ALSACE-LORRAINE FRONT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 13967, 28 September 1918, Page 1 (Supplement)

ALSACE-LORRAINE FRONT.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS.

BY LIEUT.-COL. A. A. GRACE, N.Z.F.A. BES.

One of the fundamental errors committed by tho Germans, at the beginning of tho war, was their over-estimate of the power of attack and their underestimate of tho power of defence, more especially of defonce behind fortified and entrenched positions. Their first mistake of this sort was committed at Liege, where, instead of enveloping the garrison, continuing the advance of their main army into Belgium, and leaving tho reduction of the fortress to follow by means of the usual methods of siege-warfare, they hurled their troops at General Liman's fortifications, and lost an army corps to no purpose. But they lost moro. They permitted Liege to hold up their advance for fully a week—a week which was invaluable to the Belgians and priceless to France, tho mobilisation of whose armies was thus completed in good time to meet the invading hordes of Germany. Of course, it is recognised that all fixed fortifications must ultimately fall before the heavy, mobile batteries which to-day can be brought against them. It is | the fixity of the fort which dooms it; it is ' the power and mobility of the modern 6icgo-artillcry which give it the mastery. But there is no reason, on that account, to underestimate the power of resistance which may be offered by a modern fortress properly defended by an adequate force. In the east tho Germans were everywhere successful against the Russians' fortified places—Warsaw, Novo-Georgievsk, Kovno, and the rest. In the west they have not been able to reach the French fortified zone—Belfort, Epinal, Toul, Verdun— except at its northern end! where they Have experienced two of their most signal defeats; while at Liege they experienced a resistance which materially dislocated their plan of campaign and helped to precipitate ite failure. Namur and Antwerp appear to have been abandoned by the Belgians after a show of resistance, because of the inadequacy of their forces. These remakes introduce us to the problem which is presented to the Allies by the fortified area of Metz. It consists of some 22 forts, grouped _ about the citadel, and occupying a circle whose circumference measures roughly 55 mills. The guns of the forts command an area which is fully 30 miles in diameter and possesses a circumference of not less than 90 miles. To attack this vast system of fortifications in the manner in which the Germans attacked Verdun would plainly be a costly business. To envelop it completely would tie up over half a million troops. Yet it cannot be ignored. There it stands, firm and fast, a place of great strength, barring the advance of the American Army into Lorraine. What plan will Marshal Foch propound and put into operation with a view to solving the problem presented by Metz!

Metz Isolated, But Doubly Fortified. First of all, what strategical purpose was Metz designed to serve? It was designed as the place of concentration of the striking-force which was to break the French line of resistance in the vicinity of Verdun, and, as such, it was fortified. It was designed to dominate Lorraine, which it was believed the French might seek to recover by a coup de main, and in consequence it was doubly fortified. But it is an isolated fortress. It is not a part of a great system of fortifications such as exists on the French side of the Vosges. True, Strasburg is fortified, but it is 80 miles from Metz. In any operations designed against Metz, Strassburg would be able to play only a negative part. Clearly, all the Germans hope from Metz, in the existing circumstances, _is that it wHI form a strong, isolated point of resistance to tho invasion of Lorraine, a powerful pivot of manoeuvre which will confer on the German armies operating in its vicinity a freedom of action which will allow them to make the greatest possible use of their strength, whatever that strength may be. To assault Metz, as the Germans assaulted Verdun, would seem to mean enormous loss of life to no sufficient purpose. To invest it with a view to reducing it by the usual methods of siege, would seem 'to occupy too many troops for too long a time. What, then, is likely to be done? There remains a third solution. It is possible to mask Metz. By detaching a comparatively small but sufficient army, Marshal Foch may keep Metz under such close observation that its garrison cannot move without endangering the existence of the fortress, and behind the cover of this masking force the Marshal may carry out the operations which he has planned for the occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. It will be remembered that von Kluck attempted some such method in regard to Paris, but as his numbers were insufficient for the task assigned him he was able to detach merely an army corps or two to mask the great French fortress, and so became the victim of the disastrous situation which he created. It is to be emphasised that any force which is given the task of masking Melz will necessarily be sufficient for the work, namely, to pin the garrison down to a passive and. therefore, to a futile defence. It will probably have to be strong enough to attack a portion of the defences, and actually to threaten the downfall of Metz.

All Strategical Advantages 'with Foch. | i Let us then suppose for a moment that | Marshal Foch decides to mask Metz while j he proceeds with his general campaign for the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine. What would he bo able to do in the arena which stretches southward from the great ! German fortress to the border of Switzer- j land? It would appear possible, for him to compel large concentrations of German I troops for the protection of Metz. There j is a great advantage in his holding nearly j all the highest country of the Vosges. I There is a triplex system of parallel ; railway-lines trending in a south-easterly • direction from tho vicinity of Verdun | towards Belfort and Upper Alsace. The French battle-front between Verdun and I Switzerland forms a distinct salient, point- j ing towards Germany, and offering the I advantage of interior lines to tho Allied j Armies operating for tho occupation of , Alsace-Lorraine. I

Plainly all the strategical advantages are with Marshal Foch. He holds all the trump cards. It would be passing strange if such a master of (strategy were not to make full uso of the opportunities which the situation affords him. It would appear that there is no insuperable obstacle to his advancing to the lino of , the Rhine in Alsace, and in placing his . troops in Lorraine between Metz and Strassburg. Ho may do this before winter and before Austria can detach any con- I siderable forco to assist the Germans in ! the valley of the upper Rhine. But if he j does not do it now, he will certainly do it next year, when the Teuton armies will , be weaker, both actually and comparatively, and the armies of the Allies will be stronger. I

A good deal will depend on the i Italians' operations in Venetia and the \lps rendering the Austrian armies im- • mobile. In such circumstances it would seem all ' the more likely that Marshal Poch will redouble his * present efforts for the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, j efforts which have begun excellently, | and which, with the marvellous growth | of the' American armies in France, ' appear destined to be carried through to a successful conclusion. The liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, more than anything else which comes within the scope of possible achievement at the present time, would prove to the German nation the true state of the military situation, it would prove to the German Army | its inferiority to the Armies of the Allies; it would fill the Teutonic Empires with fear, it would bring the end of the war into eight, it would proclaim the impending downfall of German militarism. — [Written September 23.]