INDIAN AND COLONIAL TROOPS

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1523, 28 February 1901, Page 28

INDIAN AND COLONIAL TROOPS

am; uvnuiMan JLIVV/V'E O —♦ THE MEN WHO FIGHT BEST FOR THE EMPIRE. CAPTAIN CAMPBEBB’S EXJLOGITJM. In returning thanks at New • Plymouth;, after being presented with a kiwi mat, Captain Campbell, of the 18th Bengal Bancors, made some interesting rem arks on the value of Indian and •* colonial troops. In the course of his speech he said:-—For our regiments in India we prefer the men not to be able in.-ha.l It

to us that they have been to school, and not learned to fight. We want them to fight for the Empire, and we will net take the educated man. We have an old man, Misrikhan, RisaldarMajor, and if he is asked, “Can you speak English?” he says “No. I can’t speak English ; I fight for the Empire.’' Our men think that England is rather a -small place, and that there are only two places in the world —England and India. They have found out now what a large place the British Empire is. In travelling through the different States of Australia they saw troops in every centre, and here, at every if tie wayside station, they find soldiers of the King. Possibly you may think that we under-rate your troops because they have not the precision of arms that our troops have. I think all this smartness in drill is going out now. We don’t

want that smartness and machine-like drill. All the drill-books at present in use ought to be burned. What we want is called “ field cunning.” We know that the New Zealand troops and all their fellow-colonials have that

“field cunning” hern in them. Smartness goes for nothing on active service. In support of the remarks which I have just made, I have only recently read a letter from one of our very smartest soldiers in South Africa. ITe was, when I first knew him, adjutant of the smartest British cavalry regiment which I have ever seen. The smartness of that regiment was entirely the result of his own soldierly qualities and extreme hard work on his part. In the letter which I refer to he said that he felt inclined to weep for the many useless years of his life that he had spent in imparting smartness to the British cavalry soldier. Ho remarked that what one wanted in a cavalry soldier* was, first, good horsemanship, which we have heard all over the world you New Zealanders possess; and, secondly, the intelligence of being able to find their way in any country. The remainder that the soldier requires in the way of seal, pluck and discipline are sure to follow these first two traits. As a. further example of what I have just been saying, I would mention that one of the best men of my regiment—a. noncommissioned officer, who was in charge of the advanced party of an ordinary advanced guard—led part of the regiment on its way back to barracks into an impassable ravins. The officer who was commanding this portion of the regiment said to the man: “When you go out coursing with me, you are a very clever man; but when you put on a uniform coat you lose your cunning.’’ The non-commissioned officer said he was very sorry, but the drill book laid dowu fthat he was to keep on an occasion of this sort at a regulation distance- from the head of the column, and in keeping his place he could not avoid leading that column into that impassable ravine. Some thirty years ago General Sir George Chesney prophesied that we should trust the native soldiery so completely that eventually, instead of having ten or a dozen British officers with each native regiment, we should have not more than a commandant and an adjutant. This would throw more responsibility oil the native officers, and the more responsibility that is thrown on them the better work they would do. This has been exemplified in the fact that every day we are raising more and more native States troops. The leaders of the native States have their own troops, and command them, and all that we do is to supply on© inspecting officer to go round each group of four or five nativo States. When you find native officers detached from their regiments in command of a troop or company, the fact of their having that responsibility thrown on them is the best training that they possibly can have, and these native officers can be thoroughly relied upon. They know their duties and know how to carry them out. The old idea was that the British Army should be armed with the newest class of weapon, and the native army with am obsolete clas3, so that the former should always have the advantage of the native army if it ever came to any occurrence such as 1357 coming on again. Now, however, we have come to the idea that this change of arm is all nonsense. Arrangements have already been made to arm the whole native army with the latest firearms. In concluding his remarks, Captain Campbell said :—There was a question raised as vo whether the men of this contingent could possibly exist away from the ship for two days. I bad asked many of the native officers and men whether they could exist for two days away from the ship. Their answer to me was that if they didn’t get one single thing to eat for three days away from the ship they would come to me on the fourth day, and they would tell me that they were hungry and thirsty.As it turned out, they had fed not only in the most hospitable manner, but with most lavish disregard of economy in food and drink.