THE SECURITY PROBLEM

Otago Daily Times, Issue 20322, 2 February 1928, Page 9

THE SECURITY PROBLEM

DR STRESEMANN’S SPEECH. INSPIRED BY EX-CHANCELLOR. (Press Association—By Telegraph—Copyright.) LONDON, February 1. (Received Feb. 1, at 11 p.m.) .The Daily Telegraph’s diplomatic correspondent says it is understood that Dr Stressemann’s speech was really inspired by Dr Wirth’s discovery during his recent visit to Paris that M. Paul Boncour and practically all the French Radicals and Moderate Socialists advocate that any evacuation of the Rhineland earlier than the Treaty dates should be conditional on Germany’s acceptance of a permanent International Commission of Control for the area thus demilitarised. Dr Wirth, on returning to Berlin, immediately acquainted Dr Stresseman, who, after consultation with Dr Marx and others, decided not to lose a moment in making it clear to France and the world than Germany would never countenance per manent foreign supervision of the Rhineland. The correspondent expresses the opinion that Germany might be willing, however, to agree to substitute supervision for occupation up to the Treaty ports.—A. and N.Z. Cable. “ Are the words and might of England valueless to the Frenchmen who clamour for still greater security? Does anybody doubt the ability of England and France to cope with the Reichswehr or England to keep her pledged word?” asked Dr Stresseman (Minister for Foreign Affairs) in a recent speech. He declared that no country outstripped Germany in solving the security problem. It was hypocrisy to demand security against Germany, which could scarcely defend her own frontiers and the lives of her inhabitants. It had been repeatedly declared that cannon and matchine guns must disappear, but they were directed against a nation co-operating with the League, and with which international and political differences were non-existent. English voices more loudly asked why British troops were still in the Rhineland, and English publicists regarded the continued occupation as a misfortune. Germany would not reject a discussion on the conti'ol of the frontier, but would not buy evacuation of the Rhineland with obligations exceeding those of Versailles, and so perpetuating mistrust and prejudicing an effective peace policy.