LAND SETTLEMENT CONDITIONS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 12472, 1 October 1902, Page 3

LAND SETTLEMENT CONDITIONS.

AN IMPORTANT POINT. (Per United Press Association.) WELLINGTON, September 30. The 1 Chief -Justice and a special jury of four were engaged to-day on a case of considerable interest, being an appeal from a decision of the "Wellington Land Board. This was 'the appeal of Fairfield Thompson, whose section in'the Aorangi block, near Feilding, held under lea-Re in perpetuity under " The Land Act, 1892," was forfeited by the board on the ground of non-com-pliance with the residential conditions of the act. Much of the morning was spent with an unsettled difference of opinion between the Chief Justice and Mr Myers, counsel for the Crown, as to the meaning of the act's definition of residence. Tho interpretation says that " ' Residence,' wherever required by this act, moane the home of the lessee or licensee of any Crown lands, or, with the consent of the board, tho home of the family of such lessee or licensee; and any suoh home shall be a habitable house, to be approved of by the board." Mr Myers's contention wa3 that residence, according to this, meant (down to " or") the home of the lessee and his family. Next, it might alternatively be, subject to the board's consent, the home of the family alone, such as iii the case of a lessee himself being able to get work elsewhere and his family being competent to work the section. Next, that the home must in any case be a habitable house, approved by the board. His Honor differed entirely as to Hie first part of the reading—viz., that in case of residence by a lessee his family should reside with him, and that in tlio event of the failure of the family, to do so the board has power to forfeit, ih's Honor could see nothing in the act compelling tho residence of tho family along with the resident lessee, and pointed out cases in which it might be advisable-for a wife to live, in town with the children in order to educate them. Mr Myers, in reply to this, said the board would not exercise its power unreasonably, but would meet suoh cases. His Honor considered it was a question of power,- not reasonableness. The board could not bo left to ,do as it pleased without authority in, law. Mr Myers pointed out that oona fide settlement was the object of the Legislature and the policy of the statutes. The keynote of the present land legislation was residence. Previous to 1892 it had been improvement and residence. His Honor pointed out that residence had been compulsory under some clauses of the act as far back as 1877.. He did not see how the Land Board had anything to do with where a family resided, and why, if the lessee resided on his (section, the family could not reside on adjoining sections. Counsel then went on to explain that appellant's wife owned a section on one side of the river, and the section in dispute, formerly held by. appellant, was on the other bank of the stream, directly opposite. The stream being fordable, stock could thus be grazed on appellant's section and brought back to his wife's, so that apcellant could work this section with his wife's farm. Section 142 of the act, which authorised the board to exempt from residential conditions in cases where two leases were contiguous (intervention of a road or river not being a bar to,contiguity), did not apply to this case, as two properties were held by a man and wife. The block was purchased by the Government under "The Land for. Settlements Act, 1891," and w-iw thus cut up under lease in perpetuity. The section in dispute was one of the finest and of 177 acres, on which appellant had erected as a blind -a two-roomed house or wharey in which, up to the date of forfeiture (December 19), there had been no attempt of Iris wife and family to reside, though prior to that appellant and some of his younger boys had occasionally slept there. The occupation' by appellant's wife and family was subsequent to December 19. Respondent submitted (subject to the point raised as to the necessity of residence of the family) that appellant's family had not resided on 'the section, and also submitted that even appellant himself had not resided prior to forfeiture. After hearing evidence, His Honor explained to the jury that thei'e were two important questions of law, which would be reserved for future consideration —tho first as to whether anything more than personal residence was necessary; the second as to whether there had been a waiver.. Th>» questions of fact for the jury to determine were:—(l) Did appellant personally reside on the property from April 9to December 19?, (2). Has he personally resided there from December 19 to the pr-Asent time? The Jury answered both questions in the affirmative. Judgment was reserved until the legal points involved are argued.