The New Zealand Times. THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1928. EX-KAISER’S GUILT

New Zealand Times, Volume L, Issue 11415, 11 January 1923, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1928. EX-KAISER’S GUILT

The existing most acute crisis with regard to German reparations has revived interest in sfie question of Germany’s responsibility for the Great "War. In his recent article, “Nations in War-time: The Pact of, Armaments,” Mr Lloyd George declares that the real explanation of the cause of the Great War is given in Marshal Fooh’s statement to him that he considered the German army of 1914 the finest the world ever saw in numbers, training, and equipment. “Were it not,” adds Mr Lloyd George, “that the German army was more perfect and more potent than either the French or Russian armies; were it not that every German officer was convinced that the German military machine was superior to all its rivals, there would have been no war. ... A transcendent army has always led to aggression. No country can resist the lure of an easy triumph paraded before its eyes for two successive generations. The inference is an obvious one.” The ex-Kaiser, it is true, denies in his memoirs that Germany was responsible for the war, and tries to shift the blame on to Britain and her Allies. He maintains that “The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown Council of July 6th (1914),” the “conspiracy” at which the war was finally decided upon, “in reality never toot place”; that “it is an invention of malevolent persons.” He actually gives credence to a story that the English fleet left secretly for Norway on the eve of war, with a view to capturing him while on his famous yachting cruise; and states that he only learnt from a Norwegian newspaper of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He also alleges that Germany was totally unprepared for war, and did not even expect war; and gives various “proofs” that the Allies, on the other hand, were prepared I But the facts of the* case very effectively dispoee of his special pleading.

The Lpndon “Daily Graphic” has, with commendable enterprise, published the ex-Kaiser’s memoirs in serial form, giving in the same issue a circumstantial refutation by Mrs Charlotte Mansfield, F.R.G.8., of the many mis-statements of which he is guilty. In a brilliant commentary, this wellSndwn and gifted writer furnishes irrefutable proof that the ex-Kaiser himself was responsible for the war. The truth about these matters, she demonstates, is that—(l) Not only was the Crown Council of July sth, 1914, held, and not only was there talk at that Council of war preparations, but actual orders were given for such preparations. (2) The ex-Kaiser did not require to learn from a Norwegian paper about the ultimatum to Serbia, because in the fortnight preceding the ultimatum he himself had advocated greater speed and harsher conditions to ensure that the acceptance of the Note to Serbia would he made quite impossible. (3) Already in November, 1912, the Austrians had “received the most binding pledges in this matter from Germany”; already in March, 1914, the “arranged mobilisation plans were complete”; the ex-Kaiser himself stated that “he had prepared against the Russians for years”; and he himself wrote, on July 4th, 1914: “The Serbs must he wiped out, and that soon.”

This sentence very clearly reveals the ex-Kaiser’s frame of mind at the time. On the date mentioned—that is to eay, jnst one day before the Potsdam “conspiracy’’ took place—a report was submitted to the ex-Kaiser, in which Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, stated that he (the Ambassador) on every occasion warned the

Austrians quietly, but emphatically not to take any over-hasty steps. The ex-Kaiser minuted on the report: Who gave him authority to do that? It is very silly! Does not concern him in the least, as it is only Austria’s business what they will do. Afterwards, when things go wrong, they will say, Germany did not want to! Tschirschky will pleaso leave this nonsense! The Serbs must be wiped out, and that soon!

Mr H. ■ Alorgentheau, at the time American Ambassador at Constantinople, has stated that, on July 14th, 1914, Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, returned to Constantinople from Berlin, and, thinking that he was speaking to an ally, informed the Italian Ambassador, Signor Garroni, that he had attended a conference where a European war had been decided on. Signor Garroni asked what the provocation was to be, and Wangenheim replied that Austria was to make demands on Serbia that would surely lead to war. Again, Dr Muehlon, formerly one of the foremost directors at Knipps,, has testified that, in the middle of July, 1914, Dr Helfferich, then Vice-Chancellor of the Reichstag, told him:

The political situation has become very menacing. The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week’s time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria will declare war on Serbia. Dr Helfforich added that the Kaiser had expressed decided approval of this procedure on the part of the Austrians. He had said that he regarded the conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between the two countries, in which he would not permit any other State to interfere. If Russia mobilised, ho would mobilise also. But in this case mobilisation would mean immediate war. This time there would be no hesitation. Helfforich said that the Austrians were extremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on the part of the Kaiser

In 1917, points out Mrs Mansfield, little by little the details of the Potsdam “conspiracy’’ began to leak out, and on August 30th of that year the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, von der Bussche-Haddennausen, reported in a memorandum: —“On July 6th (1914), after the Austrian Ambassador handed to the Kaiser the letter from the Austrian Emperor, and after the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary had been, received, a consultation with the military authorities was held with the Kaiser. ... It was decided, in any case, to take preparatory measures for war, and orders were issued to this effect ” As a matter of fact, however, Germany’s mobilisation plans were completed in March, 19141 General Graf Waldersee, acting-Ohief of Staff in July, 1914, was questioned after the war, on October 23rd, 1919, by the German Foreign Office about this conference. He replied that he, being absent, General von Bertrap reported to the Kaiser, who instructed him to communicate to the Chief of Staff that “he, the ex-Kaiser, had promised the Austrian Emperor to stand behind him with the German power." “For me, who was acting for the Chief of. Staff,” added General Graf Waldersee, “there was, as a consequence of the conference, nothing to do. The arranged mobilisation plans had been completed on March 31st, 1914.” Further, immediately after having been received by the ex-Kaiser on July sth, the Austrian Ambassador telegraphed to the Austrian" Premier in Vienna: “The Kaiser is of the opinion that this action (against Serbia) must not be delayed. Russia will in any case adopt a hostile attitude, hut the Kaiser has prepared for this for years, and, should it ever come to a war between Austria and Russia, we can be assured that Germany would he with us in nsual loyalty .... and if we had really seen the necessity of an action against Serbia, then the Kaiser would regret it if we failed to use the present moment, which is so favourable to us.” This last sentence is specially significant, as it shows, not only that the ex-Kaiser was prepared for war with Russia, but that he expressed his eagerness to seize on what he considered to be such a favourable moment. On the evening of July 7th, the Austrian Emperor’s special messenger to the Kaiser having returned to Vienna, a _Crown Council meeting was * held there also. The minutes of this meeting, quoted at some length in the “Daily Graphic,” make it quite dear that war was intended. Count Stuergkh, Minister-President, stated: “If for diplomatic reasons, the way of a previous diplomatic action against Serbia must be taken (instead of the suggested surprise attack), this should be done, but with the decided intention that such an action must only be allowed to end in war.’’ While Dr von Billiuski, Minister for Finance, declared that “he had never had any doubt that, if it became serious, Germany would stand by us, and in November, 1912, he had already received from the German Ambassador the most binding pledges concerning this matter.” In short, war had been decided on as far back at least as November, 1912. It only remained to And some sort of an excuse; and this was furnished by the Serajevo murder.