NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17322, 23 May 1918, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Bt Sheapnxl, IMPERATIVE CONSIDERATIONS. The present purpose or strategy of the Germans is to produce a stato of military fog amongst the Allies on the west Iront, and, in fact, ull round in. all theatres of war. J'h;*y are themselves pulling things together and consolidating the political, economic, and strategical position of the Central Powers and their dupes. Though the Germans havo had a hard task to organise and construct effective communications on the shell-torn terrain which they had overrun in I'ranee, they have had sufficient time, through tho pfTorts of their splendid pioneer battalions and oL innumerable impressed labourers, to ma'o good all drawbacks. Where they have been hampered is behind their lines, in the regions which are within rango of the hc-avy artillery of the Allies, and in the areas which are frequently visited by the Allies' bombing planes. In the respite which the enemy has been compelled to allow them, the Allies have not only gathered together largo reserves, but havo posted them at points where they will bo within easy call in case of necessity. General Foch and Sir Douglas Haig havo also had time to study their defensive positions and to strengthen their lines by seizing points of vantago and removing the Germans from positions which weakened the Allied front. The Germans havo not been deprived of all good positions,—as, for instance, that of Kemmcl, those south of Ypres and at La Bassee, and those along the Montdidier sector. Tho previous offensive, so desperately overcome in the final bouts, must have left the Allies in a number of strongly defensible areas, and with the i time they have had at their disposal, they will have organised and improved their defensive positions to such an extent that contemplation of the possible losses in the ?t X u °^ onsiVG ma y be giving the German High Commands cause for thought, and may havo led to a recasting of the naturo direction of their next step. Since the Allies have been greatly reinforced by trained levies and new troops from America, tho Germans may, except for operations to obtain country that will enable their armies to keep Germany and tho most parts of her conquests •■free from invasion, abandon the hope of obtaining any military decision this year. If it be true, however, that Marshal von Mackensen is on the west front and that tho Germans possess shock troops, to the estimated number of about a million and a-half, of whom 40 divisions are fresh forces, there is ground for the belief that Germany is about to make another great bid for supremacy or to create the impression amongst tho Allies that their case is one of continuous stalemate and therefore that it is useless to continue the war. Before the Germans can obtain such a condition they must clear the French out of the Champagne. Verdun, and also all the country south of St. Mihiel and east of the Meuse where German Lorraine is open to invasion. In order that she may maintain her industrial and military power Germany must retain the coal and iron fields of North France and Belgium, and the immensely valuable iron resources of Briey Longwy, and the Metz districts of Lorraine! It is, however, an international condition of future safety that she should bo shorn of the means of making war in the near future. THE ITALIAN FRONT. It will bo interesting to see which offensive comes first—that against the Allies in France or that against tho , Italians. Weather conditions and their own brilliant defence have gained for the Italians much valuable timo during which they have established great reserves, replaced their lost guns, and organised their tactics and defence. Man for man, the Italian soldier can more than hold his own against the Austrians; and in the air the Italians are very daring and superior to the Austrians. Unless very strong forces of Germans unexpectedly show themselves on the Italian front, when the offensive commences there, the Italians will meet the shock, even if compelled to give some ground, and in the end defeat it. Austria'is in such a conditoin that she cannot alone maintain a long and desperate struggle; and the more Germany has to assist her weak-kneed ally the worse it will be for Germany. The Italians are not in such good tactical positions as tho Austrians, and therefore may be forced to make a strategical retreat, but that will not mean that Austria has become definitely victorious. The stato of affairs in the Central Empires is that from now forward every desperate engagement of great magnitude leaves them weaker. Austria's case is worse than Germany's. Italy is stronger than Austria in man power, and the great financial allied Powers will see to it that she is not left without the wherewithal to continue the struggle until Austria faints or bursts up. The subject races of Austria aro now of a temper that ill-disposes them to bo sacrificed for their oppressors or for German ends. HARASSED ENEMY COMMAND. Advices from Washington state that the German Government is having tho greatest difficulty in explaining why the promised successful operations in Franco are not being carried out, and why the offensive against the Italians has not been begun. This suggests that Germany may lia% r e .her hands forced if the disillusionment spreads and tho consequent political and social discontent increases. When the High Commands of any forces are compelled through political unrest and interference to undertake prematurely operations of a critically serious nature they are much handicapped, because time is required to evolve, to the smallest details, a plan which may bo worked out along mathematically correct lines. The perfection of the modern machinery of war and the science of defence demand that there should bo no weak links in the chain of developments. Premature actions involve belated suocour and supply at important points or at critical moments, and one failure on a small sector may involve tho whole theatre of operations in confusion and defeat. When von Kluok was close to the gates of Paris ho had more men than the Allies, but he was in a groat hurry. His speed of advance increased tho difficulties of supply behind his lines, but that complication was not the chief factor of his defeat. It was tho failure of tho Crown Prince to advance towards the Camp do Chalons, south-west of the Champagne Ho was defeated in the Argonne. THE DANGER IN THE EAST. If it were not for the rapid movement of Prussian ism among tho finances and material resources of Russia, the curee of Russia —Bolshevism and treachery—might be allowed to work its own cure. The penetration of Russia by tho enemy forces and agents is a danger that cannot be overlooked. There still exists in Russia the great power of the reactionaries, paralysed, of course, for tho present, and if no "help reaches Russia in time Germany will gather that power under its banner. Agents of Teutons aro powerful in the! counsel and the actions of the Bolshevist leaders and encourage them in their vain hopes of " western revolution," of which Lenin speaks. It is not a revolution in Central Europe that ho seeks. These agents also proclaim loudly the destruction of the bourgeoisie in order to throw them on to the side of their only possible deliverers, the Germans. One bold stroke just now would brinj? about tho overthrow of Trotsky, Lenin, ;uid Kameneff, and that stroke could be most rapidly and effectively delivered by way of Persia and Mosul. That is quite clear to the German master-minds, and with all possible speed, with the help of the Turks. Kurds, and Persians, they aro outting' across tho most palpable line of least resistance—that is, towards the southern shores of the Caspian Sea and Turkestan. The Bolster ists aro trying to aid them by declaring Turkestan a republic, in order that oarly-bird Germans may make negotiations with tho Mohammedans of that country. ____________