METHODS OF WAR

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22247, 23 October 1935, Page 10

METHODS OF WAR

native advantages BRITISH OFFICER'S VIEWS MODERN ARMS DISCOUNTED GUERILLA TACTICS PREVAIL A very interesting appreciation of rach troops as. the Abyssinians is given by 3. H. Driberg, formerly a British political officer in the Sudan Service and district commissioner in the Uganda Service, 1912-1926, in the "New Stat.**man and Nation. On the east and south the mountain fastnesses of .Abyssinia proper, be sajs, are guarded by deserts in which roam extremely warlike tribes like the Danakil in the north and the Galla and Somali in the south. While these tribes are doubtless vulnerable to modern methods of warfare, it is possible to exaggerate their vulnerability, as the difficulties of the campaign in British Somaliland after the war proved. They ure both bra to anu elusive, and the ' waterless stretches of desert are their best ally against anything short of attack by air. As soon as the highlands art- reached the air loses nearly all its value as an offensive medium. The altitude and consequent rarity of the air not only make it impossible to carry heavy loads, but make it difficult for loaded aeroplanes to rise. The'dense forests. precipitous gorges honeycombed with caves, the absence of pointers like roads and terse towns, give the Abyssinians comparative immunity against attack by air. ' • Ambush Tactics It is a country admirably suited for ambushes and guerilla tactics, and the Abyssinians are adepis at this form of fghtiiig. Th<ir intelligence service is admirable; their, tactics are to avoid pitched battles and to utilise the natural advantages in breaking up the forces of the enemy, who will then be vulnerable to unexpected attacks of short duration, both on the march and in camp Attacking forces will find their progress slow, mountain tracks protected by rock avalanches, wells and iliprings poisoned in < advance.

In the south the almost inaccessible mountains,, are guarded by rock fortresses at the most vulnerable points, fortresses which in the absence of heaiy artillery can only be taken at enormous icost of life; and it is one thing t® transport artillery orer the mountains of Northern Italy, near tho array's ibase and with every facility available, ibut quito a different thing when climate Hind environment conspire to handicap j Ihe attacking force, and when malaria, ' dysentery and scurvy have weakened I the morale of the attackers.

Personal Experience One example may perhaps drive this i home, even it in point of magnituda the comparison is ludicrous. 1 was once appointed to act as political officer with j si military expedition against a small mountain tribe on the borders of Abyssinia, a tribe which differs little from those within Abyssinia itself. Our force consisted of three double companies of magnificently trained native troops, who in that climate and confronted •»rith conditions such as we met—but conditions nevertheless considerably less arduous than are to be found in Abyslinia—are infinitely superior to any European troops. There was a full complement of machine and Lewiis guns, and the British officers were men of long experience, inured to bush warfare, not men fresh out from Europe. The terrain was mountainous and broken by precipitous gorges, up and down jvhich the attacking forces had to move in single file, constantly menaced by ambushes, night, attacks and rock avalanches. Forests afforded admirable cover lor the enemy, and at the higher altitudes in the bamboo forests the bullets ricocheted off the bamboos in a manner as alarming to US as to the enemy. Progress wan always slow, and on one occasion, when the undergrowth was appallingly thick and had to be cutaway with machetes, we only covered 2CO yards in a single day, ■without seeing any of the enemy. The enemy, on the other hand, were so mobile that they nearly alwayii anticipated our movements. Satire Ascendancy The expedition dragged on for three months with hardly any result of a military nature; our casualties and .theirs were about equal, though they depended on spears and possess**! fewer fhan 20 rifles, most of which were so antiquated as to be dangerous to the user. We, both officers and men, inured as we were to the tropics, suffered considerably from the climatic conditions and the combination of altitude, sun and mountaineering. Both malaria and dysentery intervened, and even in three months we experienced a number of cases of scurvy. Our igreatest shock was to discover, long after the ex;peditson was over, thai the enemy, whose strength, deceived by their mobility, we ! estimated to be in the region of 10.000. j actually numbered fewer than 2000 j spearmen. I