HAIG DEFIED

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22393, 14 April 1936, Page 9

HAIG DEFIED

STOBY OF GEEAT WAS CANADIAN GENERAL'S ACTION POINT WON WITH HAIG [from OUR OWN' correspondent] VANCOUVER. March 25 How General Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps, defied Sir Douglas Haig, when he was ordered to send the Canadian troops to relievo the Australians and the New Zealand Division at Passchendaele, in October, 1917, is revealed for the first time in MacLean's Magazine, published in Toronto. The editor explains that be suppressed the facts, several years ago, as the author advised him that Sir Arthur Currie had requested that they bo not published during his lifetime. The author of the present article, Colonel Wilfred Bovey, was on General Currie's staff. •' In July, August and September, 1917, the British casualties were over 70,000, of which 10,000 were Australians. On October 4, the third attack by the Australians, the Official Australian History records: " British troops on the Western Front stood face to face with the possibility of decisive success. Prior to their fourth attack, on October 12, General Currie was summoned to G.H.Q." Interview With Haig " Currie was a soft-hearted man," says Colonel Bovey. '" He hated the thought of what men had to endure; ho was literally sick after a battle. He had one principle about fighting: the more rounds the gunners fired before a battle, the fewer lives would be spent for a victory; the more roads were built, the easier would be the part of the troops." Currie's interview with Haig is thus chronicled by Colonel Bovey:— " Currie," said Haig, "I am ordering the Canadian troops to go north. I shall want you to take Passchendaele."

" Yes, sir," and the rest of the reply Currie did not tell. He was a simple, direct man; he spoke to any other man as an equal, even if the other man were commander-in-chief. But he ended by asking why Passchendaele had to bo taken, what justified the awful cost. " Our casualties will be at least 250 per battalion," he said, " 12,000 for 48 battalions. It will cost 3000 more for roads, 1000 for service—l6,ooo.'' "Currie," said Haig, "a victory is absolutely necessary to the cause of the Allies. Passchendaele must be taken."

Gondition Stated Currie still demurred, says the writer. Could not the Canadians be kept for the Cambrai operation? "No." Haig told of the depletion of his other divisions. " And Passchendaele must be taken," he added. " Very well, sir. But let me say this, if we are to go to that area we shall not fight under any army commander but one we know and who has our confidence. If we go we jnust fight under Plumer. We know him and we know Harington." "Had any corps commander ever undertaken to select the army commander under'whom he would fight?" asks Colonel Bovey. Probably hot. " Currie," said Haig, " do you realise that this is insubordination?" " Yes, sir, but I cannot help it. I am responsible for my men and I am not going to see them killed for want of preparation." Commander Gives In He was fighting a battle; he must make Haig see his point. What happened to him later did not matter. Finally Haig gave way, as most men did when Currie was trying to save lives. He was to win another argument of the same kind next year. " And there must be plenty of guns, and guns that will shoot," insisted Currie. " I will not take over emplacements for guns and,a lot of disabled artillery. And there must be roads "

Currie knew what mud was and did not need to go to Passchendaele to see. He pictured that toru-up area in hi« too vivid imagination. He won those points, too, but it was with a heavy heart that he went back to his headquarters at Camblain l'Abhe.

" Plumer's Second Army took over the battle front," says Colonel Bovey. " The Canadians fought four battles in the mire. The Canadian Corps had been told to take Passchendaele, so we took Passchendaele.''

The attack 011 October 12, 1917, was the one made in the mud against undamaged pill-boxes protected by thick belts of uncut wire and which was disastrous to the New Zealand Division. Although it was not stated so officially, it was freely believed in the division at the time that General Currie had taken a strong stand with the Higher Command and that he had refused to commit the Canadian Corps to the attack without adequate artillery and other preparation. Moreover, he avoided the frontal assault on Bellevue Spur, in front of Passchendaele, on which the Higher Command had directed the New Zealanders.