may arise is immediately apparent. Further, there is no provision for the manner in which secret ballots are to be taken. An Existing Alternative The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, though governing most industries, is not the only legislation available for the handling of industrial disputes. The Labour Disputes Investigation Act, 1913, has provided for secret ballots and for strikes on a legal basis. This Act does not require the appearance of the parties before a court for the purpose of an award. It provides simply for direct negotiation between employer and employee organisations. If negotiations break down, then after a certain lapse of time a secret ballot may be taken, and if the majority favours it a completely legal strike may follow. One national trade union, the New Zealand Tramways Employees’ Union, last November took a secret ballot of its membership to determine whether the union' would authorise its. officers to deregister under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and conduct its disputes instead under the Labour Disputes Investigation . Act. There was an overwhelming majority in favour of deregistration should the officials desire to take that course. The ballot had been taken by the officials, so that if they were obliged to proceed with strike, action they would ‘have first established their legal right to move towards that end. This dispute, however, was settled without recourse to such procedure. Instead, the Minister of Labour, acting under a war-time emergency measure, the strikes and Lock-outs Emergency Regulations, set'up a tribunal with three representatives of employers and 1 three of employees and a Conciliation Commissioner as chairman. The parties, as irt practically all of the many cases occurring nowadays, failed to agree on major issues and the chairman’s decision became binding on the parties. The Strikes and Lock-outs Emergency Regulations allow decisions by tribunal, chairmen which cut across judgments of the Court of Arbitration and thus undermine if not the Court’s authority, then at least the effect of its decisions. It is possible for a union to receive an award of the Court, reject it as unsatisfactory, and have the chairman of a strikes and lock-outs tribunal amend the Court’s judgment within a week. This procedure can only embarass the Court and its authority. The Government has announced, however, that during the present session of Parliament war-time emergency legislation will be revoked. The strikes and lock-outs tribunal procedure, designed to meet war-time emergency and reduce strike action to a minimum, will therefore no longer be available. 1 Speeding-up Decisions It was generally expected that some alternative measure to speed up decision on outstanding disputes would be brought forward. To some extent this had been done, in the provision now made in the proposed amendment to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act under which Deputy Judges may be appointed. The Court

is authorised under this amendment to delegate its powers to a Deputy Judge, but parties may appeal to the Court from the findings he may bring down. It appears that this measure has been introduced to speed up the handling of disputes and to enable quick decisions to be given in emergencies. Impatience at delays in the handling of disputes by the Court of Arbitration is undoubtedly one of the causes of industrial unrest. If the appointment of Deputy Judges enables the Court to dispose more rapidly of the business it has to do, then something at least will have been achieved in the Interest of - industrial harmony. The amendment provides also for the parties to approach the court for its opinion on any question connected with the construction of any award or industrial agreement, or upon any determination or direction of the court, or upon the construction of any statute relating to matters within the jurisdiction of the court. The court may decline to give its opinion where it deems it inadvisable. This section may remove to some extent the burden thrown upon the Labour Department which has in the past been called upon to give opinions the court may now be asked to supply. The amendment is thus a further “patching” of existing legislation—a “patching” which may prove useful in some of its sections, but which is only confusing in others. The provision for secret ballots is perhaps intended more as a gesture than as an effective deterrent to strikes, since laws on like matters have more often been honoured in the breach. Likely to be Resented The ballot provisions will no doubt be resented by many unions, not because they may prove a deterrent to would-be strikers, but because they indicate a stiffening of the attitude of the Government towards that section of the community which was primarily responsible for placing it in office—that is, the industrial Labour movement. Such legislation. will be regarded by the unions as the thin end of the wedge. They will fear that their own Labour Government will pave the way for harsh, restrictive law designed to curb the traditional right of the worker to refuse to sell his labour for an unsatisfactory price. They will no doubt demand that the employer who refuses to give a service to the community, the manufacturer who refuses to make shirts because the Price Tribunal will not allow him enough profit, the dairy farming interests who threaten to withhold milk from a city for similar reasons, or the shipowner who may not be inclined to handle a certain class of goods because it is not so profitable as another—all shall be m some way placed in danger of penalty and directed to perform adequately their duties to the community. . ■ Some such policy as this may emerge from the deliberations of the National Council of the Federation of Labour on this issue. The council is dominated by the so-called militant unions, who will undoubtedly reiterate their demand that any restriction of the rights of labour shall be accompanied by similar restriction of the rights of capital.