THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1933 PROSPECTS AT WASHINGTON

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21469, 18 April 1933, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1933 PROSPECTS AT WASHINGTON

In the statement made by Mr. MacDonald to the House of Commons concerning his visit to Washington this week, a helpfully clear indication was given of the nature and scope of the forthcoming conference with Mr. Roosevelt. This statement disposes of the fear that the meeting might end without any sort of agreement. At the same time, it so definitely lifts the conference from the level of a merely personal chat that encouragement is given to the hope that a united plan of action will result. Quite frankly, the British Prime Minister has announced that the two Governments have already come to an agreement favouring a candid examination, of the war-debt question. This means much, especially when it is remembered that the British Ambassador at "Washington has, by personal interview with both Mr. Roosevelt and the British Cabinet, made each side aware in some detail of the position as it is seen from opposite points of view. Hitherto there has been room to doubt whether the two Governments would together get to grips with the question. This doubt arose from the pre-election reluctance of Democrats and Republicans alike to commit themselves to any moderation of the national demand for full and due payment, a reluctance that was unmistakably maintained after the election. Mr. Roosevelt's announcement of his readiness to discuss the question with debtors aroused no responsive enthusiasm in Congressmen. Some of them, indeed, reiterated their objections to deferring or reducing the instalments. Even the palpable surrender of Congress to the President's demand for freedom of action in domestic financial affairs did not promise subservience in relation to the debts. As a body, Congress is still uncommitted. However, Mr. Mac Donald's words, while carefully avoiding any promise of so much as a provisional agreement prepared for submission to parliamentary ratification on either side, declare that the matter is not going to be one for decision by experts, and that this personal, preliminary discussion will be candid. On this subject, therefore, there should be a good beginning. That the scope of the conversations will be usefully comprehensive is indicated by Mr. Mac Donald's naming of wholesale-price levels and disarmament as included in the agreed order of reference. Involved in the first of these subjects are the trade relations between the two countries, including tariffs, exchange and currency, and it is significant that with the Prime Minister are the Economic Adviser to the British Government and a representative of the Board of Trade. This is as thorny a subject as war debts, and as it is understood to be Mr. Roosevelt's intention to ventilate the American proposal of linking the two, in an endeavour to gain economic concessions in exchange for modification of the war-debt demand, it will raise an equally vital issue. Naturally, Mr. Mac Donald could not say anything in advance on this; the idea of a bargain of this nature has arisen in America and can be introduced only from that side. Besides, Mr. MacDonald is doubly precluded from advancing it, for the Lausanne agreement stands in the way of his offering terms, in relation to war-debt modification, that would establish any trade position not equally applicable to other European debtors to America, and the Ottawa agreements obstruct any offhand readjustment of fiscal relations with a foreign country. It will be a gain, however, to have the question frankly faced, even if no commitment can at present be made by either party. Neither the pact made at Lausanne nor the Ottawa agreements can be reasonably viewed as beyond the pale of discussion. They plainly affect all that America is known to be wishful to arrange, and a heart-to-heart exchange of confidences about them should enable their intricate implications to be afterwards faced without harsh judgment or hopeless ultimatums. Mr. MacDonald's position, when bargaining is mentioned, will be incontestably strong, and Mr. Roosevelt's inevitable acknowledgment of this can be taken as an assured basis of amicable conference. On the still broader forum of disarmament and the World Economic Conference there should be as useful an interchange of views. Close agreement between the two Englishspeaking Powers can do much to save the Disarmament Conference from threatened futility. The British proposals have been given right-of-way at Geneva and have received tentative endorsement sufficient to make them a basis of general agreement, but disappointing experience suggests that this endorsement is insufficient to ensure final acceptance. They may have to be amended before such acceptance, but with America's aid their substance can be preserved in the crucial test. On the World Economic Conference, whose agenda has been a subject on which Washington has been disposed to dictate, Mr. Mac Donald can now speak with influence as its chosen chairman; and if, as is expected, Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, is joined in the conversations, definite preparation for the preliminary international committee at Washington should be made. He is recognised in America as an authority on fiscal questions. Mr. Roosevelt's choice of him has been hailed as a promise that America's tariff policy will be thoroughly overhauled. If the prophets are right, the United States will enter the conference with a less rigid adherence to traditional views ; at all events, the preliminary committee will be expectant of a change toward greater elasticity. The outcome of the MacDonald-Roosevelt conversations may not be known officially then, but they are bound to bring a welcome definiteness where uncertainty has too long ruled.