INVASION OF BRITAIN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15684, 11 August 1914, Page 8

INVASION OF BRITAIN.

PROJECT NOT POSSIBLE.

THE NAVY TOO STRONG. 1 FATE OF RAIDING FORCE. The question whether Great Britain could be invaded has often been debated, especially within recent years, and expert opinion is almost unanimously against the practicability, of such an enterprise. In view of the despatch of colonial troops to England, it is interesting to note the conclusions of the British Government on this point:—

lii 1907, the agitation of tho exponents j of tho " Invasion School" compelled an exhaustive inquiry into Britain's policy of home defence, and the Committee of Imperial Defenco sat for nearly a whole year taking evidence on both sides. The committee studied with great caro all the changes in tho strategical situation since 1604, when the previous report was made, and tho potentialities of invasion, going minutely into such matters as tho time which would bo needed for the mobilisation of a foreign army, the facilities for transport both by land and sea, the organisation and distribution of forces, both naval and military, and the possibilities as regards embarkation, transport, and disembarkation incidental to an invasion on a large scale. Tho conclusions of the committee were arrived at after conceding to those who are apprehensive of the possibilities of invasion tho most favourable hypothesis for their purposeconceding, for instance, that the contemplated invasion would take place at a time when the Regular forces of Groat Britain were practically absent on some foreign expedition, and conceding further that the attack might bo in the nature of a surprise attack—a sort of " bolt from the blue" at a time when normal diplomatic relations existed between ourselves and the country which attacked us.

Two Conclusions. Mr. Asquith then told tho country " The conclusion at which we unanimously arrived—all the naval as well as all the military members of the committee being at ono on this —may be summed lip under two heads :— "(a) In the first place we decided that so long as the naval supremacy of this country is adequately assured, invasion on a largo scale, by which I mean invasion on such a scale as was contemplated by Lord Roberts (in 1907), involving tho transport of 120,000 or 150,000 men, is an absolutely impracticable operation. On the other, hand, if we permanently lost the command 1 of tho sea, whatever might be the strength and organisation of our military force at homo —even if we had an Army as strong as that of Germany herself— would be impossible for this country to prevent invasion, and its subjection to the enemy would be inevitable. It follows from that proposition that it is the business of the Admiralty to maintain our naval supremacy at such a point that wo cannot lose the command of the sea. Against a reasonable and possible combination which may be brought against us, if we can hold the sea, we make invasion impracticable.

"(b) I come to the second phase: there are disciples of what is called the blue water school, who think you can so rely on your navy that you do not require to, keep up a home army at all. That school did not find much, support from tho evidence which was laid before us, and our second proposition is this, that we ought to have an army for homo defence sufficient in numbers and organisation for two purposes— the first place to repel what aje called raids, that is to say sporadic offensive expeditions which are small in numbers and are not 'intended permanently to occupy the country, but only to inflict as much damage as they can; and in the second place, adequate to compel an enemy which contemplates invasion to come with so substantial a forco as to make it impossible for him to evade our fleets. Mr. Balfour Concurs. "It has often been said—l do not know how the figure first came to be mentioned— no one would attempt an invasion of this country with less than 70,000 men. (This was a statement made eicht years ago by Lord Roberts.) Our Admiralty believes that a force of very much less than 70,000 could not j possibly invade our fleets. No one, I , think, would undertake the task of invasion with a force of less than 70.000 I men. I. do not think 70,000 men will | lover get to England at all, but we must have an ample margin of safety. Our conclusion was that in order to secure that margin the force for home defence permanently maintained here should be sufficient to cope with a foreign invasion of 70,000 men,"

After tho Prime Minister's statement, Mr. Balfour rose to. speak, as Loader of the Unionist Party. "I suppose," he remarked, " tho committee will expect me to say a few words after wnat has fallen from the Prime Minister, but the agreement between him and mo on this subject is so complete that those words need be but few." He then expressed his concurrence with the conclusions of tho committee.

- the literature of the "invasion school" little has been said of the progress which has been made in the develop ment of the mobile defences on the east coast of Great Britain. This North Sea littoral is prepared against raids as the Channel littoral was never protected during all the years of strained relations with France, although, owing to the narrowness of the Channel, the danger then was relatively much greater. The Admiralty has drawn up plans for keeping watch and ward over the whole length of the coast line from t v e Straits of Dover to the extreme north of Great Britain. There are flotillas of submarines always on duty in the narrow.? of the Channel, with tueir bases at Portsmouth and Dover, and larger destroyer flotillas are associated with them; there are other submarines, dostroyers, and torpedo boats— a hundred— the Medway; a group of submarines at Harwich, 'with flotillas of eea-going torpedo-boat destroyers of the most seaworthy type. All these vessels are continually exercising on the east coast. And then, finally, further north■ there is anothor flotilla of submarines at Dundee. From Dover right away northward there is also a scries of war signal stations 011 the coast—wireless telegraph stations— together the whole nt the defences. In this manner a mobile chain has been created up the north-oast coast of Great Britain, Forces Available. The problem of home defence is revealed on the highest expert authority as one of easily manageable proportions. The War Office adopts the extreme limit —3, possible invasion of /0,000 menwhile the Admiralty holds tn»t. "no force of anything' approaching that strength could land on these shores," The target at -which the British authorities

must aim is, therefore, 70,000 mar , an extreme figure. At the same time * homo defence force must be such a, deal with raids by a small force of £ or so. which may slip past the J This is the target. What » the h available to hit it? The position be stated thus P ° S,tl ° n "ty Maximum force which can be amU by an enemy, 70,000 men; raid J, •which may elude the British v • double lino of defence—the statin n V>V ' 4 and the mobile coast defence of If* ktrovers and submarines—2ooTl o Against these are :— f tO -

(a) In time of peace-526,000 -Th Two-Power Standard Fleet, S «pp> a largo and active coast defence. 1 The Regular Army in tho TV* , Kingdom of 251,481. Um te d

'I he Territorial Army of 260 000 ~ and 15,000 to 20,000 National R^ 0 ' (b) In time of war-about 375 000 In the absence of the expediti/'" force, the navy would still perform"? la,,d " TOs

(a) 100.000 Special Reservists-™., ponding to the old militia with iJ? 'i training. revved (2) 260,000 or 270,000 men o{ .. Territorial Army. (3) 15,000 to 20,000 National R^ etc.