SOVIET'S ATTITUDE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 25964, 3 October 1945, Page 5

SOVIET'S ATTITUDE

ADHERENCE TO POTSDAM (N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent) LONDON, Oct. 1.

“ It shows once again how widely the delegations have differed and how far short they have been of finding a common language with regard to Balkan regimes, Italian colonies, the Italian reparations bill, and a scheme for internationalising the main European rivers,” says The Times diplomatic correspondent, commenting on the lengthy period required by the Council of Foreign Ministers for drafting a protocol. He continues: “It also shows the vigour with which the delegations have expressed their different policies and avoided all along the easy way out offered by splendid generalisations. They have not even ‘agreed to differ.’ Where they have agreed they have made the agreement precise. For the rest, they recognise the differences and regret them, but in the light of far clearer knowledge they can shape their future policies and re-strive for solid agreement.” Mr Bevin met Mr James Byrnes and Mr Molotov again during the week-end in the hope that they might get the Balkan talks moving at the eleventn hour.

The Soviet Government sticks to the letter of the Potsdam Declaration, which stipulated that the task of drawing up treaties with former satellite States should be reserved to the Powers which signed the surrender terms—that is, to the three Potsdam Powers.

The Americans are believed to have suggested that a preliminary examination should be made by the three Powers, bringing in France for future talks on Italy, and that their findings should then be put before a wider Allied conference, thereby meeting the dominions’ claims for participation byactive belligerents. The procedure, however, was left in abeyance. The correspondent says it was in approaching the Balkans that the delegates set themselves their hardest task. It was here that they probed most deeply, searching for the real springs of action and intention. Few people who have not been in Russia during the war years can fully understand the Soviet Government’s passion for security, nor its determination to safeguard "regimes which ior ideological reasons it can trust. When suggestions are made for broadening the regimes Moscow believes that untrustworthy elements may be brought in and its security impinged. It further believes that the Western Powers minimise the native strength of the revolutionary forces in the countries concerned. On the other side, the Western Governments maintain that promised democracy is meaningless unless it provides for free elections. Are the “ friendly Governments,” they ask. to be friendlv only with Moscow? Have not the o’ther Powers equal concern in security? Before accepting the far-reaching consequences of a bloc (alreadv throwing a shadow across the discussions of Soviet claims in Italian colonies) they are seeking a middle way. He added that the week-end brought better news about the prospects of Allied co-operation in the policy towards Japan.