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THE NAVAL TREATY

WHY DID ITALY SIGN? SALES OF SHIPS TO FRANCO Italian adherence to the 193 b Naval Treaty is believed in informed quarters here to signify the'completion of a programme providing for the sale of Italian warships to General Francisco Franco to make possible a blockade of the Spanish loyalist coast whenever the Franco belligerency,, is recognised by Britain and France, wrote a Wash ington correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor recently. Italy was a participant in the naval conference which produced the current treaty now in effect between the United States, France and Britain. At the conclusion of the conference, Italy “ initialled " the document, but did not sign. Subsequent!-' negotiations were carried on with London regarding signature. It was finally made a feature of conclusion of the Anglo-Italian accord. In the meantime, it is understood that Italy has carried out a programme of selling warships to General Franco which would have been illegal under the treaty. The treaty forbids the transfer by any means of warships of a signatory to any other country. Since Italy has not beet, a signatory up until this time she has been free to sell such ships to the Spanish insurgents That Italy has done so is reported in informed quarters here, and constitutes a major reason why there is an increasing tendency in American diplomatic circles to disapprove the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco. As soon as such rights are accorded, General Franco’s naval forces are free to establish, if possible, a blockade on the high seas. At present they can operate against commerce only within the three-mile limit of Spanish territorial waters. Fleet Remained Loyal

At the outbreak of the Spanish war the majority of the Spanish Navy remained loyal to the Government. General Franco did not possess adequate naval strength to establish a blockade, even if legal. It was particularly significant that the entire submarine flotilla remained loyal. Since then General Franco is known to have acquired considerable numbers of submarines, destroyers, and small patrol or torpedo boats. It is obvious that he has acquired them from outside sources. , The assumption is, of course, that Italy, not bound by restrictions of the naval treaty, made these ships available to General Franco. Th Italy is willing to enter the naval treaty at this stage is therefore assumed to mean that General Franco has now acquired the necessary naval forces. With this programme complete there is no further serious Italian objection to adherence.

The question now arises in acute form whether General Franco is to be allowed to take advantage of the naval power which ha been made available to him. With his belligerent rights unrecognised, General Franco does not, legally, have any right to stop a merchant ship carrying food into Barcelona, for example, until it enters the three-mile limit.

Shore Batteries Adequate

Shore batteries at Barcelona can give adequate protection to anv friendly ship heading into port from the time it enters the three-mile limit. Therefore, so long as his belligerency is unrecognised. General Franco is not free to establish a strong blockade which would cut off all food and munitions entering loyalist Spain by water. ~ But if Britain and France would recognise the belligerency and withdraw the degree of' protection which they now give shipping on the high seas. General Franco could use his vearships at will against all shipping destined for loyalist * Spanish ports. If he can establish and maintain such a blockade, it is assumed that ultimately he will win the war. due to the inability of agriculture in the loyalist territory to feed the refugeeswollen population in this area. There is an increasing disposition here to feel that such an outcome of the Spanish war would bring German and Italian influences uncomfortably close to Latin-America, where it might Interfere with development of continental solidarity ” —now the key plank in American foreign policy. ■ Therefore. .Britain’s attitude towards the Spanish situation, particularly towards the bestowal of belligerent rights on General Franco, is being watched very closely here.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ODT19390210.2.156

Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 23730, 10 February 1939, Page 15

Word Count
672

THE NAVAL TREATY Otago Daily Times, Issue 23730, 10 February 1939, Page 15

THE NAVAL TREATY Otago Daily Times, Issue 23730, 10 February 1939, Page 15