THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17484, 28 November 1918, Page 5

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

VON SANDERS'S CRITICISMS

THE EVACUATION OPERATIONS.

SKILFULLY CARRIED OUT.

LONDON, November 26. Mr Ward Price writes from Constantinople : — I have interviewed General Liman von Sanders, who said that he found the British a brave and chivalrous enemy, both in. _ the Dardanelles and Palestine camH® says that he telegraphed to Ludendorff in August that unless he received reinforcements there was nothing/to prevent a debacle. The Turkish weakness was due to their sending their available reserves to Azerbaijan, in Persia, for the conquest of the Caucasus, the Turks insisting on doing this despite German protests. L

Discussing the British strategy at the Dardanelles, von Sanders said: " The naval attack on the Straits could not have succeeded owing to the mines. I proposed to nood the straits broadcast with mines, lhe function of the forts was simply to Protect the minefields from interference. ,V been attacking the Dardanelles I would not have landed at Cape Helles or Anzac Cove, but would have made my principal landing on the coast of Asia Minor, off lenedos. Such a landing would give a convenient base close at hand, while a two-days' march would have brought the Allies to the rear of the Dardanelles forts, which can only fire seawards. At the same ri 13 !?* have landed on the neck of Galiipoli Peninsula, close to Bulair. So strongly did I expect you to choose these places that, when I took command months before the landing, I posted two of my six divisions opposite Tenedos, two on Gallipoh Peninsula, and two at' Bulair. "In regard to the Suvla' Bay landing I would have preferred to land between f Anzac Cove and Cape Helles, where the peninsula is narrower, and the Turks could then have been attacked from their rear. -ilanding at Suvla might have succeeded it it had been pressed hard. Only two battalions of Turkish gendarmes, two squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries with old guns were there to oppose it during the first 24 hours. If the British troops had pushed inland with several columns, some of the troops would have made good their positions on the heights. I hurried up a Turkish division by forced marches.

There was another critical moment when the push was made for Chunuk Bair. J^ us hed up 3> division from the Asiatic side, and it would have been blown to pieces by the British guns if it had arrived half an hour later. Onlv three battalions were then left' on the Asiatic side, where great anxiety was felt lest there should boil fresh British landing. It was also touch and go at Kirech Keuy, on the north side of an via Bay, where the Allies attacked three-days after the landing." Yon Sanders expected a withdrawal from the peninsula after Lord Kitchener's visit, and he entirely agreed with the wisdom of the decision. " The Turks," he said were constantly being reinforced, and at the end I had 21 divisions. The withdrawal was extremely well carried out The concealment devices at Suvla were most effective. Our patrols on the last sighted, red flares on the bea/ch 5 and thought for a while that fresh troops were being landed. When news was received that the British positions were empty I galloped from headquarters to organise a pursuit, but the Turkish telephones were so bad that I was unsuccessful. The Turks, advancing in the fog, stumbled into British land mines, and suffered heavy losses. Ninety mines were found in front of a single division. Yon Sanders said he saw the preparations for the evacuation of Helles, but he was unable to guess the date when it would, be carried out.