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AID FOR RUSSIA

AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TRANSPORT OF SUPPLIES ALTERNATIVE ROUTES DISCUSSED The United States has become an economic ally of the Soviet Union, and has pledged itself to furnish all aid "short of war." Military secrecy surrounds the exact extent of the supplies, but in Washington yesterday (wrote Captain Frederick L. Oliver, U.S.N., retired, in the Christian Science Monitor on August 7), it was announced that the Government had unfrozen millions of dollars' worth of Soviet orders, and that the flow of material had already beeun, . , „ These developments doubtless are in line with the arrangements which Harry L. Hopkins, Lend-Lease Co-or-dinator, made during his recent visit to Moscow. For unquestionably the Russians will require great quantities of supplies of all kinds, as the wastage incurred since the Nazi onslaught began must be tremendous. What supplies can be made available is a matter which must be determined by those who are directing the flow of our economic resources into channels productive of the best results, but to enable Russia to continue operations approaching the magnitude of those engaged in during the past two months will require the apportionment of every item that can be spared. Two Different Matters However, making material available for shipment and effecting its delivery are two entirely different matters. First, there is the matter of making available the necessary shipping, second, the transportation route to be used. As is well known, available ocean shipping is already hard pressed to carry the materials required by belligerents and non-belligerents. The recent withdrawal of Japanese bottoms further complicates matters. Russia has a limited amount of ocean tonnage, but far from the amount needed to satisfy its requirements. From a casual inspection, it appears that four alternative transportation routes exist. They are:— 1. West Coast of North .America to Vladivostok. 2 The East Coast of North America to the Persian Gulf via the Cape of Good Hope. 3. The East Coast of North America to Black Sea ports via the Mediterranean. 4. The East Coast of North America to Murmansk or Archangel. The Vladivostok route entails a sea voyage of almost 5000 miles followed by the long haul across Siberia on a railroad that is probably sadly taxed to handle existing traffic. Furthermore, although, aside from the danger of encountering a stray German raider in the Pacific, the ocean voyage at present is comparatively safe, there is the possibility of Japan becoming embroiled in the conflict. Should this contingency eventuate, the route will be closed, because in addition to the danger from Japanese raiders, Vladivistok will be cut off by Japan's control of the several entrances into the Sea of Japan. Black Sea Dangers

The route to the Persian Gulf entails a very long sea voyage of over 12,000 miles, a transhipment to the Iran (Persian) railroad at Bandar Shahpur which necessarily requires Iranian complacence, then 700 miles by rail, transhipment to water transportation across the Caspian Sea, and another transhipment to a Russian railroad for delivery where desired. In all. a haul which only the most optimistic would attempt. The Black Sea route is the most attractive from the standpoint of economic utilisation of transportation resources, and may possibly be made available. But it necessitates running the gamut of Italian airplane attack in the Mediterranean, and unquestionably the relatively inefficient Italian air force will be reinforced by every available German plane just as soon as the Nazis learn of Russian supplies being moved through that area. Then arises the age-old question of using the Dardanelles. Turkey's agreement must be obtained, or this route cannot be used. And once in the Black Sea there is real danger from German airplanes. The Arctic Ocean route can take advantage of Russia's long desired and now complete ice-free port at Murmansk. Convoys can be assembled at Iceland for the run of some 1700 miles to Murmansk and somewhat farther to Archangel. This route, however, has several drawbacks. Although Murmansk is ice free the year round, Archangel is ice bound seven or eight months of the year, but for a part of these months ice breakers permit shipping to move. The tag end of the Gulf Stream flows along the coast of Lapland, and is responsible for Murmansk and its approaches being free from ice, but this influence peters out before it reaches the White Sea. Near Finnish Border Both Murmansk and Archangel have rail connection with Russia proper, jbut the Murmansk yoad is dangerously near the Finnish border, and there is no guarantee that it will not be cut sooner or later. It is reported that Russia has recently sent General Stern into this area with heavy Soviet reinforcements. General Stern is the man who overcame the Finns in 1940 after other Russian generals failed. In any season of the year an Arctic voyage is not one to be lightly undertaken. Fog, mist, and snow all lessen visibility. Ice will be encountered. Navigational aids are lacking, and for many months of the year the sun will continuously be below the horizon. There is, however, the extensive weather reporting service of the Soviets which is available as vessels near the Russian coastline.

On top of the difficulties presented by Nature will come those resulting from the Nazi occupation of Norway and control of Finland. German submarines, surface raiders, and aircraft operate out of Narvik and other northern Norwegian ports and possibly out

of Petsamo in Finland. The recent British bombing of the Finnish port probably resulted from information the British had received concerning Nazi operations therefrom.

Norway's Possibilities

If the Arctic route is to be used, the British will have to drive the Germans from their occupancy of Northern Norway, and this operation may be contemplated. Reports state that British public opinion is in favour of taking some positive action while the Germans are occupied in Russia. Northern, Norway offers possibilities, as it is not an area which can be easily reached by German reinforcements, and the Norwegians are l-eported to be in almost open revolt. Any German reverse at this time is bound to have repercussions favourable to the Allies, not only in Germany, but elsewhere throughout this turbulent world. A British military expedition to Russia via Murmansk is out of the question, as its logistics will require entirely too much shipping.

While the same restriction does not apply with equal force to a British expedition designed definitely to put Italy out of the war and open the Mediterranean, it would be an attempt fraught with great danger, and for the present at least is probably not being seriously considered. But it is apparent that there can be no safe movement of bulk supplies for Russia by either of the two routes which will be most economical in the use of shipping, until some definite action is taken to rid them of Nazi threats. FThc opinions contained in the above article are those of the writer and are not to be construed as reflecting the views of the Navy Department or of the naval service at large. I

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ODT19411009.2.82

Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24733, 9 October 1941, Page 8

Word Count
1,174

AID FOR RUSSIA Otago Daily Times, Issue 24733, 9 October 1941, Page 8

AID FOR RUSSIA Otago Daily Times, Issue 24733, 9 October 1941, Page 8