ARBITRATION COURT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15729, 2 October 1914, Page 3

ARBITRATION COURT.

THE AUCKLAND SITTINGS. APPRENTICE PROBLEMS. Two problems regarding the employment of apprentices came before His Honor Mr. Justice Stringer and Messrs. W> Scott, employers' representative, and J. A. McCuliough, workers' representative, at the Arbitration Court yesterday afternoon. They were brought under the Court's notice by way of a case stated by the magistrate in the Magistrate's Court, Auckland.

The first concerned a lad named Seth Cassrells, apprenticed to Messrs. George Eraser and Sons, engineers. On the facts, it was shown that the lad had been apprenticed for six months to Messrs. Cullen and Co. and by mutual consent had left them. Shortly afterwards Tie had joined Fraser and Sons, and after working six months for them had claimed a twelve months' certificate and an increase in wages. This had been refused, whereupon Cassrells produced a certificate from Cullea and Co. stating that he had been employed, by them for six months as an apprentice.

Mr. M. 6. McGregor, who represented Messrs. Fraser and Sous, argued that at the time the lad was taken on as an apprentice his employers (Fraser and. Sons) knew nothing about his previous Aperience, and if recognition of that ex- j perience had been insisted upon the prob- ! abilities were that he would not have been i engaged. I

Mr. Walter Newton, inspector of awards, held that the defendant firm should either have arranged some allowance to Cassrells for his term with Cullen and Co. or should have approached the' Court for guidance on the matter. As it was, they had, in his opinion, evaded the law. If apprentices were not to be allowed for time worked under uncompleted apprenticeships it would "lead to grave abuses.

His Honor agreed that such a practice, would be very pernicious, but said he could not see where Fraser and Sons had broken the award. Coming to the Arbitration Court for advice, or to test the matter, was not obligatory upon them. : The second case contained a very : fine i point. It was set out that an apprentice named W. N. Martin had fallen from his en route to work on October 28 and that he had broken his arm." This incapacitated him until January 5, and during that period no wages were paid him. The inspector of awards claimed that his wages should have been paid. Mr. McGregor contended that there! was no liability* it was not a case where' an accident had befallen an employee at the works. When Martin'became'apprenticed ho contracted to work for Eraser j and Sons, and they contracted to find work for him, and to pay him. Through, default, he had not kept his' part of the bargain. Upon the question of,what constituted default, counsel said that if through shortness of orders, breakdown of machinery, etc., Fraser and Sons were unable to employ and pay their men, it i would be default. Similarly, if Martin failed to work except through sickness, it was a default. .Regarding the definition of sickness, Mr. McGregor cited the opinions of Lord Campbell and Mr. Justice Coleridge, who, in a particular, esse, held that true sickness could only be occasioned by bodily disease. It was clear, said counsel, !.that this was a case of accident and not [of sickness. Then, on the point of the employers' liability for the accident, .lie entirely '" disagreed with * Mr. Newton. Suppose, he asked, that Martin met with, a.i accident at a football match' on a Saturday afternoon, would it be fair to expect his employers to pay him whilst lie was incapacitated? Or, better still, suppose that Martin, being an engineer, invented an aeroplane to go to work on, and suppose that one'morning, on his way vt. work, he had -an accident and broke his leg. Could Fraser and. Sons be reasonably expected to pay him .whilst he was laid up? It was manifestly unfair, contended counsel. Again, if such a state of affairs were to prevail it would encourage malingering. Martin's accident had been caused by a dog running in front of his bicycle, and his claim for damages should lit witn the owner of the dog. His xionor reserved his decision, but re,marked that so far as the first case was concerned there was certainly no breach of the award.