Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

An. interviewer informs the world that Marshal Foch has virtually declared that tbe winter is not going to stop bis offensive, and the news from all the fronts supports the conclusion of the interviewer. It stands to reason, putting aside all evidence but the Western, that a general who opens a new offensive on a. fifty-four mile front on tho eve of tho second month of autumn, has made up his mind for a winter campaign. It is possible tbat he may obtain his objective by tho end of November; of course, for in war much is possible, especially of the unexpected, as witness the exploits 1 of General Allenby and General Desperey. But that does not help discussion, for we do not know what is Marshal Foch's objectivo; If he aims at forcing back the enemy to tho Belgian frontier, it i s quite possible he may succeed by the end of November. If he aims at the destruction of the German armies in his front, the probability is that he will have to keep up the fight right through the winter.

. The mere question of the discomfort of the troops is not crucial, because in the matter of discomfort there is notrmuch: to choose between-settling down in trenches, for the-most; part wet, and fighting in the open, witn shelters of tents to supplement the billets available in towns and villages. The practical question is of the pressure on the enemy. On the one hand there will be in the -winter months intervals in which advance is very difficult, between periods of hard weather, suitable to heavy transport; on the other hand, there is the certainty that a cessation of pressure on the enemy for the whole winter will enable tho enemy to rest, recuperate, strengthen his defences, and organise reinforcement, enabling him by these means to vastly increase the difficulties of the offensive in the. spring.

Giving full weight to these considerations, we can fairly conclude from the opening of a new offensive on a great scale that the Marshal aims at the major objective—the destruction of the enemy's,,forces—and has mado tip his mind tjfcf pursue that objective without giving'the enemy any opportunity for improving his defence. Apparently the great offensive will not stop for any reason. The winter campaign will he active, not a stagnant trench war.

The new offensive in the Champagne of the French armies in combination with the Americans is described by Mr Bell Price as the largest yet undertaken by the French and Americans. All ho tells us about it is that it was preceded by an enormous concentration of artillery and gas shells, and that it is reported to have gained all the first objectives. This is interpreted by a New York message as the capture of the first German lines. We must conclude that this assault has been delivered between Reims and . the Argonne; that a new American armv has been thrown into the line of advance, separate and distinot from the army which wiped out the St. Mihiel salient and is threatening the epemy's Metz sector from its lines between the heights of the Mouse and the vallev of the Moselle, and has Just sent forward a thrust east of that river against the southern flank of the Metz position*.

If the report is true that the German first linos have been taken, we must conclude that the enemy ha» lost his strong positions from Moronvillers to the Hand of Massiges, if not beyond that point. This is the lino on which General Gourand infliotod on von JKinim's command, during the enemy'a fourth great offensive, the decisive chock which not only saved the Allied right wing between Reims and the Marne, but enabled General Mangin to strike the Crown Prince's right south of Soissons the spectacular blow which put an end to the German offensive and gave tho initiative to the Allies. Tho German general quoted in the Reichstag by Count von Hertling (the Imperial Chancellor) attributes this defeat to the impossibility of effecting a surprise on the Reims sector. Tho explanation reveals tho utter weaknesb of tho case for the German High Command, for thero was a tremendous element of surprise. It was a doublo surprise: (1) The surprise arranged by General Gourand who, retreating from his first line east of Reims, drew \on Einim's forces into a position in which ho struck him a blow which paralysed him for the rest of those operations; (2) the surprise bv which General Mangin broke tho Crown Prince's right «'ing, won tho second battle of tho Marne, and permanently turned the tide of tho oampaign. To talk of the

impossibility of surprise to the Reichstag in the face of those . notorious facts was dangerous. That it was the only palliation offered for the huge military failure reveals the fact that oven German ingenuity and unscrupulousness is unable to conceal the tremendous character of the failure of the great German offensive. • '* *

Tho Fatherland in March watched that offensive in the daily hope of hearing of the total destruction of the Allied armies. In September the Reichstag is told that it failed because it could not surprise the enemy, and this ill the face of the common knowledge that two skilful surprises smashed the last o:': the offensive and definitely seized the initiative for Marshal Foch, turning tho tide of war strong and hard against Germany. • *. •

That initiative exerted in August is stronger than ever it was now. Ihe turned tide of war has swept the enemy back to his (starting places; has shaken the whole of bis north and south line to the limits of the precarious, besides shattering and capttiring some of its positions. It is daily increasing the precariousness of the German hold o* that line, and all the world is talking of the enemy's coming abandonment of it, with retreat to the Belgian border. •.■ * * ■ The assault developed to the enemy's west-to-east line, with strong menace against Laon. Then the tide of war in further development swirled* over the St. Mihiel salient, and brought the most serious menace almost to the gates of Metz. Against the centre of this line, thus menaced on its right and left wings, the latter "being the base of tho greater part of the German forces _m France and Belgium, the relentless tide of war brings this fifty-four-mile assault of American and French troops.,

The great counter-offensive which oponed in August has, in six weeks, developed into a most formidable, persistent, growing assault on both 6ides of the enemy's rectangle. The north-to-south line is shaking visibly, and is likely to be driven east, and the new assault threatens the east and west line with a drive to the north, to the great confusion of the communications of both. It is as if two giant hands have seized the two lines of the German rectangle, and are forcing them back on each other. That is the general situation. It requires details of the Marshal's new offensive to be properly understood. What is certain is that if those' two hands come together with a snap, the German armies will be "utterly destroyed. It is certainly not a situation in which any general would be stopped by any fear of a winter campaign. . » * *

Are those great hands which Foch has laid on the German lines likely to come together with a snap? So far as we can see, they are not. The enemy is flooding the country in front of the British in the north, and if he is forced by developments further south to retreat, the pace at which the British cau follow him will not make the movement a, enap. Moreover, the probability is that the enemy's resistance against the new advance will be 'tough, for he has rested there two months'unmolested. That he will eventually be driven from both his lines and have to go back is extremely probable. But that-he will, unlike the German general beaten by General Allenby, be able to take some thought for the order of his going—a thing, moreover, in which he is skilful — is also probable.

Some details arriving later show that the Americans occupy the east end of the new attack, and that they, have penetrated the enemv's line on a front of some ten miles from The Meuse west, to an average depth of seveni miues, taking eight towns and 6000 prisoners. Other details ifcow that the French are attacking near the Argonne on ' tho battlefields of , 1916. It is enough to show that the offensive has begun well. The American penetration ■, of seven miles in exceedingly difficult country is a record.

"We have reports about German public opinion, some declaring that the people are ready to revolt against the dynast) and the military class, others rather discounting the idea. The most noti worthy statement made in Germany as reported to-day is that of the "FranTHort Zeitung," which declares that the German Western line is in no danger provided the soldiery fight as they ought to fight. The point of doubt is very suggestive.

General Allenby has apparently frußr trated the Liman von Sanders plan by pushing forward into the country west of the Sea of Galilee, and by drawing the net close round the doomed Fourth Turkish Army, east of the Jordan. He is clearly master of the situation. His next move will "show what he intends to do with it. .

This article text was automatically generated and may include errors. View the full page to see article in its original form.
Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZTIM19180928.2.30

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10087, 28 September 1918, Page 6

Word Count
1,579

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10087, 28 September 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10087, 28 September 1918, Page 6