THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19014, 9 November 1923, Page 6

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

AUSTRALIANS DRAWN IN. “THE CRIME WAS NOT TO PERSEVERE.” THE SECOND VOLUME OF WINSTON CHURCHIT L’S MEMOIRS. Copyright. Rights of Production Acquired by the Otago Daily Times. V. After the meeting was over, we adjourned for several hours. Although the \V<h* Council Jkul come to a -decision wim Tv'liich 1 heartily agreed, and no voice, had ticeu raised against the naval plan, I thought 1 must come to a clear understanding with the First Sea Lord. bad noticed r lie incident of his leaving the table and Lord Kitchener following him to the window and arguing with him. and I did not know what was the upshot in his mind. After lunch 1 asked him to come and see me in my room, and we had a long talk. I strongly urged him not to turn back from the Dardanelles operations; and in the end. after a long and very friendly discussion, which covered the whole Admiralty and naval position, he definitely consented to undertake it. There never has been any dispute between us subsequently as to this. “When 1 finally decided to go in.” said Lord Fisher to the Dai dandles Commissioners, ”1 went the whole hog. totus porous.” Wo then repaired to the afternoon War Council meeting. Admiral Oliver, Chief of the Staff, coming with us. and I announced on behalf of the Admiralty and with the agreement of Lord Fisher that v.e had decided to undertake the task with which the AVar Council had charged us so urgently. This I look ns the point of final decision'. After it I never looked back. We had left ihe region of discussion _ and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The matter had passed into the domain of action. I am in no way concealing the great and continuous pressure -which I put upon the old Admiral. This pressure was reinforced by Lord Kitchener’s personal influence, by the collective opinion of tbe War Council, and by the authoritative decision of the Prime' Minister. It was a pressure, not only of opinion, which was overwhelming, but of arguments to which he could find no answer. Moreover, there was in addition on the technical side a very great weight of support at the Admiralty. Naval opinion was unanimous,” said Lord Fisher afterwards; “Mr Churchill had them all on his side. I was the only rebel.” Let us now see exactly what it was the Admiralty had committed itself to do. We. had undertaken to begin a serious bombardment of ihe Dardanelles forts, and to attempt, without the aid of an army, by a new and gradual method of piecemeal reduction, to fight our way slowly into the Marmora. But we believed we could with- | draw from this operation at almost any stage if the difficulties and the Turkish resistance proved unexpectedly great. And so far as the Admiralty was concerned—apart, that is to say, from general consideration of policy and prestige—we could indisputably -have broken off the operation at any point; and we did in fact do so, to my great regret, after March ±B. USING CONDEMNED SHIPS. Further, the ships wo proposed to risk were almost all of them valueless for any otner purpose. Four of them, indeed, had already been condemned to be scrapped, and most of the others were of similar type. Had they not been used in this way they would have rusted in our southern dockyards. They were fit only for sibsidiary bombarding 'operations. They were surplus to all the' vessels by which our supremacy %t sea was maintained. It would have been simple murder of their crows to put them where modern German battleships mignt catch them. They were quite useless for a fleet action. Yet here in the Dardanelles these old vessels might, if all went well, change the history of the world, cut the Turkish Empire In' two, paralyse its capital, unite the Balkan States against our enemies, rescue Serbia, help the Grand Duke in the main operations of the war. and by shortening iis durtion save countless lives. Ye had undertaken this operation, not fie-ause we thought it was the ideal method of attack, but because we were tokl_ that no military force was available, and in response to the appeals for help from Lord K'tehner and the Grand Duke. We had undertaken it with our surplus resources after we had successfully and fully discharged and nrovided for all those great duties of tlie navy —the safety of the British Isles. Ihe clearance of the seas, the protection ’of commerce, the transportation of troops —for which perhaps the Admiralty deserved some measure of confidence and gratitude. So far as 1 am concerned. I undertook this task out of a sincere wish to aid the common cause, and to make the weight p| the navy'tell as effectively as possible. This. I thought, was my duty. Searching my heart, I cannot regret the effort. It was good to go as far as we did. The crime was not to persevere. . Mr Churchill’s that 10 divisions. including two Australian divisions in Ecvpt, wero available for moving to (he Dardanelles at any moment in January, 1915. elicited a letter to The Times from Lord Kitchener’s biographer. George Arthur, who says that most of the divisions were not trained for such a purpose. For example, the Australians had only recently landed in Egypt, and had received no sort of divisional training. Kitchener cannot be blamed for the delav in despatching the 29th Division, because .Toffre telegraphed to London that unless this division was kept in France he would refuse the responsibility of keening ihe Allied line intact. Mr Churchill replies. saying that if .Toffre said such a thimr it'was without justification. Also. Kitchener should not have been misled Thereby. It was an example of the nmvar---anted rumours spread by the French Staff, with the natural object of keeping as many troops as possible in France. “NO TROOPS AVAILABLE. Up to this point, in the story of the Dar. dandles the "War Council and the Admiralty had accepted nnquestioningly the basis that no troops were available for offensive operations against Turkey. It was on that foundation alone .that all our decisions in favour of a purely naval attack had boon taken but henceforward a series of new facts and pressures Rune into play which gradually but unceasingly changed the character and enormously extended the scale of the enterprise. Under thc.-o influences, in less than two months tbe naval, attack, -with its lack of certainty, but with its limited costs and risks, became subsidiary, and in its place there aro-e a military development of great magnitude. Over this pew'plan the Admiralty bail no responsible control. Our advice did not prevail; our criticisms were, not welcomed; and even inquiries became a matter of delicacy and tact. Nevertheless, by ihe results of lln-t military operation, we had to stand or fall. After all. there was an army. The decisien to abandon or postpone indefinitely Che advances along ‘/be Belgian coast liberated portions of the reinforcements destined for Sir John French. The feeble character of the Turkish attack on Egypt and its repulse liberated the greater part of the army concentrated there. _ The continued improvornent in the training of the ■Australian and Territorial troops in this aiTnv increasingly fitted them for offensive operations. The suppression of the rebellion in .South Africa bad removed other anxieties. Meanwhile the First and Second of ihe Now Armies tin all 12 divisions) were improving in training and progressing in equipment. A number of Territorial divisions fully equipped and in good order, whose training was now advanced, wero also available at The large numbers of armed and organised soldiers in tlio United Kingdom should have removed all apprehension of oversea invasion. At, intervals during the next three months there were actually ordered to the Dardandles; — , , From England. ■ The 29th Division. . . - Two first-line Territorial divisions. The Roval Naval Division._ A Yoo/nanry mounted division. From Egypt, Two Australian divisions. One extra Australian brigade. The Lancashire Territorial division. One Indian brigade. From France. Two French divisions.