THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. Monday, may 7, 1906. ULTIMATUM TO TURKEY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLIII, Issue 13170, 7 May 1906, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. Monday, may 7, 1906. ULTIMATUM TO TURKEY.

The Bannerman Administration is showing— as so many Liberal Administrations have shown — that whatever individual members may think upon Imperial matters it does not intend to allow the strategic frontier of the Empire to be nibbled away by Powers which may foolishly imagine the time to be opportune. The ultimatum which has been sent to the Turkish Government, demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Egyptian territory as a preliminary to the formal delimitation of the boundary between Egypt and Asia Minor, is in conformity with the best traditions of British policy, and will bring the matter to a head in a very few days. Meanwhile, a strong British squadron is gathering in the vicinity of the Dardanelles, constituting an exceedingly strr hint to

' the Sultan that ; the grave conseI querides which : he has* bees warned to expect in the event, of his refusal f to withdraw his troops into his own | territory will descend upon his own i capital and not upon the desolate wastes of Sinai. Were the struggle to be confined to the locality actually ! in dispute every advantage would lie •with the Turks; and every disadvantage with the British. For it might easily take an army corps to shift the Turkish troops from the Gulf of Akabah, and that army corps might have to remain constantly in possession in order to .maintain the Khedival authority. But a British blockade of the Dardanelles would bring the seriousness of the situation closely home to the Turkish trading community, and the knowledge that the Yildiz Kiosk itself • might be shelled over his ears is calculated to induce even a Turkish Sultan to refrain from rash and' unprofitable . action. For no Turkish gains in the Peninsula of Sinai could offset the blow to Turkish prestige and the damage to Turkish . trade and property which a maritime war with the greatest of maritime Powers could easily inflict. It remains to be seen whether, in the face of the determination exhibited by the Baiinerman Cabinet, the German Emperor will venture to commit himself and to make open cause with the Sultan in exchange for the concessons in Asia Minor with which the Sinaitic trouble is presumably connected. With the Franco-Russian Alliance sdpporting the British demands and with the Triple Alliance falling to pieces by ■the open declaration of Italy that she did not enter it to antagdnise England, it does not seem very probable that we shall hear as much from Germany in the matter of Sinai as we did in the' matter of Morocco. If the dispute is narrowed down to one between Turkey arid the An-glo-Egyptian forces, whatever happens it can hardly be more than one of tho£e little wars which perpetually ruffle the' Imperial frontier. This, not because Turkey is not capable under favourable circumstances Of taking the field "as a first-class military, Power, 'but .because those favouring circumstances will not enable lifer to use her strength. The boundary of Egypt in Asia was fixed by the agreement of 1892—When its Abyssinian frontier was also arranged a line drawn from -the head of the Gulf of Akabah to a point in the south-eastern angle of the Mediterranean Sea. This corner has always been claimed by the Khedives, and their claim has never been challenged by. the Sultan, though the' frontier, as is customary in sparsely v settled 'and barbaric lands, has always been an indefinite one. It is, of course, quite possible for Turkey to raise sufficient men to obtain temporary possession of this, in itself, barren and worthless strip, but the moment a Turkish, army approached the Suez. Canal they would encounter very different conditions. All supplies would have to reach them overland, and it would be absoi lutely impossible to keep a large army long in this barren, waterless wake, while the Anglo-Egyptian forces would not only have ah exceptionally convenient base of supplies all along their line, but could be assisted everywhere by naval guns and naval forces. The whole of the Egyptian army Would be practically on the spot; and Egypt has compulsorily drilled the most suitable young men for nearly a generation. In active service ; she lias about 18,000 natives, of whom 10,000 are infantry, and in an emergency could call to the colours at least 100,000 native troops who have been universally regarded and quoted as proof, of what British drill-sergeants can do with originally unpromising material. With a few thousand British troops to give them confidence, the Egyptian soldiers would probably prove themselves . equal to anything that Turkey couTd march against them to the Isthmus of Suez- For though the Sultan has an estimated total war strength of a million and a-half of fighting men, they are largely irregulars, arid In any case the commissariat problem would limit any army sent to invade Suez, commissariat, in this instance, including water well 'as food. Not only this, but the cutting of communication between Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia would be the signal for a Macedonian rising against the Sultan, and the inevitable Bulgarian intervention, as it would free the Christian population from their dread of the employment , against them of the Asiatic Bashibazouks. In all likelihood this cer- ' tainty of the effect of war upon ! Macedonia is what 'has inspired i Russia to support the British de- ' mands, for Russia, is not disposed to see the Balkan situation disturbed until she is ready to profit by any such disturbance. Thus, while any i attack upon Suez would have to be [ made by the Asiatic Turks, the , authority of the Sultan in Europe i might be assailed when it was least able to defend itself. It is evident that - there can be very little doubt as to the outcome of an appeal to arms by Britain and Turkey. This strength of the British position is the best guarantee that the Porte will withdraw his invading troops unless he obtains a European support, which at present appears non-existent. And when We look for the key of the situation we find it in the supreme command of Turkish waters possessed by the dominant British fleet. Theoretically the Turkish navy is manned by some, 30,000 officers and men; actually, there is not a Turkish vessel afloat , which could stand for five minutes against a second-class British , cruiser. It is common knowledge that half-a-dozen British ships would , sweep Turkish waters and leave no- : thing afloat that carried the Turkish flag, thus immediately placing every Turkish port at. the mercy of the British Government, and rendering , all navigable water impassable by the Turkish army. From which , situation, and from the extreme probability that it will ensure peace ' where a similar quarrel with a landPower like Russia would as probably : , lead to war, the .British colonies may form some idea of the value of the Imperial, navy, and see, as by an object lesson, : how our New Zealand coasts might be defended by the action of the Imperial navy in disi taut waters.