INDIAN FRONTIER TROUBLE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 14211, 12 May 1908, Page 5

INDIAN FRONTIER TROUBLE

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TIM

MQHMANDS,

THE AFGHANS RECALLED,

Press Association.—By Telegraph.—Copyright

CALCUTTA, May 10.

General Willcocks, with two brigades, ■has received orcleitt to proceed against the Mohmands, who liave failed to obey the summons to attend at Jirgah.

TEE AMEER'S ORDERS. LONDON, May 11.

(Received May 11, at 10 p.m.) Renter's Simla, correspondent. states that tlva Ameer Las assured tho Indian Government that he has issued stringent orders recalling the, Afghans who erased the frontiers, and that he has directed tho officials to prevent the Afghans giving assistance to the tribesmen who are operating against the British.

, The military correspondent, of The Times, m the earlier stages of the Za-kka Kliol campaign, wrote:—"ln justice to the military authorities in India, it must also be stated that tho Anglo-Indian army has nothing whatever to do with frontier policy o; with any failure to police the border in an effectual manner. Ever since the North-west Frontier Province was created in 1901 the control on the border lias boon exorcised by an official appointed by, and directly responsible to, the Government of India. Tho wholo of tho tribal militia, levies, and military police on the border have been, and aTe, under civil authority and control. All frontier relations, whether civil or semi-military, ha.c been, and arc, under the immediate control of the Government of India. Tho Anglo-Indian army is called upon to act in aid of the civil power which has exhausted all other means of repression and redress. As the military authorities are in no way responsible for frontier policy or for its results, neither arc they responsible for any extension of the area, ot distur' ice which may follow from the order given them to act, except in so far as such extension may bo proved to result directly from military execution inefficiently performed, within the limits of orders received from higher authorities. " But when tho civilian rails upon the soldier to tict, then tho latter can very properly ask for a free hand to carry out the mission imposed upon him in such a manner that the work may bo thoroughly done, and that all may not havo to be recommenced a few months or a few years later. Ever sinco we crqssed tho Indus our punitive policy with regard to the tribes north of tho Gonial has been one of raid and scuttle. Wo havo fought with tho tribes, we have demolished their houses, ravaged their country, captured their herds, and destroyed their crops. In only a small minority of cases has a useful and enduring result been obtained, while, on tho other hand, wo have firmly implanted in each savage bo6om an abiding heritage of bate. At the first opportune moment these sentiments find moans for prompt expression, and so it must continue till tho cud of tho chapter or until we change our ways." As to the Bazar Valley campagn, " there is nothing to prevent the withdrawal of non-combatants into the Bara Valley and beyond or even into Afghanistan, and all wo are likely to lnoßt is fighting men who, if thoy follow the precedent of 1897, will give way beforo every advance, snipo our camps by night, and harass our columns on their return march. As in 1897 also tho tribesmen will in this case consider they have driven us out of their country, and thty will becomo more insolent and aggressive than before. , . . There is no middle couise between two extremes. Either we should remain where we are and take more effectivo measures to deal with raiders, or we should occupy and administer thfc Bazar Valley in a permanent manner. No soldier who knows anytiiing of tho frontier can affirm that a fortnight of raid and souttlein Bazar will havo any serious chance of bringing malefactors to justice or of improving in any way tho present state of affairs. It is consequently not reasonable to suppose that any soldier of experience has either recommended or initiated the pending operation in Bazar."