THE TRIPLE UNDERSTANDING.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XXXIX, Issue 10716, 15 March 1911, Page 6

THE TRIPLE UNDERSTANDING.

UNAFFECTED BY A RUSSOGERMAN AGREEMENT. (From a Special Correspondent of the London Daily Chronicle.) There is a great deal of trepidation just now as to the future of the Triple Entente, or as my latest Russian correspondent prefers to call it in English, the Triple Understanding. This is a good tiling, because at a crisis of our internal politics we may forget that our European interests also require to be attended to ; and, indeed, in the other countries concerned, France and Russia, fears have been expressed that the death of King Edward, coupled with our political crisis, might' tend to cancel our role for the time being in Europe. All the. so.me, there seems to be no reason for any grave anxiety. The Triple Understanding is in the nature of things. If in the days of avowedly absolutist government in Russia there could still be not only an understanding but even, an alliance with republican France, how much more favorable are the circumstances now, when the beginnings of constitutionalism, in Russia have only served to show up the apapproval by the Russian people of this article of the former policy of the Government. Alliance with France has not given, and Mill not give, to the Russian Liberals, all that they might like, to get from it, but it means in a ; certain sense "doors open," whereas the old concerted action with Germany usually meant "doors closed." This is only one aspect of the matter; but'it! must not be forgotten that the Russian Emperor himself last year received a' party of Deputies of the French Chamber. •.■".■'.'!

Tc turn to more everyday interests,: French capital is too deeply engaged in: Russia, and the economic transfofma-. tion of Russia is now far too definite ai process for the friendship of France to'' falter at a moment so propitious to her commercial interests. But one be-., comes much surer of one's ground if! one glances back .at the '. action of many with regard to Russia during the: past' few years. In Russia, Germany; is in a sense widely credited with the; initiation of that disastrous policy' which brought Russia to a prematures strugglo .with Japan under the most! unfavorable conditions possible; for| Germany is supposed to have wished to! create a vacuum on the western fron-< tier of -Russia', which would leave herj free to prosecute her own plans. This! foar, entertained by Russians, seemed! to be confirmed when Austria,, with the! support of Germany, proceeded to the! annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, | and apparently separated Bulgaria! from the rising movement of Pam-I slavism in the Balkans. j The revolution in Turkey has been' only a temporary check to the.political! and economic .advance of German influence ; a'nd'.w'e-.ma'y fairly assume that the German ■■ interests there are too ; sc!id>to u b.e disturbed.; This Ist l a/great, change,fjom ,the times., when; {Englandj was. supposed J-t'orbe preventing- Con-: stah'tinople ; from falling Into' the hands of Russia. From an English point of) yiew,; there. was also .. something exSuccess afterithe: Bosnian an-! nexatiou,' when she' demanded that Rus- i sia.should retire from the role of champion df_.Sla.vohic States of the. Balkans, ilfithisis not Russia's role in European pontics, it.i6.hardv:tb ,see that she has any "other. An immediate victory was won and without war; but that has left a pasting soreness.. bound to \pf felti at leasi/fjuifc as much by the and : 'his Government as by :his\ people, because it was the former that had to accept the responsibility .foii.a. reverse which would be remembered by every patriotic Russian. 'Russia could not then go to war; 'amongst. other. K .,things,r.-the internal sfats of the cpuntr.y absolutely forbade i%;.-T?# fixe chec£> co.mirig7:almost ijtn i*WM tu *fe'«£.' an from!? a {?s*§* had claimed to be friendly to Russia, could not soon be forgotten. Of that one could have no; doubt, after witnessing the way in j which., men of the--most incompatible! igojitical: opinions:. me!t together in com-] 'j'OJV 5 protest. £N6w, of Austria' and "in ' "the Balkans is precisely the first most necessary! nStep_ r to.:;th© -strengthening of: : Ge"fmah i influence, political and, economic, -along | cthe line/ithat: runs through the TurlnsE ] >Empire to Persia. '■ --' ' ■ ' ■"- i "Why, then, should there be a RussoGerman agreement at'all? There are several reasons, arid they'are easily understood. In internal Russian, .politics, i as in exEerna]=r4in<J thjsis one of the! things that' Englishmen are constantly: forgetting—German .means, not the ! Germafepebple/.at allpbut" the .German | Government, which is regarded' by alii parties in Russia as the chief prop of: absolutism in Europe. This view has \ rover -and over- again been expressed, i especially by the Reactionaries. The: ■Reactionary leader, Mr Swanebach, ad-j dressed his protest against a Russian; Constitution, not to his own Sovereign, \ ? but to the German Emperor. When! the Duma, men cams to England, the! ißeacfcioriary /spokesman, Mr Purishke-'j fvieh';-addressed an"open letter to the, German people through the,Kreuz Zei-j tiirig explaining that all good , absolu-! tist-Russians really hated England. Thej same gentleman announced last year ] in'theTDuhia that if a' party of repre- \ sentative Englishmen visited Russia he \ would,try to a arrange for them an uii-i friendly reception. J J.s this, .then, the .attitude of the: Russian Government ? Nothing of the '■ jsoft. : But it must be' remembered that ; /English friendship is new for the Rus- ; !'siaa Government, and, as internal af- : | fairs sufficiently testify, the-new spirit: progresses, not without difficulty in Rus- : sia, and the old prejudices die hard, i The Reactionaries have no longer any moi-ai-support in the country, but they I still-have a disproportionate influence in' the vicinity of the Sovereign. However, this: is only a partial explanation. Russia has suffered a severe . reverse, followed: by great internal disorders. Those who wish to see quiet restored will "not be anxious for new complications. It is eminently in the interests of Russian that there should be a.period of recuperation, and anyone who is fearful of change—and this moo<Lis very strongly defined in many certainly not be inclined to drift into any quarrel with Germany. Beyond all this, there is no doubt that the Russian Government is right, and has taken up the correct position. _ Whatever may be the various opinions as to German aggressiveness, the •viewboth of-Russia and England is the same —that there is no hostility' to one country because one seeks the friendship of another. Sometimes an opposite- view has. been attributed to Germany ;■ she is supposed to claim that friendship between England and Russia, is in. itself an offence of both parties ; against herself. No one will for a moment admit such a claim, and one has no right to believe lightly that it is put 'forward. . But anyhow, what Russia appears to have done is to have anticipated -possible complications .by treating'on points of detail"with the Power concerned; and we a.t least should only be glad, for it is what we should no doubt- be ready to do with Germander with anv other Power.

In face of conflicting reports, it is difficult to know exactly what has been stipulated; but the arrangement appears at the most to reduce itself to an agreement that there shall be no opposition from Russia to a railway ending at the Persian Gulf, and connected by Russia with- lines traversing the Russian zone of Persia. This at once reminds -us of the recently published project for a line connecting the Russian railway system with the British Indian. This project emanates from a group of Russians long known for their advocacy of friendship, to England on grounds of public interest, and carries the support of some of the most prominent financiers, . in Russia. The through line already reaches Baku on the one side and Nusliki on the other. There is -required a'line-from-Baku to the Russian frontier, with a continuation through Persia. A glance at the map will show that the whole route is very direct .and can, if undertaken fairly soon, he completed before anyother. It would ; .not be difficult . to bring into touch, with it the goods traffic of the Vol»a-and' Caspian, and thusreassure. the Mr.scnw merchants as .to the development of their very important .trade with Northern Persia. r ; The. .-present, suggestion is that the whole, line should he administered by a single international company, which would admit the accession of other capital besides English, and Russian. If

such a,line is constructed, it would be no misfortune that a German line terminated , at the, Persian Gulf were sonjewhere connected with it. On the contrary, this might prove a guarantee for solidarity of interests not only of _>tlie 'two but of the three countries in .-Persia..., :■.;■■•-■ - ■.-"■ In "a word, it,, would appear that there is no, reason for .alarm at the conclusion of tlie Russo-Gerraan agreement. It would seem to.be an arranger ment .which \ye, under similar circumstances,. '.might have concluded ourselves;' and it is for. many reasons exceedingly unlikely that it will make any serious - disturbance, of-- the present balance of forces in Europe.