CAMPAIGNING IN AFRICA

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXI, Issue 4301, 9 March 1901, Page 3

CAMPAIGNING IN AFRICA

AN ARMOURED TRAIN. T(IE <)RGANFSED WA ({. G UERILLA WARFARE. XKW ZEALAND CONTINGENTS. KIMBERLEY, January 23. After mi unpleasantly-long bat enforced sojourn at M a feting, owing to illness, I have at. last tnuunged to make a move, v.’liic'n, I trust, will ere loir; bring mo into direct toneli again with tne main body of New Zealanders now in Si dli Africa. L was one of a iiumb« r who left MufoUing for Kimberley in an iunbulutuio and passenger train on the li Ist inst. T!io journey, which imeii|iit(l about thirty-three hours, was not altogether witlioa; adventure, and hut for Hie protection afforded by the armoured train which accompanied ns wo would certainly have had a decidedly lively experience. .Inst before dark, and at a point about ten miles north of Vryhnrg, we were stall led by file familiar crack of rides, and. sticking our heads out of (he carriage windows, we soon discovered that oar position was one of some dancer ; for a commando of Boers could he distinctly seen in the fading light, aland DUD yards away on onr right. Tim f rains immediately pulled up, and in an instant (he Maxims were spitting lire and lead in the direction of the f"( . But Mr Boer was not prepared for serious business. When he found that we were protected, aml ready to give him a hearty recaption, he heal a. hasty retreat, and disappeared on (he horizon in a very short sruice. of lime. We proceeded on to Vryhnrg without further molestation- — the .B iers have a v/hoiosomo fear of armoured trains—and remained there nil id tlit,, as it was deemed unsafe to travel any further in the dark. On the previous night the line, had been blown up a few miles south of this village (Vryburg), and the news soon rescued 4is i that it was similarly treated at the i spot whom wo saw tin; commando. the I explosions being seen' ami hoard almost j immediately after we passed. Wo, i therefore, had a very narrow escape, j "'he Boers are very active in the vicini- j f.V of Yryburg. I learned that the gar- j rison had been engaged with a comman- | do finost probably (ho one that we en- i countered) up to 4 o’clock that day. ] and on the previous day a number of j our men, who had been .sent out to ar- ; rerb a. certain suspected farmer, had i boon captured, and had actually fallen : into the hands of the very man they ; had. boon sent out to arrest! Not one ] .shot was fired on either side, so the 1 Boers secured a- number of horses, rifles j and full bandoliers without any trouble. J Our men were greatly outnumbered, \ but. it is said that tiny bad no business fo he in the position in which they were surrounded. They belonged to a ' local corps, and either deliberately played into the bands of the enemy or committed 1 Git AYE ERRORS of judgment. Their action in siirrcndering without firing a shed; has been very severely criticised. I am _ very much afraid that the .anxiety to fill the ranks of the local mounted corps has created an opportunity for men of questionable character or loyalty fo come forward.

iin opportunity for men of (juestionahlo character or loyalty lo come forward. On tho following morning three long trains, which were preceded by an armoured train, and had been delayer! owing to the break in the line above mentioned, steamed into the station, and n few minute:-.’ later —about 9 a.m. —wo resumed onr journey south. V.'n v. ere, however, not destined to roach onr destination in peace. At a, point about twenty miles south of Vrybnrg (hero are some nice kopjes adjacent to tlie lino, and from these some “snipers” got to work. Our train stopped and. backed some distance, while the ar»rnonred train :Advanced and sent out scouts under cover of the guns, but the snipers could not bo located, though they evidently gob a fright, for their sniping soon ceased when they;saw that others were prepared to do a bit of sniping coo. Surely this indiscriminate sniping at trains containing only sick and wounded soldiers and unarmed .civilians, including women and children, should alienate the .sympathy of all right-minded persons, of whatever nationality they may be. The fact that special protection has to bo provided for trains of this nature is hardly a fluttering commentary on tho humanity of the Boer. Wo arrived’ at Kimberley at 0 p.rn. on the name day, without further mishap. There ia some fine country between Mafoklng and Kimberley, but tho farm.lias bplLtont and Ithala behind form’d üblh earthworks, »nd guns meet the eye at ovary turn, white every little town or station along tho lino bears; iinliuV f.iiknblu sigiTk of sanguinary conflict. Verily, ibfi in not a land of peace I And one sometimes really fools constrained to ask, Will it ever bo? Two hundred and fifty thousand British troops oounds largo, oven formidable, but when the position is seriously and fully considered, how small it really is! Double the number, rniao it to 500,000 British rifles and scatter those over thousands of

square miles of inhospitable country, and the mini her would still lie small, tho difficulties would still be great, and tho Boers would still have plenty of reo'm to move. ENGLAND’S WORK at tho beginning of the war was, with excusable ignorance, treated as a mere bagatelle ; to-day it is not understoodit is under-estimated. Nor . until tho bant shot has been fired, until every irbol in South Africa has had a surfeit of loot, will the task he fully appreciated. Not till then will the British nation realise tho enormous difficulties which now beset our generals—then, and not till thou, will the world know what

II; means to subdue a white people, imbued with a Targe degree of patriotism, mid Inflated with a much larger degree of faith in their own virtue and righteousness Verily, the task is stuueudous! But people at a distance, however much they might have road, cannot possibly grasp the situation in all its hearings, for no amount of writing could fully state the ease. History provides no' parallel, though it took -100,000 French troops five years to reduce the guerilla warfare in Spain: during the insurrection in Cuba 227,000 Spanish' soldiers were in the field : and although the war has raged for over three years, there are at the present moment over 100.000 Americans still fighting the guerillas in the Philippines. These facts provide us with sopie consolation.,ns well asvwilh food for unpleasant reflection, and they may assist the imagination or understanding of those who have mover been in this country; but nothing short of actual experience, ntld intelligent, unbiassed neivontd /observation on the spot could over lend to a, just and accurate conci'.uaioa' regarding tin's important subject. Tho average newspaper account onlv tends to ecu fuse the mind --it. onlv gives a ha ay idea of the r«»a! slate of affairs, and loaves tho reader in doubt, and with more false than cc-

•■nra'.e impressions, for the simple roa. Ab that the scene, and, consequently. I lie conditions are constantly changing ; and, I am sure, that none are more snr-

prised than those who land in the country with their minds full of the Ideas which prevail abroad concerning ' South Africa, and everything pertaining to the war. j ORGANISED WARFARE ■'and guerilla tactics must not he confounded, tor they have no veal relation 00 each other further than that both sys- • 1 ems cause a great deal of suffering and : h'ood'-ii. cl. When wc had the Boci j “ army ” to deal with, our generals knev. 'that by making certain definite prepa. r itions, and movement-s they cou.d, wit! .more or less certainty, bring about i ■ definite result. Above all, they almost ; invariably knew where to find the enc ■ mv, which in turn meant that they 1 could make battle almost at will, li j ; om ,i( lines happened, of course, time j the enemy started the hall rollin';, mic 1 cur commanders were occasionally ,sur ! prised, but they were generally able r< ‘anticipate his movements, and, there foie, to make a counter-move, and ii ! distribute their forces accordingly, amj the Boer anyy. which, was going te I Sweep the verdomed romneks into the -non became .a thing of the past. 1 Organised methods, however, demand j no'special knowledge, equipment, o; lability, though it must be admitted thai i peculiar local conditions and the introi (lection of smokeless powder and long, j range gun.? in held operations, hacked I no by Vi mounted and unprecedentedly mobile foe. created many unexpected difficulties from the very beginning, a no these certainly required a special effort and considerable intelligence and tact to overcome them. It is notorious that liio very knowledge which the Boer; lacked, and which was generally considered their weakest point—they were “only a mob of ignorant farmers”— proved to be their greatest safeguard and our general?,’ greatest stumblinghi ick. For had they not as muoli to unlearn as they had already learned: These things are generally understood and admitted. But,under the present ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES tho demands on our intelligence and military resources are phenomenal. All the difficulties which originally beset ut are now intensified and multiplied a thousandfold. Acquainted with every inch of the country, unencumbered with transport, and assisted by friends, male and female, young and old, wherever they go, the guerillas dart about here and there and everywhere in small bands, concentrating at convenient points when they aro ready to make an attack on weak or unprotected towns or convoy’?, trains, or Outposts, and dispersing when closely pursued or attacked. Tho guerilla Boer will not stand and fight unless, bis chances of success are one hundred to one. His policy is to haras?;, punish, kill, rob and loot whenever he can do so without danger to himself; te. hide when pursued, run when discovered; surrender when ho cannot run; and tc fight only when ho has a big stone in front of him, and his horso is ready and tho road is clear! On tho other hand, enr troops, for the most part, are absolute strangers in tho land, and are like “li-h out of "water” in this rough country ; they aro obliged to carry heavy burdens on their horses, or, worse still, on their own backs, and to encumber themselves with long strings of waggons to carry food for themselves and fodder for their horses, or face starvation on the veldt. Tho Dutchman takes good cave to save all ho can sparo and all ho can procure for his itinerant friend, who pays periodical visits to his_ larder, and always knows where to find it too. The British are constantly' harassed by unseen fees, who ".snipe” and feast, sleep and rod, while British soldiers plod on in mournful silence, by day and by night, over tho parched and blood-stained veldt in search —of what?—of (to use an expressive figure of sncech) “a needle in a haystack,” or a moh—it might be ten or ton hundred—of half-civihsed Boers roaming tho wilds of South Africa, and who are never to bo found where they are expected, and are always to he met when they are not expected, thanks to tho kind offices of the harmless (!) men and women amongst whom we move, and who will by-and-by draw nice sums from the Imperial exchequer : for their claims for compensation will be paid without a. murmur! . Our generals aro obliged to trust to glides (mostly Boers) for direction, and to”Kaffirs (who would soli their souls for ninopence) for intelligence; and as often as the suri appears in tho east they are deceived and sold. It is very easy for DRAWING-ROOM CRITICS to bask in luxury and comfort in the seclusion of their homes and criticise the actions of men who are at least as intelligent as themselves, and have the additional and great advantages of being on the spot with years of military experience and superior facilities to assist their judgment, and have heavy responsibilities resting on their shoulders, H is r.nhy, but certainly not becoming un- , dor tho circumstances, {or these wise folk to doUbonitojy sgciep jit men who flbk thoir reputations, if not tnmr bread apq butter, (in their official actions, and h a Y fi proved th(4r sincerity and mtoreat in their country in a manner baycod Uis- " puto; nmd unless these wiseacres aro prepared to advance the theory that all officers should be infallible, and to guarantee that tho Boers and other uncontrollable circumstances will not upset their calculations, we must expect mistakes to occur sometimes-*—even in the British army. I am no apologist for tho incompetent and habitual bungler —I adinit his existence —but it is absolutely sickening to read or listen to the sense- , less rubbish which some ill-informed and narrow-minded alarmists give vent to in nublic and in private concerning the veal workers and preservers or the Empire. Let silence prove the loyalty I of those patriots, who shriek about incompetence, etc., and declare with’ such preposterous assurance' that ‘The British Army is the laughing stock of the world,” for at a distance of thousands of miles from the soon© of action, they are, to sav the least, very incompetent judges and their utterances are either tho’ result of gross ignorance or of deliberate intc-ntion#to pervert the truth, and, in cither case, their conduct is most reprehensible and pernicious. r i<* the. unthinking, ill-infonncd traduce) - of our noble army it no doubt sounds very fine and large, when it is statedwithout any qualification whateVor, that 260.000 British troops cannot crush 26.000 “ignorant Boer farmers,” But has it ever occurred to these hot-headed extremists that close on 200,000 of these troops are practically ineffective-, not being available for offensive movements? And what .other tactic?; will subdue guerilla.?.? Have the Boers hnnj drnds cf towns and villages scattered all over South Africa, and thousands of miles of lines of communication to

guard and keep open? And wlion they had such duties, even on a limited scale, to perform, how/ long did they last as an integral force? Hoiv long did it take our generals to force them from their '■'impregnable” positions—even from heir capitals—and to smash, their army I into a thousand pieces? In those days our armv was comparatively free, and v/o had a foe to meet who at least made a stand, often a bravo stand, too, but always in an impregnable position. Things are different to-day. Our array is not free, but the Boers are—they are unencumbered —except those at .St. Helena and elsewhere. And when allowances are made for the contingencies indicated, and for the thousands who are always on the sick list, suffering from tho effects of a climate and conditions to which they are not inured, how many British troops are left to chase De Wet and the thousand GUERILLA BANDS

■hat arc now scattered all over the vast country, hiding in caves, kopjes, or bush to-day, and looting or running for all they aro worth, to-morrow ? How many troops of any other nationality would t take'to catch 26,000 well-mounted ind armed Boers, or guerillas, who are materially assisted by two or three hundred thousand accomplices, including men, women and children, both white ind black, whose cunning and treachery ire ten times more fatal to the British muse than all the Mausers' that ever jpoko defiance to the victors? Observing relative proportions, or allowing ton British to each Boor now in she field, how long would it take ten if England’s patriotic (!) military critics ir sportsmen, unacquainted as they aro with the country, to “ bag ” one innocent little “bunny” acquainted with -ivery track, burrow, nook and corner vithin the million or more square miles sf territory open to him. and advised, guided, sheltered, and fed by 96 per rent, of the population, while the remaining o per cent, merely look on, afraid to move, the pursuers themselves, ef course, being impeded and harassed exactly to the same extent ■•. hat “bunny” is assisted? Then, how much longer would it take tuem, under similar circumstances, but with thennumber reduced to per cent, of the whole number or force being _ required to guard lines of comunication, food supplies, etc., to catch or “bag” an armed, and dangerous Boer, who, owing to tho use of smokeless powder and his ability to get away quickly when necessary, can “ snipe,” and pick his heavily-laden prisoners off without exnosing himself to view or clanger? It has been estimated ancl affirmed by leading and recognised military authorities, that ono man

UNDER COVER, and armed with a modern long-range weapon, is as good as nine men in the open or making a charge; which means, of course, that the chances aro nine to one in favour of tho defender (and this, mark the point, when his whereabouts or position is known), or that to make an attack with any chance of success, it would require 900 men or more to take a. fortified or protected position held by only 100. Now, our troops have practically been on tho offensive almost from the very commencement of hostilities. But can it be said that the odds have been in our favour in accordance with these calculations—and they can hardly bo disputed—or that we have had anything like nine to one in the field available for offensive purposes, at any period during the war? Certainly not. Then by what method of reasoning, or stretch of imagination, can it bo said that “ the British army is the laughing-stock of the, world.” An eminent German military authority, at the head of the finest army in the world, in disgussing “Lessons of the War,” said, Wo could hardly have done better, and would probably have made similar mistakes.” This is flattering testimony, coming from such a quarter. And if England subdues the 25,000 guerillas now in the field within the next twelve or eighteen months, or even two years, the British army will have done wondoits ; for no country in the world affords better facilities for guerilla warfare than South Africa.