NEEDS OF THE NAVY.

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXII, Issue 4588, 17 February 1902, Page 4

NEEDS OF THE NAVY.

“I believe,” said Lord Roscbory. in his famous Chesterfield speech on 16th December last, “ that the Navy is in a high state of efficiency; but it is a matter in which we cannot afford to relax for a moment, in which no vigilance could be excessive.” The optimism of this utterance, according to not a few competent critics, was unwarranted by the actual condition of things. The Navy is no doubt efficient, so far as it goes; but there are grave doubts as to its being sufficient in strength to cope with possible hostile combinations. It was, for instance, remarked by a former naval officer in a lecture on the subject that Lord Rosebery had omitted to state that Britain is short of battle-

ships, cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers, that ten of the battleships on the effective ii&t of the fleet are armed with muzzle-loading guns, and that the mercantile marine, upon which she should have to depend to man the Navy in war, is manned by 36 per cent, of foreign seamen. Admiral Sir Harry Rawson, in the course of a recent address to business men at Glasgow, declared that Britain was “only partially insured against the risks of war,” as she had “ not enough battleships and cruisers to meet any emergency that might arise.” Admirals Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, Sir R. Vesey Hamilton and others have spoken in similar terms. Sir Charles Dilke, in a communication to the “ Navy League Journal,” has also dwelt upon the yaut of fast cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers, and the necessity for making better provision for a naval reserve; while Mr Arnold White two months ago contributed a couple of articles to the London “Evening No vs,” in which ho dealt seriatim with the weak points in the naval defence of the Empire.

Since these criticisms were uttered, the conclusion of the treaty with Japan has placed at Britain’s disposal, in certain eventualities, a powerful and efficient fleet that would be of valuable service. It is also assumed that we should always be able to secure an alliance with Italy, as against a FrancoRussian combination, and the Italian fleet is not a ncgligcablo quantity; but it is not well to rely upon striking alliances or friendships which might not endure for a day in the face of some great international embroilment. The British fleet, it is conceded by men competent to speak on the subject, ought to be able, single-handed, to protect our possessions and commerce ; and to do this, it is essential that it should, as speedily as possible, be made equal to the fleets of two or three Powers. The need for strengthening the first line of national defence is admitted by the Ministry, which has just made financial proposals with a view to “ overtaking arrears in construction.” It is proposed to spend £9,050,000 in building two new battleships, two armoured cruisers, two third-class cruisers, four scouts (a new type of swift cruiser made necessary by modern developments), nine torpedo-boat destroyers, four torpedo boats and four submarine boats. The permanent personnel of tire Navy is ,o be increased by 3875 officers and men, and provision is to be made for strengthening the Naval Reserve. This is by no means such a heroic programme as ardent naval reformers have demanded; but it is very good for a beginning. ’Hie “ minimum ” which Mr Arnold White states as necessary to bring up the Navy to a two-aud-a-half Power standard includes the construction of twelve battleships, sixty cruisers and fifty destroyers—six times more than it is now proposed to provide. Mr White also holds that there are 118 vessels of the Navy that ought to be gob lid of, as being “ useless in war and costly in peace,” while their retention “makes the country think that it is stronger than it really is.” Twenty-five of these ships are, under the proposals of the Admiralty, to be fitted with modern armaments; the remaining three-fourths are to remain in their unsatisfactory state. It will thus bo seen that even the large programme outlined in our cable messages will nob bring the Navy up to that standard which is required for absolute security. It can only bo hoped that the work of construction will he pushed on with all possible speed, so that in a year or two a further instalment of ships of war may he built. In the meantime, other nations are straining every nerve to increase them naval power, and Britain may not be able to do more than maintain the present relative strength of her Navy, Unless she places some contracts with American builders. The prominent fact about naval warfare is that it is almost impossible to retrieve initial disaster brought about by weakness or unreadiness. Mr Arnold White has emphasised this in a significant passage. “When,” he writes, “ we were beaten thrice in one week in South Africa, we could send Home for generals, to -Syria for donkeys, to America for mules and horses, to the colonies for brave men, and to all the world for the necessities of the Army. In the event of a naval defeat there is no time for this, for a fleet of battleships once beaten or even checked is the end of all things. The defeat of Britain’s fighting' fleet is final, irreparable, and eternal in its effects. There is no time to send round the corner for a naval Roberts. New ships are not made in Germany for sale to negligent nations who have forgotten in prosperity the lessons of national existence. For a fighting fleet to win, it must be ready to attack at half an hour’s notice.” Heavy as are the Naval Estimates, it is evident, if Britain is to be

effectively safeguarded, that the expenditure must be increased, so that the work of construction may not be allowed to lag. An important question is raised by the announcement that tho future composition of tho Australasian Squadron will be considered when tho colonial Premiers are in London for the coronation. It is generally recognised that Australia and New Zealand ought to increase their contributions, so that tho squadrons may be strengthened. Possibly, also, proposals may be made lor the Commonwealth starting naval construction on her own account. Though this idea does not meet with favour at present among Homo authorities, it is manifestly only a question of time when both Australia and New Zealand will become groat naval Powers, and when, by their ability to build warships, they will bo able to render as signal service to the Mother Country in a naval war as they have been able to give by v.heir land forces in the present South African campaign. The Dominion of Canada, too, may be expected to develop a shipbuilding industry. Allied' to this question of the strengthening of the naval squadrons is that of their distribution. Some authorities hold that there is now no need for maintaining a large and costly North American Squadron, when the vessels would bo of much more service elsewhere. The British Navy is divided into nine squadrons, and some of these, in addition to tha North American, could very well be dispensed with. Instead of having squadrons stationed at various points—this, of course, does not refer to such distant parts as Australasia—it is contended that flying squadrons, stationed in Home waters, and ready on an hour’s notice to go swiftly wherever required, would meet all requirements in (.hose days of telegraphs and steam. It is pleasing to find statesmen and publicists alive to these important and vital questions; and we have no doubt that the outcome of the activity now being manifested will be to place tho defences of the Empire on a thoroughly satisfactory fiasis.