THE WINGED VICTORY

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9784, 6 October 1917, Page 4

THE WINGED VICTORY

GREAT AERIAL FLEET MENACE OF BRITISH CONSERVATISM. Even as tho Greeks of old 'carved that delicate and immortal masterpiece, - the Winged Victory, as a tribute'to their own prowess, so when this war is finished—there is ample fdmd .to meditate the project—the Allies will strike a modal, on the obverse Ot which will bo found an aeroplane. One by one, other avenues of victory tiavo been successively closed up, the process being aided by that quality ot mind which used to bo so much vaunted in time of peace, but which, amid the stress and violent crises of war, Booms.hardly distinguishable from stupidity.-* * I moan (wrkos Mr Arthur Lynch;-.M.p., in a recent exchange) that conservative habit that tenaciously resists- tho entrance of new, ideas. If I speak in this somewhat impatient tono it is because I mention R e making me free of the field. I advocito in its mam bold lines a plan which "the Government seems at last, after 'three years of war, to be Pitting mto' ,; pi%otice, or at least for which it the way. , The plan, in brief? 1$ to concentrate on the Air Service, not to bo content with superiority, over the Germans m casual contests:or in the general work y day of-the Air Service, such as scoutiha' hnd' directing artillery fire, but to that the aeroplane arm, suffieimy developed, is capable of deciding the great turning events of the xr«v

MYSTERIES AND SURPRISES. Connected with, this project must necessarily be that of experiment and invention. Ideas of genius cannot be commanded by any organisation, however faithful to tradition and, routine. Exceptional means must be taken to throw r out a sort of intellectual network; that will catch these ideas and bring them at length to the test or experience. The aeroplane is still fu» of mysteries and surprises. The prmmpler of itw "construction are for the jnoot part empirical; that is to say, it is only by experiment and trial that W» can form an opinion as to the best types, either in the general design or fa regard to the hundred details that '‘make up"the' machine. An improvo--1 ment in any one detail may moke the difference of a few miles per hour in speed. The consequences of that will eventually be found in the casualty lists, net xnefoly the casualties amongst •>* pilots, but in the killed and wSunded ‘ in the big pushes. The aeroplanes are f J| * -ifio ‘eyes of the Army. . r" ' Hbw do the Allies stand now os against the Central Powers? In -he \"• personnel I believe that both the Bn- ' tJsh sad the French are superior to the Germans, and this may be faia without disparagement of the great ’ qualities and at times the extraordm- ., may * brilliancy, ..displayed : by the enemy. But, m addition to the control of mechanism, the British pilots have added the fine feather of the sporting* quality and the French their s!t»t‘ and mordancy, and on the whole the balance " rests on our aide. As to the machines themselves, the contest might bo likened to a long-dis-tance race when one competitor leads lor » time, finds himself. overtaken , in a spurt by another, regains hi a po- • sition once more, loses it, and still . struggles on, for the goal of perfec- . tion-is yet far off. The British types - of machine axe more numerous than those of the enemy, and of late they can claim a,distinct superiority; that ja to say, in regard to the machines ■which are the best, for a considerable proportion of out-of-date types are ’ ■ B till 'employed! Again, without disj crediting the German talent of inV ventivenoss, it may be said that both * British and French are more fertile ’: in ideas than the Teuton—l think the V Celtic infusion has aided them—but the methodical, well-trained brains of "■ German engineers are* good for _ adapting and improving the inventions of others , . . , _ The one great invention of the Germans in the air world has, by the irony of fate, proved the salvation of w the ’Allies. I mean the Zeppelin. <y« The Germans were hypnotised by their -i Zeppelin. its -real greatness called >' • forth all their faculty of "Schwaer’2- merei”; its untold possibilities led • them on and held their minds en- •- thralled. Had . they BhH no Zeppelins thOT- would have perceived more clearly the vast possibility of the aeroplane, they would have brought to hear upon it- -their admirable power - of their great capad- • ity foF'Worki ‘and the war would now '** have been in "a" much more hopeful phase for them, ■ A NEW STRIKING ARM.

Our authorities haid no Zeppelin. Jhose they tried to construct in imiGerman were nothing to heart of.* fiut they have not yet risen-to..tha-dear and complete contemplation of the possibilities of the instrument that they may yet hold in their, hand. We nave had a series of tentative efforts to' create an Air Board,' and we have not yet arrived at an Air Ministry. The difference is essential. What I have in mind is not merely the Hull development and porfeotionnent of tho Air Service as subsidiary to tho Army and _ Navy, T' but while leaving these services in ■ full-control of all that is necessary for the best employment of such wea- • must also open our minds r ’to this idea: the creation of a great new striking arm in the shape of a Beet of aeroplanes, built on the analogy of the sea fleet and extending m . diversity of type, in strength, and number to a degree of power hitherto undreamt of—at any rate by the official mind. Will the present Air Board accomplish ench a work? X hope so, bnt 1 have no confidence. It is true that the private conference with Lord Cowdrey and tho other members ot the Air Board was reassuring. One can say that much without betraying confidences. I suppose few experienced Parliamentarians entered the room without expecting that the statements would be reassuring. During the years wo have been at war I have heard many statements on behalf of the Air Authorities, and I have never known one that was not reassuring. Yet it has been the pride of the authority, speaking six months afterwards, that he has discarded much of what his predecessors had done and had improved'tho rest beyond recognition. lord Cowdray himself made an excellent chairman, simple, but im-

pressivo in manner, luislncssliko in methods, clear in statement. But I judge by tho great outstanding fact, that whereas the enormous possibilities of the air should have been present to tho minds of the organisers in charge from tho beginning, that they should have bent every energy to their task and have evolved even the creation ot now means of production and now methods of procedure, that they ought to have hold continually before their eyes as their objective the one sure avenue to victory, we have had at best tho fair average of a routine department, and we have been content with a relatively poor result. There are all sorts of ways of explaining, for instance, the German air raid on London; but it came, and it will bo repeated; and I say that there was within the power of tho Government tho means of making such raids impossible, the means not merely of gaining a superiority over the Hermans, but such a complete ‘and overwhelming predominance that not a German aeroplane could dare to show its nose above tho horizon. I know that many of tho great authorities will laugh find sneer at such suggestions. That merely gives the standard of their own calibre. fcugKoations were laughed and sneered, a throe years ago which it is now their pride to put into execution. Judged by criterions of this kind, how can wo be content .with the Air Board? 1 for one am discontented that it is merely an Air Board, for that already indicates the crippling of its functionsW© must face this fact, that blunders of any kind do not simply mean the inconveniences that might result m time of peace; they do not merely moan tho loss of tens of thousands or bright young lives; they mean that while the scales are still trembling m the conflict of Romo and Carthage, incapacity, however popular or influential, may dip the scale towards Carthage. Tho Air Board, its creators, and its servitors, have been found wanting. Ido not mean that they are not all excellent men, but, to bring the matter home by a familiar example, a man might ho an 'accomplished and brilliant athlete, and yet, if you were asked would you put him into the ring to fight Jack Johnson for tbs championship of tho world, you would—well, you would revise your standards. Briefly, I would fix the responsibilities for all this, I would have a complete overhaul. I would direct tho immediate establishment ot an Air Ministry, and I would indicatein a larger scope the main lines of its task. It is not too late; it will bo soon. ■ , QUESTION OP REPRISALS. Mention of tho air raid brings about the question of reprisals. The word reprisals is itself ambiguous. If by reprisals is meant the most vigorous and determined counter-action, I am for reprisals. It would be : even well to stretch a point, in departing at times from tho strict lines of a military correct plan, for the psychological factor counts for much in wars, Moreover, it must be candidly recognised that the German raids, as, for instance, on London, . have a military value, arid, in some circumstances, might have a,great military value. Therefore, in this sense let us have reprisals, and with plenty of ginger and dash. But if we mean by: reprisals hitting below the belt, killing German babies simply because the Germans killed ‘English babies, then I see nothing whatever in any sense to be gained by such conduct-. This war is not being fought out in a closed room. . It is the spectacle of the world. It was the foul play of the Germans, mainly, and not tho superiority of British diplomacy that brought in America. Reputation is of great importance. Leave the foul blows to the Gormans, it is they who eventually will suffer. In this respect I recall the impression made on my mind by some brief but telling words of a gallant seaman, who was a member of Parliament, Mr G. A. France, who called on the House to scorn mean tricks and to fight like men. Brave words like that increase our respect for the British character.