CHANCES OF WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15684, 11 August 1914, Page 8

CHANCES OF WAR.

RUSSIAN GENERAL'S VIEW*

TERRITORIAL ADVANTAGE

General Kuropatkin, in a criticism 0 tho Russian Army written five yearn ago makes a candid statement in regiCrd to the possibilities of war between Hu? 8 !» and Germany, which, if the fact is bom, in mind that Russia's defences have undergone tremendous improvements during tfo intervening period, should be interests reading to-day. He say ß ;

"Tho German frontier, 738 miles in length, follows no natural feature. Beyond it lies her nearest neighbour— nation with whom we have been in close social and economic relationship ever since n got into touch with European life, fa the present time five separate lines 0 { railway connect different parts of Russia with Germany's Baltic ports and with Berlin. Our annual trade with for amounts to 26.5 percent, of all our foreign trade. Thus the economi-. connection b* tween the two countries is very close, Out interests are reciprocal, and, consequently, economic reasons alone necessitate a pre! serration on our part of the present friendly relations. But it is of no use disguising the fact that the part played By the German Government at the Berlin Congress gave us reason to change i policy which has always been favourable to Germany, and her entry into the Triple Alliance, which was directed against us, was the origin of our rapprochement with France.

By the .expenditure of vast sums ol money Germany has made ready in the most comprehensive sense to march rapidly across our borders with an army of 1,000,000 men. She has 17 lines of railway (23 tracks) leading to our frontiers, which would enable her to scud to the front more than 500 troop trains daily. She can concentrate the greater part of her armed forces (14 to 16 army corps) on our frontier within a few days of'tie declaration of war; while, apart from this question of speedy mobilisation, she has at her command far greater technical resources, such as light railways, artillery, ordnance, and engineering stores, particularly for telegraphs, mobile siege-park«, etc., than we have. "She has also made most careful preparations for a determined defence of her own border provinces, especially those of Eastern Prussia. Tho first-class fortresses of Thorn, *Konigsberg, and Posec are improved yearly, entrenched camps are built at tho most important junctions, and material lies ready stacked for the rapid semi-permanent fortification of field positions. " If we were better prepared for war, or in a case where Germany's main forces were diverted in another direction, ths Warsaw military district would constitute a place d'armes, cutting deep in between her and Austria, whence we might, with equal ease, advance rapidly on cither Bcri lin or Vienna. The former is 200 and the latter 213 miles from our frontier; Sti Petersburg and Moscow are 633 and "33 milos respectively from the German, and 900 and 800 from the Austrian, frontier. If, however, wo were successful in such a campaign, and sought to expand the Empire further, military considerations would point to the annexation of the whole of Eastern Prussia up to tho Vistula. " Astride this rjver, with possession of both its banks and of its mouth, and of the River Niemen, we should hold a very commanding position as regards Germany, and should have considerably improved our military frontier. But these advantages of position would bo more this outweighed by the many disadvantages attending such an increase of territory. There would arise (or us a question of lost provinces comparable to that of AlssceLorraiue; but it would 'bo of a more acute nature, for tho German nation would always be watching for an opportunity to regainby war if necessary—territory with which the ruling dynasty was to intimately connected. It may be assumed) therefore— "That, taking the armed forces of both nations as they exist to-day, and making; allowance for their comparative readiness, an invasion of our territory by German armies is more probable than a Russia invasion of Germany; that an invading German army would meet with few®' difficulties than ours if we marched into Prussia; that certain territory might 08 taken from us; that we might take Prussian territory from Germany, but that the pop"' lation of the conquered provinces wen always be hostile to us, on account of tho difference in their state of civilisation national ties, and traditional sentiments that both Russia and Germany aro sue great nations that neither could possi y : accept a loss of territory nor rest unt it had been regained; and that, takwg everything into consideration, it ""° . not suit Germany, and it would certainty not suit us, to go to war for the ' of altering the existing frontier.