GERMANY'S WAR PLAN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15684, 11 August 1914, Page 5

GERMANY'S WAR PLAN.

ATTACK THROUGH BELGIUM.

BIG TURNING MOVEMENT.

ASSAULT UPON LIEGE.

A military correspondent -of tho Fortnightly Review contributed an article not long ago on the probable plan of campaign which Germany would adopt in the event of a war with France. The developments of the last few days make tho article of groat importance and interest.

" The main German idea upon which the plan has been formed." he wrote, "is that Franco must be seriously damaged in the first threo weeks of the war, so that Germany may find herself in the position of victor in the first round, before England and Russia have entered the field. There was a time when it was thought that the chances of a direct attack on the line of the Vosges were not inconsiderable, and that weak spots might bo found between Belfoit and Verdun. But this point of view is now held in only a modified degree, for it is considered that the best chance of making the frontal attack a success will bo by executing a disconcerting and menacing movement through tho comparatively open country between Verdun und Sedan. A Broadened Front.

"With this end in view the Germans have, for the last 15 years, been making the necessary preparations to secure {hat broadened front for their advance which is essential for the accomplishment of their purpose, and these preparations aie bow practically completed. The line of the Vosges is not merely exceedingly formidable as a fortified position, but it its also exceedingly narrow. Prom Belfort to Verdun, the two extremities, is no more than 145 miles, and although Belfort might be turned by tho violation of Swiss territory, the invading army could only operate against Lyons, which would take time, and exercise little or no i interest on the first phase of tho war. It is not safe to assume anything too positively in a problem which must become modified by fresh factors from time to time, but unless Austria can be induced to carry out an offensive movement through Porrentruy and the Rhone Valley, Germany will stand on the defensive in South Alsace. In any case, there is no necessity for any overwhelming anxiety on the part of the French authorities with regard to what may happen south of Belfort, Here, if anywhere, tho opening for an offensive movement seems m,oro favourable to Franco than to Germany.

The Line of the Vosges. " The contracted front of the Vosges is almost as serious a disadvantage to the enemy acting on the offensive as the formidablo character of its defences. The lines of advance for any considerable body of troops are also further diminished by considerable stretches of impossible country. For instance, any advance between Belfort and Epinal, speaking, as we are, only of large operations, would be out of the question, There are, indeed, only four lines of advance open to the Germans in this quarter. They are from Metz to Verdun (two roads), through Pont a Mousson to Commercy, through Chateau Salins to Nancy and Toul, and' from Strasburg to Luneville. The last, two named are available for a combined attack on Toul and its system of dependent forts. The total frontage for <he | German advance between Verdun and i Luneville is then no more than 70 miles. In this restricted space it would bo impossible for the Germans to employ more | than half a million men, and in the event of any reverse or breakdown in the execution of the plan of attack the Germans would find themselves exposed to heavy loss before they could get outside the range of the French fortress artillery. " Although the German authorities are set on putting the efficiency of the Vosges forts to the test, and also of experimenting with some of their new theories for ' the capture of fortified' places, it is to the widened front that they are mainly looking as the scene of their first victories. From Luneville to Verdun they have 70 miles of fortresses, fort and battery in front of them. From Verdun to Givct there are 75 miles of undefended country. Longny "and Montmedy do not count as fortresses. Givet-Charlemont and

Mezicvcs, both oil the Mense, aro more up to date, but from Verdun to Mezieres stretches open country with a frontage of oO miles. This is Germany's objective." Belgian Neutrality Ignored, When the French drew the line of the Vosgcs fortifications at Verdun it was assumed, the writer says, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, but it is evident that the Germans will do 110 such tilling. For some time they have been making preparations for taking tho offensive through neutral 'territory from Dalheim to Treves. By these means they obtain six excellent! roads leading into France.

"Having conceived the plan," the writer goes on, -i the German authorities did not toy in making the preparations behind their own frontier to render it capable of execution. For the last seven years Germany has been -entirely engaged in providing frontier railways flanking the projected front, and in linking them up with the two bases. on the middle Rhine at Coblentz and Cologne. In addition to tho railways, double-lined and metalled for heavy traffic, sidings have been provided i at all the stations, and at suitable points betweon them. Between Montjoio and St. Vitli landing spaces sufficient for over 120.000 men have been provided, and it is confidently asserted that force could be thrown across, the Belgian frontier near Franeorehamps in a singlo night without the Belgians knowing what was coming, the troops to be employed being entrained at Coblentz. Cologne, Bonn and Gladbach. There is not the smallest reason for hoping that this dispatch of the advance force of the invader would miscarry. If th/ whole corps d'armco were not over the border in the 24 "hours, at least a sufficient, part would be over to make sure of the possession of Libramont in half that time. Under , tho present system, perhaps tinder any, there is no possibility of the Belaians doing anythingto arrest or even delay this movement. The completeness of tho success' of Gcr-

manv's attack on the north-east frontier of Franco would depend on the fat of Liege. If it passed info her hands in the first few days of tho war German strategists would have no anxiety about their richt flank and would press on the broad front from Givet to Thionville. But tho left wing, moving through Treves. Thionville and Luxemburg, would be even more formidable. Its object would bo St en ay and Vonziers. The taking up of a strong position on the Aisnebytho two armies moving through Belgium and tho Orind Duchy would represent the successful achievement of tho first stage in the German plan of campaign against France. What France May Do. "To obtain her primary objectives, Germany is prepared to waste a laree number of men. The cost, of men will not prevent her strainin? every effort to obtain her ends. If tho French pour over into Beleium to meet her half way, they will bo playing her came and equalise the chances of loss. An obstinate defence without ri«kintf too much in any pitched action north of the Rheims-Laon-La Fere line is clearly the best French strategy. Time would thus be rained for Eneland to play her part, and the further German troops have cot. south of the Semois, tho better our chance of striking at their rear. It will not bo a, bad thins for France's chances of final victory if the first ureal battle of the war can he deferred until the Germans are in tho Aisno I Valley."