THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1914. THE "MOTOR WAR."

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15753, 30 October 1914, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1914. THE "MOTOR WAR."

The capture of Lemberg, in Galicia, by tho Russians was of enormous importance, in that it cut off Germany's chief source of petrol. Great as was the disaster sustained by the Austrian armies in Galicia, the interruption of the supply of oil may well 'prove to be ultimately a greater blow. The occupation of Lemberg not onlv deprived Germany and Austria of the Galician oil fields—the first commerciallyworked and a valuable supply—but it places in jeopardy the importations of oil from Roumania, on which Germany depended to a secondary degree. The River Danube is a vitally important arteryconnecting Germany with the Roumanian fields, and the ability of the Austrians to protect the Danube against the Russians and Servians becomes increasingly doubtful. By a coincidence which Germans must

consider unfortunate one of the chief fields within the Empire is in old French territory in Alsace, near the frontier. The French, have already made efforts to. occupy this district and they will certainly seize the first opportunity of taking the

aggressive witn a view to cutting off an important part of the enemy's essential supply. The domestic production of oil in Germany is un-

important in comparison to her needs. The industry is a declining one and there is scarcely any pos sibility of increasing its gross production, even temporarily. The maximum output, 43,000,000 gallons, was reached in 1910 and since then there has been a steady decline. Germany does not publish records of her liquid fuel imports, and there are no , trade returns giving the

stocks of any description of oil, but the insufficiency of the domestic production may be estimated from the fact that in 1911 the United Kingdom imported over 365,600,000

gallons. The great war which is now being waged has been called the "motor war" on account of the extensive use made, for the first time, of petrol-driven vehicles. In describing tho strategical withdrawal of the British troops in France, a newspaper correspondent has said that it was preceded by an avalanche of motors—London motor-buses and trade vans, with the advertisements still on carrying guns, ammunition, and provisions. Another correspondent has told how the Allies have rushed reinforcements

to the front by means of automobiles and lorries. The rapid advance of the Germans through Belgium and France in the first instance was primarily made possible by motor transport. The motor .is undoubtedly the warvehicle of the future in campaigns over countries that are well roaded. By this means troops can 'be carried to points not tapped by railway, and a motor service is not nearly so liable to disorganisation and in-

terruption as a railway service. Over horse-drawn vehicles the motor-car has very obvious advantages. It is faster, can go further,

occupies loss road space, and is more-easily manoeuvred. Indeed, it is not too much to say that in war the horse is doomed except for a few special services. The general who is well served with mechani-cally-driven vehicles may defeat his enemy by mere mobility. The unprecedented wastage of horse flesh in this campaign shows how hopeless it is to pit the horse against the motor. We shall not know for some time, if at all, how many motors are being used in the present campaign, but it may safely be said that the advantage is with the Allies. According to official

statistics, Germany possessed prior to the war 60,876 motor-cars, 22,457 motor-cycles, and 9739 motor-wag-gons of the commercial 'type. She probably has a superiority in motor road trains, but the Allies are better

equipped with other vehicles. Britain in particular was fortunate in being able to draw upon a great number of private 'buses and lorries, but Russia—where mechanical

transport is in its infancy—must be suffering from lack of mobility.

Warfare in all its forms— land in the air and on the sea— 1

great demands upon the oil fuel. Britain has six battleships, 16 light

cruisers and 145 destroyers and torpedo boats burning oil alone and a large number of other warships equipped to burn oil or coal. The world's production of crude oil in 1912 was about 11,200,000,000 gallons, the chief producing countries being tho United States, Russia, Mexico, and Rotimania. The distribution of the supply is shown in the follow-

ing table, the figures for each country being the latest available Gallons. United Stales (1911) ... 7,713,000,000 Russia. (1911) 2.316.000,000 Roumania (1912) 364,000,000 Mexico '1912) 220,000,000 India (1912) 230,000,000 The Allies' consumption of petrol can be limited only by their needs and the. world's production, whereas Germany and Austria must experi-

once great difficulty in obtaining

supplies. One of the Allied States, Russia—which first exported oil and built, special vessels for its carriage —produces more than enough for

her . own requirements, while Britain and France can draw almost unlimited supplies from America. In 1011 tho United States sent 240,209,563 gallons to the United Kingdom, Russia 43,592,889, and other countries 81,837,025 gallons. Supplies from Russia can still be obtained, though there may be delay in delivery, and the largest orders may be placed in America, which, having lost a good customer in Germany, will be very ready to increase the exports to Britain. American experts have agreed that one of the first uses Britain would make of her sea power would be to cut off her enemy's supply of oil, while maintaining and increasing her own. Thus does the Silent Navy control an important aspect even of the land campaign.