BRITISH UNREADINESS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 11933, 5 January 1901, Page 7

BRITISH UNREADINESS.

MINISTERIAL MUDDLING. Mr H. W. Lncy, the London correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald, write 3: — . When a confiding public were first awakened to the fact that her Majesty's Government, ignorant of or underrating the resources of the Boers, was wofully unprepared for war in South Africa, questions were naturally asked in Parliament as to what the Intelligence department had been doing. This branch of the service occupies towards the War Office the position of scouts attached to a column in a hostile country. What was the use of the Intelligence department if they had no intelligence to convey? Pressed oil this point, Mi' Brodrick, then Undersecretary for War, boldly answered that the Intelligence department wns thoroughly up to Boer preparaand had conveyed full information to the Government. Aβ acceptance of this , assertidn involved the incredible assumption that the Government, knowing what was before them, were content witfrmnking arrangements which for more than two months imperilled the safety of British South Africa, it was regarded as a chivalrous defence by the Under-EGcretary of a section of his department. I have had the opportunity of conversing with one of the highest authorities on thn subject, and find that it is the incredible that occurred. Mr Brodrick- was literally correct in his assertion.- The Intelligence deuartment have for the last four years kept close observation upon Mr Kruger's agents on the Continpnt and ih the Transvanl. According to my informant, they had precise particulars of every ? nn delivered to the order of the Transvaal Government. They knew the prohaWe number of burghers who would take the* field—knowledge confirmed by the event. They iil»o rioted and recorded the steady influx of foreign mercenaries waiting the word to fall to. In July of last year, earlier warnings being disregarded, a formal communication was made for the consideration of the Cabinet advising the despatch of a large force fully equipped, estimated to he sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the first onrush of the Boers

As wo know too well, nothing was done. When on October 12 in last year the Bocrj crossed the frontier they were confronted by 12,000 men, poorly armed. To make matters worse, this small force was broken up in two detachments. Four thousand stood for a while at Glencoe, soon to be swept away by the flood of the Boer invasion; the remaining 8000 were encamped at Ladysmith. If the Boers had carried out their original plan of campaign and marched straight on to the sea, nothing could have saved Durban and Capetown. ' It is admitted even in Downing street that the Hoirit Administration terribly bluhdered. To err is human: but there is something qniti? inhuman in the state of things here disclosed; showing that blunders were committed with foreknowledge of what they must lead to. This is a serious statement,'not to bo made upon mere tumour. I repeat that I have the highest authority for it. Officers arid officials directly connected with the Intelligenne department Ate. of couree, tonguetied. But it is not the least regrettable incident in a bad business that a body of men who faithfully did their appointed duty should lie under the charge of being worse Hum uselesi--4atally misleading. General Biiller, in a speech delivered At Pietermaritzburg on the eve of his departure from Natal, prit the matter in three sentences: "I landed at the Capeon October 31 lest, year," h<? said. "I wbb a general without an araiv. The army was to follow." This was 39 dnvs after the Boer forces had crossed the frontier, Not since the Crimean war has giieh. a terrible indictment been brought against a Government; -Tust a year ago, when the country first began to realise the dangerbiw muddle in which it had been landed, >a Onni. servative Peer, ft powerful buttress of the Government, gloomily discussing the situation.' said: "If there is any unnecessary lose of life owing to our hopelera condition, there is ono Minister who ought to be impeached." No one at the table ventured to ask who was the ctilnrit. Later such nersirtent nnd cirenmetantial attacks were made, chiefly in tftiionist circles, airainst the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Sir Michael Hicfcj-Beach found it desirable to make an opportiinitv For publidv denying that h« was personally responsible. At the Intelligence department, and generally at the War Office, it w»S certainly understood that the reasofi why timely' preparation was hot made was because th<i sury objected to find the money. But no Alinirtry can shift its responsibility u))on hn individual collftaßiie. Especially in.a matteflf momentous interest eiich hs this the Cabinet would net as a whnle, and as a Ifh6le it will be bold responsible. . '

That sorely-shorn sheep, the British iairmypr, realises .with A irroah thnt the necessity for the hasty and by Ministers unexpected wto t«r season implies further raisin? of rtbney. When rho Wai , actually broke out the Gowfrti' ment indicated their opinion of its probabiK mntmitude and duration by asking lor Id millions sterling. Bpfore tlie prordeatipri the sum actually rn.ised was 70 millions, 1 tn, tnkini; the vote the Chancellor or (Kβ-fix-chedner confidently assumed that tho wafr would be bvor in September, and that trn'4 amount would amplr suffice for all needs, ft becomes increasingly dear that if frn 6'6«e the account with an expenditure of 100 milliora we shall do very'well. Beyond this there , is the certainty of a larce annual cost to ltd borne for an indefinite series of years, in ordrt to meet the r*arftes of fhp inereas&i) miliary force thnt will bo reonifed in South Afrjna, It is a rioomv outlook, relieved only by thd satisfaction' Ministers rnuet foal that thiiy '$bV the genital election comfortably over before it opened up. . .

Tho frinnds o{ Runner W. Fiitrhison. of [.lift Rhodp'ian Field Force (well known ne "JTot»m.r" nf tho W«*lv PressJ. wi\\ fce interested to Wr that the most rpc»nt lptH>f receiver] from him wn* dnted from TSTimWley, Where lie Was «n mute from JjicMeiiWtf, via Mfifnkme' nnd Kimb.6rl.ey. to .Tohflnneß. bure. Hp hurt been wanted a fpttnigrit'e fiirIniltrti. nnf) whs On liie wnr ro vwt \m brotnT, Afr Osnrffft Hutrhison, at .Tonannesbntu. Hii lietlth Vind contiinie'j irno'l—he ht\* nrt hni\ 3 day's illness pin"? he Ipft NW Zealand:— iwi ho wa? vefv li?h't. He anticinntpd that -wi'Mi (he i?ock' fpre he was exnerifsanrnp , nnd tlio luxury of pleepimr on soft bed?, he.would fmeeditv add n ptonn or two to his weight. Hfi ( felt, in fact, that he was "swellin , wisibly."