MODERN SPYING.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 21300, 2 April 1931, Page 5

MODERN SPYING.

SECRETS OF THE WAR. WHEN JOYCE WAS SUSPECT. SOME GRIM HUMOUR. Spying is not nearly as spectacular as it is made to appear in fiction. Yet it is scarcely, less exciting, and it is certainly no loss hazardous. “ Vigilant,” in Secrets of Modern Spying,” has collected a volume of interesting information concerning the German spy system before the war, the work of spies during the war, and the prevailing methods of espionage practised by the Bolshevists, says a writer in the Melbourne Argus. Some of the best passages in the book deal with what the author calls : the humours of spying. Many of the jests recounted are grim; some of them are grisly. One of the best is a joke at the expense of the British. In time of war it is generally advisable to follow the scriptural injunction, never to let the left hand know what the right hand is doing. But there are times when even an intelligence service may obey the maxim too strictly. In the winter of 1914-15 the British Naval Intelligence Service directed its agents to spread a rumour that the British fleet contemplated a descent upon the north-western coast of Germany. Agents in neutral and enemy countries disseminated the false report, and at Portsmouth, Dover, and other naval bases warships performed manoeuvres calculated to lead enemy spies to believe that transports were being assembled to carry an invading army .across the North Sea. When the false reports arrived at Berlin they were accepted unquestioniugly. The fortifications along the German coast were strengthened, heavy guns were dismounted from warships, and were grouped into naval batteries at suitable points, and a long line of trenches was dug hastily from Cuxhaven to Borkum. The British Naval agents reported that trains of German Intelligence Service chuckled when its troops were being hurried to the defence of the north-western coast, when they wore needed so urgently in Slanders. AN OVERSIGHT. ■Unhappily the naval authorities forgot to tell the sister service what it was doing. The military intelligence r service had its own agents in Germany, who saw the assembly of considerable forces on the German coast. The military agents reported these movements to the War Office, which concluded that a plan to invade England had been detected just in time. Largo forces were rushed to the east coast of England, where trenches were dug with feverish haste in situations which the Germans might deem suitable for landing. Thus the British forces in Flanders were deprived of reinforcements also, and the British taxpayers, like the German taxpayers, had to pay for preparations to repel an invasion that was never projected. When the naval intelligence service and the military intelligence service discovered that the army and the navy had been working at cross purposes the authorities agreed that in future all information should be pooled, and that they should tell each other of their plans. The censors’ department did splendid work during the war. Even in the first few weeks of hostilities the censors passed on much valuable information to the naval and military authorities. The promptitude with which they took advantage of any slip made by a spy in his correspondence led to the undoing of several German agents in England. The scientists in the censors’ department found chemical preparations that revealed all invisible inks, and experts unravelled many a code which the inventor had deemed insoluble. On one occasion, however, the experts were completely and, ignominiously baffled. One of the refugees in Switzerland in the early stages of the war was James Joyce, the author. At the beginning of the war Joyce earned his living as a teacher of English in Trieste. The Austrian authorities allowed him to remain in Trieste until the spring of 1915. CODE SUSPECTED, When Italy entered the war all the subjects of the Allies were either expelled from the town ,or interned. Joyce obtained permission to leave Austria on parole, and to live in Switzerland for the duration of hostilities. With him he took the incomplete manuscript of “Ulysses.” He finished the book in the autumn of 1017. He arranged for his work to appear as a serial in an English magazine and an American magazine, which were circulated privately. The typescript was sent away chapter by chapter as Joyce revised it. The first instalments arrived safely, and they were printed. . After a long delay the editors of the two journals, wrote to complain that no further instalments had arrived. Eventually the missing packages arrived after some weeks, during which the subscribers to the magazines had expressed considerable annoyance. After the war the reason for the delay became known. The literary style of “ Ulysses ” was so baffling to the censor’s staff that the experts suspected that it was a coded report disguised as a novel. In the end, however, the decoders and decipherers had to' admit themselves beaten. They suggested that after all the typescript might be what it purported to be —a modern novel. A literary expert was summoned to the censor’s office. After a long study he declared gravely that the matter bore some faint resemblance to literature. So “ Ulysses ” was set free. BOTH SIDES. Despite its extraordinary efficiency the German system of espionage was by no means infallible. One joke kept Switzerland laughing at the expense of the Germans for months. In 1917 both the Allies and-the Central Powers found that their supplies of munitions were unequal to the requirements of their armies in the field. Independently, but almost simultaneously, they hit upon the idea of establishing munition factories in neutral countries. In Switzerland the watchmaking industry of Geneva, Neuchatel, and Biel had suffered a heavy slump because it was isolated from their customary markets. The directors of several companies were happy, therefore, to negotiate with the belligerents. At first some opposition on pacifist grounds was offered by the Swiss Socialist Party, but the fact that the war had thrown large numbers of workers out of employment was an argument which the Socialists could not combat. In one instance there were two companies with adjacent premises, one working for the Central Powers and one for the Allies. The output of one factory went northward to Basel, whence it was conveyed to the German armies; the product of the other factory went southward to Geneva, and thence across the frontier to the guns of the French. Switzerland has neither coal mines nor iron mines. She has always depended upon Germany for these minerals. Despite the depletion of her man power, Germany found it convenient during the war to supply Switzerland with goal and iron, for by a system of barter she received in exchange large quantities of Swiss butter, milk, and cheese.

No conditions were imposed, for the fact that German coal warmed the premises of the British Legation at Berne and the premises of the British Consulates in every large Swiss town was not worth bothering about. But it is amazing that for three months the German agents in Switzerland appeared to remain blind to the fact that, German coal. was being used in the factories which were supplying the Allies with munitions. The factory workers knew it and laughted about it daily; it was a joke that never failed to cause a laugh in the most depressing times. From the munition towns the jest spread all over Switzerland. After the three months.the Swiss Board that controlled the importation of the coal and iron was notified that in future consignments would be permitted only upon condition that the coal, was not distributed among factories which were working, for the enemies of Germany. Whether the German agents were at fault or whether red tape prevented earlier action is not known. It is possible that' officers at headquarters declined to credit the truth. This was an error which was made frequently on. both sides. There is no doubt that the British tanks which occasioned such surprise when they first appeared on the battlefields were seen by German spies in England, but the German General Headquarters obdurately refused to believe that they existed until the new arm of warfare was brought into action. Even then the tanks were regarded as a myth by those who had not seen them. One of the first tanks was blown to pieces by a direct hit. The sole survivor of the crew was so overcome by his experience that in a state of hysteria which lasted for many days, he told his captors every detail of the structure of the new war machine. So accurate was his description that German engineers made a model from it, but the report that the intelligence officers sent to the War Office at Berlin was tossed aside contemptuously as being too incredible .for belief. COSTLY UNBELIEF. An Alsatian deserter who came to the French trenches told the details of a forthcoming attack by the Germans. His story appeared to bo too complete and too detailed to be true. The French suspected him of being a German spy. They sent their prisoner to the base under strong guard and paid no heed to bis warnings. The Germans attacked as he had said they would, and the French received a serious beating. Among the grim stories told by the author is that of the officers in the British Intelligence Service who contrived to make the Germans buy them a motor car. Muller, a Russian, who was arrested while he was endeavouring to obtain information concerning the movements of the British Fleet in the North Sea, was executed in the Tower of London in the summer of 1915. The clumsiness of a confederate betrayed Muller, who communicated with his employers by means of an ingenious code by advertisements which he inserted in provincial newspapers. The German Intelligence Service did not know of the execution of Muller. There was no reason to become apprehensive concerning his silence, for.it is one of the first principles. of spying that an agent working in enemy country must lie low for a time if he has reason , to suspect that the counter spies of the enemy are on his track. He suspends operations and refrains from communicating with his employers. As the British Intelligence. Service knew the name of Muller’s confederate in Amsterdam, a budget of information was concocted and despatched by the usual code. To their joy, the officers in the British Intelligence Service found that Muller had been paid by results, . A substantial sum of money arrived- at the address at Deptford of Peter Hahn, the AngloGerman accomplice, whose carelessnesshad betrayed Muller and had earned for himself a sentence of seven years’ penal servitude.. The game went on until eventually the British officers over-reached themselves. A sharp intimation was, sent that no further payments could be made until the statements. had been confirmed. With the £4OO which they had “earned” by pulling the German’s leg, the British officers bought a motor car which they named “The Muller.”