LIBEL ACTION

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 8653, 11 February 1914, Page 8

LIBEL ACTION

SUMMONS REFUSED “TIMES” CO. v. WELLINGTON PUBLISHING CO. The decision of the Chief Justice on an, interlocutory matter in connection with the libel action of the “Now Zealand Times” Company, Ltd., versus tho Wellington Publishing Company was delivered yesterday morning. The defendant moved a .summons calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why it should not forthwith deliver to the defendant “particulars*of tho loss or damage alleged i.n the statement cf claim to have been suffered by the plaintiff, with the nature of such loss or damage, and - how the amount of damage has been estimated or made up,” and the ground upon which tho summons was moved was that without such particulars tho defendant was unable, to prepare fully to meet tho plaintilf’s case for trial. This summons followed a- demand which had previously bcoii made on the plaintiff’s solicitors ,to furnish such particulars. A CHARGE OF LIBEL.

His Honour pointed out that the statement of claim is a charge of libel, and in paragraph 11., after stating tho words complained of that are said to bo libellous and setting out tho. innuendo as to their meaning, the plaintiff says;—-“The plaintiff company lias thereby been greatly injured in its business, credit, and reputation.” There is no claim for damages at the end of what may be called tho first cause of action. There os then what is called a second and alternative cause of action, not tiro causes of action, and tho alternative cause of action repeats all and every of the allegations contained in tho first cause of action. It therefore repeats that the plaintiff lias been greatly injured in its business, credit, and reputation. It goes on to aver that tho libel complained of was printed and published maliciously with tho intention of injuring the plaintiff company in its business and Of inducing tho business people of the 'community to cease advertising in the plaintiff company’s, newspaper, or to have any business transactions with suciti newspaper, etc. In the fast paragraph in the. second and alternative (lotion the averment is that the plaintiff company has suffered great damage thereby. Tho prayer for damage is as follows: —“Wherefore the pkiiintiffi company claims (a) in respect of the first cause of action, and alternatively: in respect of the second cause of action the sum of £3000.”

NO CLAIM FOR SPECIAL DAMAGE.

” “It is clear, therefore, from the Statement of claim,” proceeded His Honour, “that there is no claim for special damage, using , tho phrase ’Special damage’ in its ordinary acceptation. Further, it is clear from the summons, and from tho letter or demand for particulars issued prior .to the summons, that what was asked in .the letter or demand and is asked in the summons is not particulars of the damage sustained in the second cause flf action, hut particulars of the damage .claimed in the action, because Hie words are ‘particulars of the loss damage alleged in the statement of claim.’ Now, it is admitted by tho defendant’s counsel that the defendant has no right to make such a demand so far as tho first cause of action is concerned. Where general damages are claimed in a libel action, particulars of how the plaintiff' arrives at the amount he claims cannot be demanded. Defendant says that this second cause of action is in the nature of an action on the case, and not an action for libel, and that the action on the case is not maintainable unless damages have been sustained and that the proof of such damages is necessary for the maintenance of this cause of action, and it says it therefore has right to demand how these damages have been arrived at.”

After citing certain cases relative to special damages, His Honour said: “It seems to me that the 'words ‘suffered injury in its business, credit, and reputation’ is a general statement, seeing it is repeated in the second fiause of action, sufficient to warn tho defendant of tho nature of the evidence which it is proposed to call. The plaintiff is not bound to state what the evidence is, nor is ho bound, in my opinion, to give a statement of the particulars of how he arrives at his damages. That has never been done. The only question that seems to me arguable is whether there is sufficient averment in tho claim to show that the plaintiff is going to give some evidence of loss of business. I think that tho words sufficiently imply that-,- but in case there may he any difficulty about tho matter, I think the proper order I ought to make is this: Summons refused, because plaintiff only relies on general damage to its business, and not on particular instances of damage. As to costs, it is clear that the demand for particulars as well as the summons asked more than the defendant was entitled to, and that would have entitled the court to have dismissed the summons. I think, under the circumstances, that only two guineas costs should be allowed, to the plaintiff. I shall therefore endorse the summons: Summons refused, because plaintiff is only relying on general damage to its business, and not on any particular instances of damage.”