THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1939 RUSSIA IN MIDDLE EAST

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23488, 27 October 1939, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1939 RUSSIA IN MIDDLE EAST

Russia has suddenly changed from I a passive to an active role in foreign I policy, but. her real aims remain J obscure. How seriously her latest j moves in the Caucasian region of , the Middle East should be taken is j not yet apparent. A member of the ! Soviet Socialist' Union, Armenia,! has made demands for the. return of ' a province lost to Turkey. If the report is substantial that 300,000 ! Turkish troops have been concentrated to defend this south-eastern corner of the Black Sea region, the Angora Government must regard the. Russian menace as serious. The same conclusion is suggested by news of the meeting in Istanbul of representatives of Turkey, Iran (Persia), Irak and Afghanistan. The three last-named countries block the line of any Russian advance to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, with Turkey lying on the western flank. Soviet stirrings in the Transcaucasian region would naturally concern them because Russian expansion. in this region at the expense of any one of them would affect the security of all. Each would find it difficult, if not impossible, to withstand Russian pressure in isolation, but collectively they form a formidable bloc, reinforced by the natural obstacles, presented by the mountainous terrain and the lack of modern communications. Railways : arc few and, although oil fuel should be plentiful in the region that includes the Russian, Iranian and Irakian petroleum deposits, few good roads exist. It should hardly be necessary to add that the British and Indian Governments are as vitally interested in fending any Russian thrust southward as the four States of the Middle East now conferring in Istanbul. Britain is formally allied with Turkey and Irak and has for generations asserted her own and India's special interest in the destinies of Iran and Afghanistan. It is a matter of the deepest import to Britain and the Empire if Russia is considering a return to the Middle Eastern policy that she pursued at the end of last century. The Middle East is the nodal point of Imperial communications, including the land route to India, the Suez Canal, and now the junction of air routes between Europe, Asia, Australia and Africa. It 'also contains the important oil deposits of Mosul, Iran and the Persian Gulf, which reduce British dependence on American supplies. The penetration of Russia into this Imperial nervecentre could not, therefore, be regarded except with the utmost gravity. India would also be intimately concerned. Her interest in the Persian Gulf and Irak was expressed during the Great War in the Mesopotamian campaign. "While these points arising out of Russian moves south of the Caucasus demand attention, their bearing on the present world situation cannot be estimated until Moscow's intentions | become plainer. In the past Russian | policy has inclined to the East or the West, or to the warm waters of the South, but never in more than one direction at the same time. She has never felt or been strong enough to exert pressure in two directions at once.,At present, however, she seems to be omnipresent on the great Eurasian Continent. She joined Germany in partitioning Poland, she is busy bullying the Baltic States, her troops are reported on the Bessarabian frontier of Rumania, the Caucasian frontier of Turkey, and in the western provinces of China. Little wonder if Russia has concluded an armistice with Japan on the borders of Manchuria. Even so, it is hardly credible that she can be making demonstrations in effective force on so many fronts simultaneously. If she is exerting even half the military effort indicated, one thing is certain —she can have no surplus supplies of food, oil or raw materials to assist Germany in surviving the British blockade. The last occasion on which Russia turned her attention to the Middle East was in the 30 years following the Berlin Congress of 1878. New Zealand possesses in the obsolete forts at her main ports tangible evidence of the seriousness with which the Russian bogey was regarded in the 'eighties. At the Congress, Disraeli in his role of "honest broker" succeeded in heading Russia -away from the Balkans and the Dardanelles. Baulked of her objective—the warm waters to the South—in one direction, Russia sought to emerge further East. She turned from the Dardanelles and the East Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. To-day, just 51 years later, Turkey backed by the Entente has again fended a Russian lunge toward the Balkans and Dardanelles, a repulse followed almost immediately by Russian moves in the Middle East. To suppose that, in these critical times, the Soviet is really interested in redeeming a small Armenian province does not seem sound. If she is moving in the Caucasian region, her aims are more extensive. The old dream of an outlet to the Indian Ocean may be haunting her. If she is really intent on that project, the implications for Britain, India and the Empire are plain, to say nothing of the four small nations that bar any Russian advance. Another implication would be that Russia is in earnest in seeking a rapprochement with Japan. If she is turning to the Middle East again, she would wish to be quit of complications in the Far East. Thus the Sino-Japanese struggle may be affected. And the final implication would be that Russia feels so secure in the West, so sure of German friendship or of German preoccupation with the Entente, that she can turn to the Middle East. The development of the new affair in the Caucasus should therefore be closely watched, because much else hangs on itt