THE GERMAN WEAKNESS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15684, 11 August 1914, Page 8

THE GERMAN WEAKNESS.

WHERE SHE MAY FAIL. THE BELGIAN RESISTANCE. The German Army, according to Mr. Hi!air Bclloc, has tine weakness that may prove fatal. It is bound to " a military clan which must collapse altogether —and their political system with if— less tho first onset is immediately and overwhelmingly successful," Mr. Belloc discussed the German position in some detail. He dealt particularly with tho possibilities •of & struggle between Germany and France.

" Upon the German side," he says, " you have just two great fortified points, Metz and Strasburg, neither of them fortified with tho thoroughness or at the expense of tho corresponding French points; no system of fortifications holding the line of the Rhine and behind that line nothing whatsoever that military science need take into account; no rationally disposed system, that is, or lino of fortresses, supporting one another and compelling the delay of an advancing army." On tho French side there is tho first lino of fortifications, four great fortresses; a second lino of fortresses runs from Burgundy • through Champagne to tho southern fortresses of tho Belgian frontier; and, thirdly, there is the capital, better fortified than any other great town in Europe. : Consequently, tho chances of a successful onset at tho start arc small, and difficulties would bo very certain. Bui. it is continually taken for granted that Germany would rush through Belgium. , " The German Army possesses," says Mr. Belloc, " for an attack upon the Belgian frontier t precisely one main lino of railway. Tliero is no strategical co-or-dination of tho losser lines in the manufacturing district of Aix-la-Clmpello. To tho south and closo to the point of attack, crowding that point into a very narrow channel, lies tho high difficult and de(sorted country of tho Fagne, through which no rapid movement is possible. Tho Mens* is a serious obstaclo, and it is an obstacle fortified absolutely without rogard to expense, and in tho most thorough manner possible. Its fortification was carried through by the greatest engineer and the greatest authority upon fortification of our time. On the French side of the Mouse vou have a cl6scr network of railways than is to be found in any district of Europe; and, though these were not designed for a strategical purpose,_ industrial accident has made all tho main lines lead up the Mouse from all the principal military centres upon that frontier." _ I Germany has shown great slowness in! understanding the significance of new thing? in, military science. Sho won her victory over France by means of a better field artillery, but, though Franco within 10 years was possessed of an artillery superior to the German, for a whole series of years Germany was armed with a weapon which would have given Franco an overwhelming superiority. Even yet Germany lias not produced a quick-firer of the perfection of the French. The experience at Port Arthur has shown that the German under-valuation of fortifications wns wrong, and that the French woro right. Germany was the latest to adopt tho submarine, Germany also went in foT tho rigid rather than the semi-rigid dirigible, but has at last slowly been compelled by experience to follow the precedent of the French.