GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18551, 8 November 1923, Page 6

GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

Ik'&■&■>«: ■'■•,■'■■:"... >■■■■ • " . | CSHUIKCHILL memoirs. MILITARY EFFORT INVOLVED 'NAVY BECOMES SUBSIDIARY BY THE BT. HON. WINSTON S. cmmcmiiL. (Copyright.')

Although the War Council had come to a decision with which I heartily agreed, and no voice had been raised against the naval plan, I thought I must come to a clear understanding with the First Sea Lord. I had noticed the incident of his leaving the table and Lord Kitchener following him Co the window and arguing with him, and I did not know what was the upshot in his mind. After lunch I asked him to come and see me in my room, and we had a long talk. I strongly urged him not to turn back from the Dardanelles operations; and in the end, after a long and very friendly discussion, which covered the whole Admiralty and naval position, he definitely consented Co undertake its There never has been any dispute between us subsequently as to this. •' When I finally decided to go in," said Lord Fiaher to the Dardanelles Commissioners, "' .1 went the whole hog, totus porcus." Wo then repaired to the afternoon War Council meeting.. Admiral Oliver, Chief of the Staff, coming with is, and I announced on behalf of Che Admiralty, and with the agreement of Lord Fisher, that we had decided to undertake the task with which the War Council had charged us so urgently. This ] took as the point of final decision. After it I never looked back. We had left the region of discussion and conCation, of balancings and misgivings. The matter had passed into the domain of action.

k The Only Rebel." I am m no way concealing tho great and continuous pressure which I pub upon the old Admiral. This pressure was reinforced by Lord Kitchener's personal influence-, bv the collective opinion of the War Council, and by tho authoritative decision of the Prime Minister. It was a pressure, no? only of opinion, which was i verwhelming, but of arguments to which ho could find no answer. Moreover, there was :'n addition on the technical side, a very great weight of support at the Admiralty. " Naval opinion was unanimous," said Lord Fisher afterwards. " Mr. Cborchill had them all on his side. I was the only rebel." Let us now see exactly what it waa the Admiralty had committed itself to do. We had undertaken to begin a serious bombardment of thi Dardanelles forts, and to attempt, without tho aid of an army, by a new and gradual method of piecemeal redaction, to fight our way slowly into the Marmora. But we believed we could withdraw from fhis operation at almost any stage if the difficulties and the Turkish resistance proved unexpectedly great. And so far as the Ad- ■ miralty was concerned — that is to say, from general consideration of policy and prestigewe could indisputably have broken off the "operation at any point; and we did in fact do so, to myf great regret, after March 18. Using Condemned Ships. Further, the ships we proposed to risk were almost all of them valueless for any other purpose. Four of them, indeed, had already been condemned to be scrapped, and most of the others were of a similar type. Had they not been used in this way they would have rusted;; in oar southern dockyards. They were only fit for subsidiary bombarding operation's.. % The'jr were surplus to all the vessels by which our supremacy at sea was maintained. It would have been simple murder M their crews to put them where modern German battleships "might catch them. They were quite useless for a fleet action. Yet here in the Dardanelles these old vessels might, if adl went well, change tho history of the world, cut the Turkish Empire in two, paralyse its capital, unite the Balkan States against our enemies, rescue Serbia, help the Grand Duke in the main operations of the war, and by shortening its duration save countless lives. ,". V ' ; ■'*.■ '•''■- We had undertaken this operation, not because wo thought it * was the ideal method of attack, but because we were told that no military force was available, and in response to the appeals for help from Lord Kitchener and the Grand Puke. We had undertaken it with our surplus resources after we had successfully and fully discharged and provided for all those great duties of the Navy, the safety of the British Isles, the clearance of the seas, the protection of commerce, the transportation of troops— which perhaps the Admiralty deserved some i, measure of confidence and gratitude. So far as lam concerned, I undertook this task out of a sincere wish to aid

the common cause, and to make the weight of the Navy tell as effectively as possible This, I thought, was my duty. Searching my heart, i cannot regret the effort. It was good to go as far as we did. The crime was not to persevere. >*■; "No Troops Available." Mr. -'Churchill's statement that 10 divisions, including two Australian divisions in Egypt, were available for moving to the Dardanelles at any moment in January, 1915, elicited a letter to the Times from Lord Kitchener's biographer, Sir George Arthur, who says that most of the divisions were not trained for such a purpose. ' For example, the Australians had only recently landed in Egypt, and had received no sort of divisional training. Kitchener cannot be blamed for the delay in despatching the 29th Division, because Joffre telegraphed to London that nnles3 this division was kept in France he would refuse the responsibility of keeping the Allied line intact. Mr. Churchill replies that if Joffre said such a thing it was without justification. Also, Kitchener should not have been misled thereby. It was an ■'example of . the unwarranted rumours. spread by the French Staff with the natural object of keeping as many troops as possible in France. Up to this point in the story of the Dardanelles the War Council and the

Admiralty had accepted unquestioningly the basis that no troops were available for offensive operations against Turkey. It ■was on that foundation alone that all our

decisions in favour of a purely naval attack had been taken, but henceforward a series of new facts and pressures came into play which gradually, but unceasingly, changed the character ' and enormously extended the scale of the enterprise, Under these influences, in lees than two months the naval attack, with Its lack of certainty, but with its limited costs and risks, became subsidiary, and in its place there arose a military development of great magnitude. Over this new plan the Admiralty had no responsible control. Our advice did not prevail; our criticisms'* were not welcomea; and even inquiries became a matter of delicacy and tact. Nevertheless, by the results of - this military operation we had to stand or ialL

" There was an Army." < .After all there was an army. The decision to abandon or postpone "indefinitely ■>, vi? advances along the Belgian coast liberated portions of the reinforcements. destined for Sir John French. The feeble " character of , the Turkish attack on Egypt ' th™ PUlse " I rated the Sre ate r part ' a S ro c v Swn d S ere ; ' Ll > a ™-< a the AustraSn Sd Tw??i ft"" 11 * ? f , Second of The ne * ?^.' ?,le r he Piret and , divisions) were faJfSjfa^ P '"■ *»** - jm>gre«sini? in equSn t A and Territorial diviftbns/?n? ' A - number of ■ good order S?i eqmppcd . and in . vanced, were aho £&"" ."T ad "" ;. . The largo number* of ■%*£, ji afc , i hon *>-! feed soldiers L the V^iL^l■<*«*»' V fthouad have iStoSl dl "£&£?**?* {mm mvaeJoßT <»

■At intervals daring the next three months there were actually ordered to the Dardanelles i-— From England. The 29th Division. Two first-line Territorial divisions.The Rcyal Naval Division. A Yeomanry mounted divisionFrom Egypt. Two Australian divisions. One extra Australian brigade. The Lancashire Territorial Division. One Indian brigade. From France. Two French divisions. Drawn into the Gull. All these troops for Gallipoli were available for moving at this moment. Tho transport for their conveyance by sea could readily have been procured. All, or their equivalent, and more were subsequently sent. Together they comprised an army of at least 150,000 men. This array could have been concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean in readiness to intervene at any point selected some time before the end of March. If at any time in January it had been deliberately decided to use such an 'army, according to some good plan and with a resolute purpose, in a great combined operation to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula, and thus open the passage for the fleet, few will now doubt that a complete victory would have been gained. On the other hand, apart from the 29th Division, all uiese troops had been raised or permanently embodied only since the outbreak of the war. To open a new campaign on a large scale was a most 6erious decision, in view of their partially trained character and of the general shortage of munitions. This was the justification for the naval attack. It also within its limits presented a logical and consistent scheme of war. Either plan was defensible. But for what happened thero can be no defence except human infirmity. To drift into a new campaign piecemeal and without any definite decision or careful plan would have been scouted by everyone. Yet so obliquely were these issues presented, so baffling were the personal factors involved, that the War Council were drawn insensibly and irrestibly into the gulf. (To be continued daily.)