A MAYOR’S POWERS

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 8683, 17 March 1914, Page 8

A MAYOR’S POWERS

LOCAL POLITICS IN OHAKUNE

CAN THE SUPREME COURT INTERFERE? Recent incidents occurring at meetings of the Ohakuue Borough Council resulted in a case being heard before His Honour the Chief Justice in the Supreme Court yesterday in which Councillor Alexander Herbert Wilkie proceeded against the Mayor and Councillors with a claim for an injunction to restrain them from preventing him attending certain meetings of the council. The Mayor is Thomas Hanna Kiely,. and the councillors cited were W. S. Baird, F. C. Allen, Norman Christie, J. H. Craven, I'. H. Moran, G. J. Goldfinch, junr., 3. H. Hope, and R. J. Lyttle. Mr T. F. Martin, with Mr W. H. Tustin, of Raetihi, appeared for the plaintiff, tnd Mr C. P. Skerrett, K.C., with Mr G. H. Fell, for the defendants. removed from the meeting. The circumstances leading up to the case, as set out- on behalf of the plaintiff, were that on February 23rd, 1914, at a special meeting of the council, the defendants unlawfully (it was alleged) passed the following resolution ; “That Councillor Wilkie bo suspended for one meeting, pen ding his apology for charges made against the Mayor at the last ordinary meeting of the council. - '

The plaintiff, it was complained, was not present at this special meeting and was not notified that any such resolution would be brought before the meeting. On March 3rd an ordinary meeting was held, at which the plaintiff was present. "When the question of the confirmation of the minutes of the previous ordinary and special meetings was dealt with,- Councillors Lyttle, Baird and Moran objected to tho confirmation of the said minutes. The plaintiff, it was further alleged, attempted to object to the confirmation, but the Mayor refused to allow him to speak or vote on any matter before the meeting, and requested him to withdraw, and on the plaintiff’s refusing to do so, tho meeting was adjourner. An ordinary meeting was held on March 4th, and the plaintiff was present, but before the business was proceeded with, the Mayor directed Constable Armison to remove the plaintiff from the meeting, and plaintiff was removed. After his removal the defendants passed a resolution that the plaintiff be suspended for a further -period of fourteen days from March 14th. As a result,_ it was contended, the plaintiff was prevented from exercising his rights as a councillor. The council was to meet for important purposes on March 10th, and an ordinary meeting would he held on the 17th, and plaintiff submitted that by the action of the defendants h© was prevented from attending either of tliese meetings, and he .feared that should he attend either of them he would be removed at the order of the Mayor. It was contended that it was of the utmost importance to the plaintiff and the ©lectors of the borough that he should be present at the said meetings, and should not be prevented from exercising his rights as a member of the council. Plaintiff therefore prayed for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendants from preventing him attending the said meetings, and from preventing him exercising his lawful rights as a councillor at such meetings, and that the defendants be ordered to pay the costs of this action. CHARGE AGAINST THE MAYOR. Tor the defence it was contended that at an ordinary meeting of the council on February 17th, the defendant, used the words, “He (the Mayor) had allowed Mr Allsworth to side-step the accounts for twelve months in the old Town Board days,” Mr Allsworth having been the town clerk of the Ohakune Town Board. It was further contended that the defendant had notice of the special meeting of February 23rd, and could have attended it and objected to the unanimous resolution of the council, then passed, to take other important business. The defence denied that Councillors Lyttle, Baird and Moran objected on March 3rd to the confirmation of the minutes of the previous ordinary meeting; on the contrary, it was alleged that Councillor Lyttle moved their" confirmation. On March 4th (defendants submitted), before the business of the council was proceeded with, the Mayor again requested the plaintiff to withdraw his offensive words. The plaintiff refused to do so, and tho Mayor directed the constable to "remove him from the chamber, which the constable did by gently tapping the plaintiff on the shoulder and requesting him to leave, Wilkie walking out in front of the constable. In regard to the resolution suspending Councillor Wilkie for fourteen days, it was contended that this was carried in pursuance of Rule 1 of the borough by-laws, and the standing orders and forms of proceedings of the House of Representatives. As to the meeting of March 17th, it was contended that it was still open for the plaintiff to withdraw his offensive remarks, in which case he need not fear the prevention of his duties as a councillor. The electors of the borough, it was submitted, would in nowise suffer by the plaintiff’s absence. COURT’S JURISDICTION QUESTIONED.

Mr Martin laving outlined the circumstances of the case. His Honour questioned whether he had any power to adjudicate whether the words used were disorderly or not. Were they not fro be decided by the local authority? Could there be an appeal to a judge to say whether a point of order was decided or not? He wanted some authority. Mr Martin said there were not very many authorities on the subject. A mayor wishing to rule a councillor out of order, could seize hold of any words and suspend the meeting. All that the words used by Mr Wilkie could mean was that the mayor was not vigilant in the exercise of his public duty. Counsel submitted that there was no personal attack conveyed in the words. , His Honour said he was'not looking at the case from' the merit of the question, but from the jurisdiction of the coart. Mr Martin pointed out that cases from assemblies in the smaller colonies had been taken to the Privy Council. He mentioned a case in point. His Honour remarked that the grounds of the case mentioned by Mr Martin would be trespass. After referring to the by-laws, Mr Martin said it would be a serious

tiling for a council to adjudge any words disorderly, and to have a member removed, and thus deprive his constituents of his services. He submitted that a council should not be the absolute judge of such a matter without any appeal to the court. This would ho an exercise of power which might lead to a great deal of abuse. A mayor might exclude a councillor in order to get rid of his vote. THE MAYOR’S DISCRETION.

Mr Skerrett said ho hoped the court would not interfere with the power of the mayor over the council. The mayor’s action ought to bo treated in a court of law with proper consideration, especially when it was honest and bona fide. The mayor was elected by the ratepayers, and in whatever he did he was subject to thair criticism. He submitted that the plaintiff could not succeed in this action, on the following grounds:— (1) That the mayor was within his rights in treating the plaintiff's conduct as disorderly; (2) that the plaintiff’s action, being disorderly, was calculated to bring the authority of the mayor and council into contempt. In using the words quoted the plaintiff was referring to ancient history, and was thereby gratuitously offensive to the mayor, who was entitled to call upon him to withdraw. The court was entitled to uphold the action of the council on the grounds (1) that the express power of suspension was conferred by the usage of Parliament and the standing orders, and (2) that there was an inherent power in every deliberative assembly to suspend a member while ho disregarded the authority of the chair. Counsel also submitted that the power of the court to grant an injunction was restricted to property and rights of property. Mr Martin, replying, said that if a disorderly reflection was made and no apology or withdrawal followed it, there was a breach .of the by-laws, and the proper remedy was in the Magistrate’s Court at Ohakuue. A councillor had a right, and the court could respect that right. His Honour: “What is your remedy?” . . Mr Martin; “To get an injunction restoring that right.” \ His Honour asked if Mr Martin could cite a case where a person bad secured an injunction because he feared an assault. Mr Martin replied that ho could not. ' . " His Honour said that if a man was unlawfully ejected he had his remedy in an action for damages. After further argument, His Horn our said ho might come to the' conclusion that there was no power of Suspension, and no power of injunction. He announced that lie would give judgment this morning.