WAR SIDELIGHTS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22240, 15 October 1935, Page 10

WAR SIDELIGHTS

ITALIAN INVASIONS TWO DISTINCT OPERATIONS MAJOR MOVEMENT FROM SOUTH It may bo assumed by those who have not studied the terrain of Abyssinia that the Italian plan of campaign is to drive columns from the north, northeast and south-cast to converge upon Addis Ababa. Experts have emphasised, however, that the difficulties of the country and the absence of # roads will compel the campaign to be fought in two distinct sections. It would take years for a modern army carrying its supply roads with it to reach Addis Ababa from the north. Writing two months ago the correspondent of the Times in the Abyssinian capital said: — "Military opinion here holds that the plain of Adowa, scene of Italy's humiliation, can be occupied in a day by the Italians. It is thought that Italy may accompany this advance by a turning movement from the extreme west of Eritrea, moving; up the easy valley of the Barraka-Gash, which is never less than 37 miles broad, perhaps as far as Gondar. But even in a country so well furnished as the Barraka-Gash Valley, communications and supply will be highly vulnerable, unless Italy proposes to create a military precedent and use only the air for these. The outflanking movement will eventually extend a flank to tho enemy, who in this part are a race of particularly tough fighting mountaineers.

"Thus the Gondar theory, though widely held here, does not greatly impress tho Abyssinian War Ministry. Rather they think that an Adowa campaign finished with eclat will be followed by a general movement of Eritrean troops by sea to Somaliland. Here an advance is expected from Walwal, behind which road-building has been much more intense than at other points like tho Webbe Shebeli and the Dolo-Lugh angle, to guard which the Ethiopians are at this moment concentrating a few thousand troops at Sarrar. Tho Walwal movement, with its right flank guarded by the British frontier, will, the Abyssinians think, develop into the major movement of the war."

GUERILLA TACTICS CONFLICTING ABYSSINIAN IDEAS A question that is constantly being discussed is whether the Abyssinians will adopt guerilla tactics which have been advised by their European instructors, or give battle en masse, in which case the modem weapons of th© Italians would have full play. Writing on this subject Mr. Ladislas Farago, a Hungarian journalist, says that if guerilla tactics are adopted Italy's task will be impossible. She might gain a few spectacular successes on the frontiers, but after that the war would settle down into a grim campaign of attrition. The impetuous Amlmra warriors, however, might rest their hopes of victory rather on self-esteem than upon expert advice and by massing for assault make themselves an easy Although the Emperor has advised his people in the capital to scatter when bombing begins, it is possible fthat even he may have false notions about the tactics of action. Mr. Farago mentions in his book that on one occasion having watched a sham fight at his officers' training school the Emperor was somewhat surprised an even annoyed when the Swedish instructors gave their decision in favour ot the force which had kept in cover. One of his Court naid: "War is war and not blind-man's buff. Only wwards sneak away from the enemy. The Abyssinian fights more chivalrously, man to man, and will never fire at his enemy from ambush." —'

NILE IRRIGATION • IMPORTANCE OF TSANA Britain's rights over Lake Tsana, the headwaters of the Blue Nile, res on an old treaty, the importance of which is that no further irrigation can be carried out in the Sudan, except through conservation at Tsana. A rumour has persisted that it would be possible for any nation controlling Tsana easily to divert the water, in which case the existing irrigation works above Khartoum would be jeopardised. For this there, seems no foundation, yet importance attaches to the ownership. Writing in the Times, Mr. L. I. Athill says:—■ "Lake Tsana is a large basin, into which a great volume of water is carried each year by tributary streams. This water passes from the lake over a natural spillway into the Blue Nile. Raise the level of the spillway, and you will at the outset impound an additional volume of water, reducing . the supply reaching the Sudan Jiy that volume. But subsequently the discharge of the lake will be exactly the same as it was before, except for the additional wastage by evaporation due to the increased area of the lake. Nor can this discharge be diverted from the Blue Nile by any possible means. The melting snows and the rain which falls in the catchment area of the lake will in due course find their way into the gorge of the Blue Nile and along it to the Sudan and Egypt, no matter who owns the lake. "But its ownership," ho adds, "does carry with it the power to grant or deny facilities for improving the water supply of those countries. As han been pointed out, 'effective conservation (or perhaps, more correctly, the maximum of effective conservation), can only be accomplished by regulation work at Lake Tsana.' The impounding o): an additional volume of water in the lake and the release of this wator as and when required has been the ambition of those responsible for the water supply of Egypt and the Sudan for at least two decades. The Ethiopian Government has been slow to grant facilities purely from motives of suspicion and from ingrained conservatism. No European Power controlling the lake would bo swayed by either of these motives, but if it had not already a large stake in the countries to bo benefited, it would probably want a considerable quid pro Especially a Power with Mediterranean ambitions, and wishing to strengthen its political or economic influence in Kgypt would find a bargaining asset of immense value in the ownership of Lake Tsana. Is not this, and not any positive threat to the water supply of Egypt and the Sudan, tho true crux of the matter ii"