THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1940 JAPAN'S THREAT

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23780, 7 October 1940, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1940 JAPAN'S THREAT

Is the compact between the Axis Powers and Japan to produce, as an early result, a breach of diplomatic relations between Tokio and Washington? No definite answer to this question can yet be given, but it would be a mistake to regard the possibility of war between Japan and the United States as either negligible or remote. The bellicoso attitude of prominent Japanese spokesmen is unmistakable. Mr. Matsuoka's fiery words cannot altogether be put aside as since withdrawn or explained away, for as Japan's Foreign Minister he carries a responsibility above others, and the association of his name, in news from Tokio, with a point-blank challenge to the United States, would not have happened without reason. Even the removal of his authority from the challenge does not make any serious difference. The Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, has said virtually the same. What he added in apparent desire to mollify this declaration was of little value as a gesture of peace: as plainly as possible, he thrust upon the United States the onus of aiding Japan in getting her way in East Asia, and that is anything but a peaceful way, as events in the past three years clearly prove. In a subsequent utterance Prince Konoye has reiterated his uncompromising demand, asserting that the question of war or peace in the Pacific depends upon whether the United States and Japan respect and understand each other's positions—an innocuous statement only when it is unnaturally considered apart from his added threat, that should the United States refuse to accept Japan's version of her position and persist in regarding her alliance with the Axis Powers as a hostile act, there is no other course but war.

It is immaterial, therefore, whether the voice is that of Mr. Matsuoka or of his supreme political chief; from either, the national announcement is in effect an ultimatum, and unless there is a prompt assurance to the contrary Washington will be perfectly justified in treating it as such. Of its origin there can be little doubt. The language of Prince Konoye, no less than that of the statement attributed to his Foreign Minister, relates it to the policy of the Axis Powers. Against this interpretation only one argument can be advanced with any show of reason; it is that Japan has said she has no intention of taking part in the European conflict, a disavowal that might seem to imply entire aloofness from the plans of Hitler and Mussolini. But this plea has not the slightest force. W,hv should Japan have an alliance at all with Italy and Germany if a mutual purpose is not to be served'? Something much more realistic than the tripartite anti-Comintern Pact has been frankly brought into existence. That, if it really was what it purported "to be, had never any validity: Germany and Italy both confessed as much, when the arrangement between Hitler and Stalin was afterwards made. This is none other than a military alliance, with an eye to the probability that something would soon have to be done to offset the aid the United States was giving to Britain. The most obvious move was to employ Japan in embarrassing the United States, and no secret has been made of the intention that, in return for Japan's contribution in this way, she was to profit by an ItaloGerman assurance of a free hand in East Asia.

How far this assurance can be made effective is doubtful. Hitler and Mussolini cannot be greatly concerned about that aspect. Possibly they will be far from reluctant, should circumstances tempt them sufficiently, to sell Japan's hopes for a "new order" in East Asia to Stalin at a figure satisfactory to all three conspirators. Stalin has his own ambitions in East Asia, and will not be at all disposed to consider Japanese feelings in the matter ; and he has his own claims, upon Hitler at all events, for consideration. The Rome-Berlin-Tokio alliance, consequently, may prove to be not a whit more serviceable to Japan than the tripartite antiComintern Pact. However, Japan may snatch at the chance of an advantage just as eagerly and blindly as Hitler and Mussolini are bent upon seeing the United States so entangled for a while with Japan that American aid to Britain will be restricted. Each of the three in the alliance is, it seems, ready to take a gambler's chance at this juncture, for the eventual policy of Russia is quite uncertain, the United States may take heavy toll of a weakened Japan, and Britain's defence, developed into offence, will ere long have to be faced.