STOLEN GOODS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18556, 17 May 1922, Page 5

STOLEN GOODS

PAWNBROKERS’ -RISKS. AN INTERESTING JUDGMENT, (From Due Own Correspondent.) WELLINGTON, May 16. A reserved judgment of considerable interest was delivered in the 'Magistrate’s Court this morning by Mr W. G. Riddell, S.M., the case being that in which O. B. Kline, a wholesale and manufacturing jeweller, took action against the Anchor Exchange and Loan Company for the recovery of certain gems in the possession of the Jptter firm. “Some months ago," said the magistrate, “the plaintiff handed a number of diamonds to Julius Mailer,, a working' jeweller, to manufacture certain articles of jewellery. Mailer wrongly appropriated a number of the diamonds and gold and pawned those mentioned in the statement of claim with the defendant company, which advanced him the sum of £36. Mailer was later convicted of theft -in the Supreme Court, and application was made there on behalf of the Crown, for an order under Section 451 of the Crimea Act, 1908, that the stolen goods be handed to the owner on payment of the amount advanoed. Counsel for Kline opposed auoh an order, and the court held that where stolen goods bad been pawned, and the pawnbroker was in no way blameworthy, a summary order under Section 451 should be withheld, unless the owner submitted to conditions requiring him to contribute to the pawnbroker’s loss in that case. Mr Justice Reed said that Section 451 of the Crimes Act was enacted for the benefit of owners of stolen goods. It enabled the court, whore the accused had been convicted and the ownership of the goods 3 was clear, to make an order which saved the owner the expense of bringing a substantive action for their recovery, but nothing in the Act purported to take from the owner his ordinary legal rights to recover his property if he .did not wish to invoke the powers conferred by Section 451. No order made thereunder without the owner’s consent had any effect in limiting his right to recover his property by ordinary legal remedies. No order was made by the court, as it considered the case was one where the owner should bear ■ part. of the loss which had fallen on the pawnbroker, and this he refused to do. Defendants have net handed the goods to plaintiff in response to his demand, and plaintiff is now suing defendants civilly for their return, or, in default, their value (£7O), Section 26 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1906, enacts that where goods have been stolen and the offender is prosecuted end convicted, the property in the goods so stolen reverts in the person who was the owner of the goods, or his personal representative, notwithstanding- any intermediate dealing with them by sale in market, overt or otherwise. From this it is clear that the property in these goods is vested in plaintiff. A perusal of the cases shows that the law on the point is definite, that if no order of restitution is made by the court convicting the accused, or if an order subject to a condition is mode without the oonsent of the owner, he can disregard it and successfully sue in the civil courts for the return of his goods. At the hearing it was suggested that as defendants were in no way to blame in the matter, the court might consider whether its equitable jurisdiction should not bo applied in order to minimise defendants’ loss. The value of the goods claimed is outside the equitable jurisdiction of the court, but even if their value were fixed at the amount originally set out in the statement of claim, I do not think that the case is one where the court’s equitable jurisdiction can *be invoked. The rights of the parties in law are so clear that equitable principles do not apply. Defendants will suffer a loss over the dealing, but that is one which must be included among the risks of their business.” Judgment was entsred for plaintiff, and the defendants were ordered to return the goods to plaintiff by 3 p.m. on May 17. In default, judgment would be entered in plaintiff’s favour .for £7O, with costs.