THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1937 AMERICA AND EASTERN ASIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22823, 2 September 1937, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1937 AMERICA AND EASTERN ASIA

What is being thought in the United States about the war in the Orient 1 Little is being said, almost "nothing officially. That does not mean unconcern. I) or reasons that are fairly obvious, there must be concern. Will it be deep and compelling enough to produce action? If so, what action? Less than a fortnight ago an anti-aircraft shell fell upon the deck of the Augusta, American flagship on the China Station, as she lay off Shanghai. By it one man was killed and eighteen were wounded. Whence it came was not known. Of course there was a stir in Washington, but Mr. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State decided that American officials at Shanghai could ...deal with the episode, which would be treated as merely an unfortunate and almost inevitable accident, not affecting American policy in the Far Eastern crisis. A few members of the Senate thought differently, but nothing was done. Since then, however, the President Hoover incident has happened, that American liner being hit by a Chinese bomb. Apparently she was mistaken by a Chinese airman for a Japanese transport. This incident is understood to have induced a change in official American thought. China has expressed profound regret and offered immediate redress, but although nothing further may arise directly from the incident its influence is considerable. As one outcome the United States may join Britain in creating a convoy system, in order to ensure safety in the withdrawal of nationals and in other means of succour; there is good authority for believing that an American cruiser division will be despatched for this purpose to the danger zone. Action is certainly pending, and it would not now be surprising if the day-to-day communication between the President and the State Department resulted in something more than the kindly sort of appeal to both combatants the Secretary of State has already sent. The United States has large investments in China and Japan. Those in China, which are mostly mercantile, are alone considerable enough to occasion anxiety about the progress of the present conflict. Since "the unfortunate and almost inevitable accident" to the Augusta the menace to ■ foreign life and property has noticeably increased, and there are signs that popular pressure may constrain Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Cordell Hull to adopt a firmer attitude, particularly in dealing with Japan as the aggressor. Less than any other country, according to a current American opinion, should the United States passively accept the prospect of Japanese control of the Orient; yet the reasons for this are probably not fully understood by many of those voicing the dictum. Much more than the actual investments is at stake. Their loss could be borne with comparative ease, but were Japan to gain such an ascendancy in Eastern Asia that she could close its trade to non - Asiatic nations the consequent loss to American industry and commerce would be no light thing. For generations the United States has enjoyed a highly profitable trade with China, beginning with whaling enterprises and associated general commerce and extending to the exploits of the famous tea-clippers. These activities tended to become concentrated in the region of Canton. In the north, Japan long remained shut to Western commerce, and an American naval mission in 1845 failed to j>ersuade the Japanese to enter into a treaty. Afterwards came the expeditions of Commodore Perry, of the United States Navy, in 1853 and again in 1854 —at flrst with four warships and 560 men, next with ten warships and 2000 men. Japan was convinced of the wisdom of yielding. So, by the compulsory negotiation of a treaty of peace and friendship, two Japanese ports were opened and detailed arrangements were made for the placing of American consuls or agents and the development of American commerce. Good as this was for Japan, the method of its introduction was deeply resented. Afterwards Japan cherished a further sense of injury as Japanese migrants, to the United States, going there under strong inducement, were subsequently denied rights to possess land, and in recent years there have been further heartburnings about migration laws, comparative naval and the question of recognising Manchukuo. In spite of much surface cordiality, a deep-seated antagonism exists between the two Powers. If Japan should pursue a campaign of conquest in Eastern Asia there would be a violent American reaction; a hint of it is in the resolution of the Chicago Maritime Conference demanding an enforced economic embargo on Japan. Without territorial holdings on the Asiatic continent, and possessing only the Philippine Islands near it, the United States cannot, nevertheless, lightly view a challenge to the century-old insistence on unhampered opportunity of economic exploitation in the Orient, particularly in China. Related to this is the American policy in the Pacific. Too much is at stake for Washington to be at ease.