THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1903. THE MANCHURIAN POSITION.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XL, Issue 12268, 12 May 1903, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1903. THE MANCHURIAN POSITION.

The steady development of the United States as a great worldPower, uvith extensive frontage to the Pacific and vital interests upon the opposite Asiatic coast, has introduced a new and most desirable factor into the commercial and territorial politics of the Farthest East. While the rivalry between British ; and American traders exposes us to apparent loss, the actual loss is far more than counterbalanced by the underlying unity of interests between the twain. The advantage accruing from their necessary and inevitable co-operation is being brought more forcibly home to us as the Republic is drawn deeper and deeper into Asiatic affairs. It cannot be said, of her that she comes willingly. There still exists at Washington the influence of that historic American; policy of maintaining a strong isolation from world-politics which for a hundred years dominated the councils of Congress and the administration of Presidents. But step after step, each one forced upon the other by the resistless march of events, each one undertaken more or less unwillingly, but each one afterwards found to be irretraceable, have brought the United States from its would-be domesticity into the foremost rank of the world-moulding States. She is to-day one of the fox*ces to.be reckoned with in Eastern Asia, although she still insists that she will not cumber herself with foreign alliances. It is due to this, and to the finding in Japan of a worthy claimant to Imperial honours, that the British Empire can regard the threatening position of affairs in Manchuria with equanimity, conscious -that the stars in. their courses fight there against Russian intrigue and aggression.

j A decade ago British interests in i the Farthest East appeared practically dependent upon our unaided efforts. Germany, France and' Spain held territory in the Pacific, but national jealousies prevented us from placing any reliance upon their cooperation in maintaining mutual ini teres is. Russia, with a fine eye to the future, had sedulously cultivated American friendship, had withdrawn from the American continent and had done her utmost to ensure the friendly neutrality of Washington. Suddenly, the Japanese sprang to the front as the most progressive, vigorous and patriotic of independent Eastern peoples. They demonstrated their capacity in the war with China, as later in the march toPekin. Still more suddenly, the Spanish Empire was- shattered by American seamen, and the United States found itself heir to Imperial Spain by right of conquest, while its commercial expansion was breaking down the cautious policy of its statesmen. So that there arose together, in the Pacific, not only a great kindred Power compelled by its customs, its methods, its inheritances and its instincts to move side by side, if not hand in hand, with Britain, but a great native Power, capable of strenuous effort and imbued with a daring ambition, which might well be supported and encouraged by Western nations as the arch-antagonist to that Eastward movement of the Muscovite, whose triumph meant the downfall of Japan. The diplomacy of Lord Salisbury, who perceived immediately the importance of the issue and' seized the occasion with a swift decision that contrasts instructively with his favourite plan of letting matters right themselves by letting them alone, ranged Britain in the Farthest East as the avowed friend and pledged ally of Japan. America is being thrust into a very contiguous position by the commercial injury to which Russian action in Manchuria exposes her, Already American newspapers speak of " underwriting" the Anglo-Japanese treaty, and the American Secretary of State has officially recommended President Roosevelt to take joint action with Britain and Japan against the Russian occupation of Manchuria "without committing America to a formal alliance."

We may therefore say with reason that the three great Powers of the England, America ana Japan—are arriving at, if they have not already practically reached, a friendly understanding as to their attitude toward Russia in Manchuria. It is ancient history to recall that Russia pledged herself to withdraw from Manchuria after the allied, march to Pekin. She has been repeating her promise with effusion ever since, but is now in more effective occupation than ever.' From territorial reasons, Japan and Britain insistently object to this occupation, the former being still more concerned in the exclusion of Russian influences from Korea, which is .reported to have been lately invaded by Russian troops. Whether America would object to the Russianising of Manchuria under "the open door" system is hardly in question, for the Russian commercial system is opposed to the open door and the rule of the Tsar in Manchuria would mean the blocking of American trade with such treaty ports as it was anticipated China would open in that province. The United States is therefore interested commercially, as Britain and Japan are interested territorially and commercially, in forcing the Russian frontier back to its treaty limits. Doubtless, that strong American party, corresponding to the Little Englander party at Home, which opposed the annexation of the Philippines and prophesied in jeremiads upon the outcome of intervention in China, will do its utmost to prevent the Roosevelt Administration from resorting to the only argu-

men!:, which the Tsavocracy really weighs, the argument of an appeal to arms. But eighty millions of Eng-lish-speaking people, securely fortvessecl in a continent, proud of their strength and jealous of their rights, are not permanently to be ignored even in Manchuria. It is. certain that no reputable American statesman would make* special terms with Russia to the disadvantage of friendly Powers which have dealt honourably with his country. So that, in this Manchurian crisis, America must either retract her commercial claims or take concerted action with other Powers having an equally strong objection to Russian occupation. The latter is the advice of the American Secretary of State. It remains to be seen whether, if the three Powers stand firm, Russia will bear the brunt of war or will withdraw.