TRADE IN ARMS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 22832, 17 March 1936, Page 14

TRADE IN ARMS

ROYAL COMMISSION EVIDENCE OF THE 1.C.1. SIR H. M‘GOWAN’S STATEMENT. (From Our Own Correspondent) (By Air Mail) LONDON, February 8. Sir Harry M’Gowan, chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries, and a number of his technical colleagues, were the principal witnesses for several days this week before the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trade in Anns. Sir John Eldon Bankes is chairman of tlie Commission.

Sir Harry M’Gowan emphasised that there was a widespread but utterly fallacious impression that 1.C.1. was essentially an armaments firm engaged to a large extent in the production of war materials. 1.C.1. was, in fact, advantaged more by profits of peace-time operations than by sharp peaks of emergency production. The 1.C.1. itself was a combination of interests, the productions of which covered a very wide field. Its manufacturing activities were divided into eight groups, only two of which —explosives and metals, —were directly concerned with the manufacture of munitions. Even in these two groups, sales of military products were only 5.G per cent, of the turnover. In relation to the total turnover, the total sales of military products in the past five years amounted to 1.8 per cent., while foreign sales were 0.9 per cent. USEFULNESS IN WARTIME.

Referring to the company’s utility to the State, the statement submitted by Sir Harrv M’Gowan emphasised that while not to any material extent engaged during times of peace in the manufacture of military products it had great potential resources for their manufacture.

Although much of its equipment was designed for commercial products, it could be readily converted to other uses.

“ For example," _ the company stated, “we produce considerable quantities of nitric acid, which is a basic material for practically all high explosives manufacture. From the by-products of the hydrogenation of coal for the production of petrol, we can produce certain compounds which enter into particular types of high explosives. Wo manufacture nitro-cellu-lose for industry, but could readily change over to nitro-cellulosc for military explosives.

“ Some of our sporting powder plant could be utilised for military propellants. Our nitrogen plant for the production of fertilisers is capable of being, converted to produce ingredients necessary in certain disruptive explosives. “ Our nitro-glyccrine plant, used in connection with the manufacture of mining and quarrying explosives, could be converted for the production of necessary ingredients for the manufacture of cordite." Under - modern conditions of war it would be impossible for any first-class nation to defend itself without an extensive, highly skilled and perfectly equipped chemical industry, such as 1.C.1. offered. During the war British nitric acid requirements were dependent on the importation of nitrate of soda from Chili and sulphur from America and Spain. Approximately one and a-half tons of nitrate of soda were required for every ton of cordite or T.N.T.

The Government recognised the supreme danger of its position, and decided in 1918 to erect a nitrogen fixation plant at Dillingham. Since the 1.C.1. had taken over this plant test technique had been developed, and a high state of efficiency existed in this industry. The 1.C.1 was not only able to meet all Home requirements, but to obtain world markets. POISON GASES.

“ There is an ill-formed impression,” the statement proceeded, “ that the dyestuffs industry is interested in the production of poison gases. This ia entirely untrue. Our plants and processes are exclusively designed and employed for industrial purposes. “It is, however, a national asset that the knowledge of organic chemistry, the trained personnel, and the varied and flexible plant employed could be used in on emergency to make almost any organic compounds. “ It is not to the interests of dyestuffs makers to devote time and attention to materials to be used for lethal purposes." The statement explained that phenol, obtained as a by-product from gasworks, was used in large quantities in the production of synthetic resins It could bs converted into a pharmaceutical product, a dye intermediate, a dressing for wounds and burns, and a ‘munition of war. Obviously, the organic chemist would focus his attention on the pharmaceutical and industrial aspects of phenol. It was a purely accidental circumstance that its derivative, picric acid, could he used as an explosive in time of war. After giving statistics about the manufacture of sulphuric acid and chlorine, the 1.C.1. said it w r as well known that chlorine was used in the early days of tlie w'ar for .gas attacks. It had not to be overlooked that chlorine, apart from its important role in peaceful pursuits, afforded the only efficient menus of decontamination after a mustard ga« at tack. Consequently, it was a defensive weapon of the highest value, not only to the military, but possibly also to the civilian population. Mustard gas was not produced by the I.C'.L, nor was any other lethal gas for offensive purposes. SHADOW MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS. Much greater benefit and security could be obtained from the establishment of a permanent supervisory body, armed with full powers, to co-ordinate private manufacture and provide auxiliary helpin the erection of purely military factories where the demand was likely to be in excess of the capacity of private concerns. . Sir Harry M'Gowan said that the suggested supervisory body would be a kind of shadow Ministry of Munitions. The suggestion was that the Government would make a complete survey of the capacity of Governmental and industrial concerns, and then decide what policy should be adopted. Behind such a plan the Imperial Chemical Industries would throw its whole resources.

Sr Harry, replying to the chairman, said that no mustard gas or other lethal gases had been produced by 1.C.1. since the war. There had been no export. “None of our research people,” he added, " are busy on poison gases for use in war.”

SUPPLIES FOR JAPAN AND CHINA. Sir Philip Gibbs, in the course of his questions, remarked: “You were endeavouring to get business with Japan, and did deal in certain specialities. These, presumably, were for the invasion of Manchukuo. At the same time you were supplying the Chinese with the same materials of war in order to defend Manchukuo. “It is this system of private sales abroad that has aroused such criticism,” added Sir Philip. Asked if he was responsible for the personal and moral character of 1.C1., agents, Sir Harry replied: “I am afraid not.”

Sir. Philip referred to one man. and said: “Do you know that he was an international spy: that he had acted as agent for 12 different companies; that he was used by the Germans to mine the Dardanelles and Heligoland, and that he was worldua,in close association with von Panen in the United States before the end of the War? ” Another representative of T.C.T. replied that the man was never agent for 1.C.1., but was appointed by Du Pouts.