PARLIAMENT AND THE WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVII, Issue 11365, 7 May 1900, Page 5

PARLIAMENT AND THE WAR.

THE SPIONKOP ENGAGEMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY

ATTACKED.

London, May 4.

Preparatory to to-night's debate upon the action of the War Cffii'O and generals in reference to the Spionkop reverse, the Government has published a number of telegrams throwing light on what occurred.

The telegrams are those which passed between Lord Lansdowue, Secretary of State for War, Lord Roberts find General Buller.

Lord Lansdowne apparently feared to disclose the information, as it might prove useful to the enemy.

He consented, however, to the advisability of issuing ii selection from General Buller's reports with Lord Roberts' criticisms thereon, or the securing, through Lord Roberts, of a fresh narrative from General Buller, with a view to publication, inviting Lord Roberts to add modified criticisms.

The Times and News unite in blaming the attempt to shift the responsibility in connection with the affair.

The Times, while denouncing the official request to the generals to cook their opinions, with the idea of deluding the public, warmly commends General Buller's refusal to co-operate in whitewashing anyone, even himself.

Lord Roberts did not object to the publication of selections from his criticisms, and allowed Lord Lansdowne to make selections. This was accordingly done.

London, May 5.

During the Spionkop debate the Government was strongly attacked in both Houses for shirking responsibility by the publication of the despatches of Lord Lansdowne.

Mr. Balfour indignantly denied that they wished General Buller to "cook" his despatches. He considered the censures passed on General Buller to be mild. .

The division in the House of Commons resulted in a Government majority of 99 out of a total of 331 votes cast. The vote is taken as no test as to the extent of the Government's supporters' dissatisfaction in publishing the despatches at all.

The Duke of York and the Prince of Naples were present during the Spionkop debate.

DEATHS OF AUSTRALIANS. London, May 5. The deaths of Trooper Seeby, of the Victorian Mounted Infantry, of enteric fever, and Gunner W. Edwards, of the New South Wains "A" Battery, of tetanus, are reported.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR NATAL.

London, May 4. Britain bus responded to the Natal Government's request for temporary financial support.

THE MANCHESTER TORT.

Sidney, May 6.

; Tho injuries to the. troopship Manchester Port are serious, and will tako at least a week to repair. Five plates and 11 frames have to be removed. ■

■'■.'y'rt ' ' ' " -I———«-■ i A NEW ZEALANDER WOUNDED. • [Bt TELEGRAPH.— ASSOCIATION.] '■- - ' , ■ .... Wellington', Saturday. > ■-:■-'■ ..,'.' The Agent-General:' has telegraphed the Premier as follows: —" Regret to inform you * '~:■ that Private James Fahery was dangerously ;" wounded at Thabanchu."

Fahery is a Southland trooper.

CABLEGRAM FROM MAJOR ;; %;. SOMERVILLE. ' • ' [bt TELEGRAPH.—PRESS association.] Wellington, Sunday. The Premier has received the following cablegram from Major Somerville:— ban, May 5. • Arrived to-day (Saturday). The men are well. We are going to Beira."

THE NEW ZEALAND HORSES.

[BY TELEGRAPH.—PRESS ASSOCIATION'.]

Welllvgtov, Saturday.

A lieutenant of the Fifth Contingent Writes to the Mayor of Wellington, stating that out of 14 horses lost only one came from Wellington. All speak in glowing terms of tie selection of horses mado by the Wellington Committee.

LIEUTENANT CJIAYTOR. A private cablegram has been received stating that Lieutenant D'Arcy Chaytor, who , has been ill, is now convalescent. Lieutenant Chaytor was mentioned in the last letter - from our war correspondent as taking part in Lord Roberts' famous march to Bloemfontein.

LIGHT ON A DISASTER. METHUEN RELATES HIS PLANS AT MAGERSFONTEIN. At last we havein last night's London Gazette— (says the Daily Mail of March 17), Lord Methncn's despatch relating the battle of Me ".rsfontein, and also General Gatacre's accoun'; of the battle of Stormberg. , Wo havo also a criticism by Lord Roberts of General Gatacre.

The Magersfontein despatch is forwarded by Lord Roberts without comment.

After pointing out that his orders were to relieve Kimbcrley, that the enemy were being heavily reinforced, and that a turning movement was impossible to such a small force as his. Lord Methuen deals with the battle itself.

On December 10 the bombardment of the -Boer position was ordered, the idea then being that— "At daybreak on December 11 the southern end of the kopje was to be assaulted by the Highland Brigade, supported by all the guns, their right and rear being protected by the Guards Brigade." The night march was ordered for half-past twelve a.m., the bearings and distances hav- - ing been ascertained, at groat personal risk, by Major Benson. The distance is two and a-half miles, and daybreak was due at twenty-five minutes past three a.m. About half-an-hour after the Highland Brigade marched off it came on to pour, a , heavy thunderstorm accompanying the rain. The downpour lasted until daybreak. Tho brigado was led with perfect accuracy to the point of assault by Major Benson. „ Tho advance was slow, even for a night march. Major Benson, with a compass in each band, had frequently to halt on account of the lightning and rifles affecting the compasses. I may remark that two rifles went off by accident before the march and it is pretty clear flashes from a lantern" gave tie enemy timely notice of the march. Before moving off, Major-General Wailchope explained all he intended to do and the particular part each battalion of his brigade was to play in the scheme. 1 The brigade was to march in mass of quarter columns, the four battalions keeping touch, and if necessary ropes were to be used - for the left guides ; these ropes were taken, but I believe used by only two battalions. " The three battalions were to extend just before daybreak, two companies in firing "line, two' companies in support, and four companies in reserve, all at five paces interval between them.

What happened was as follows:— finding any signs of the enemy on the right flank just before daybreak, which took place at four a.m., as the brigade was approaching the foot of the kopje, Major-General 'Waucliopo gave the order for the Black Watch to extend, but to direct its advance on the spur in front, the Seaforth Highlanders to prolong to the left, the Argyll 'and Sutherland Highlanders to prolong to the right, the Highland Light Infantry in reserve. Five minutes earlier (the kopje looming in the distance). Major Benson had asked Major-General Wauchnpe if he did not consider it to be time to deploy. LieutenantColonel Hughes-Hallctt states that the extension could have taken place 200 yds sooner, but the leading battalion got thrown into confusion in the dark by a very thick bit of bush about 20yds to 30yds long. The Seaforth Highlanders went round this bush to -the right, and had just got into its original position behind the Black Watch when the order to extend was given by Major-Genera! Wauchope to the Black Watch. The Seaforth Highlanders and two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were also moving out. and were in the act of extending when suddenly a heavy fire was .poured in by the enemy, most of the bullets going over the men. Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes-Hallett at once ordered the Scaforths to fix bayonets, and charge the position. The officers commanding the other battalions acted in a similar manner. At this moment someone gave the word "Retire." Part of the Black Watch then rushed back through the ranks of the Seaforths. Lieutenant-Colonel Hailett ordered

his men to halt and lie down, and not to

retire. It was now becoming finite light, and / some of the Black Watch were a little in front, to the left of the Seafortbs.

The Artillery, advancing to the support of the attack, had opened lire from the time it was light enough to see. No orders having been received by the Sen-

forths, the commanding officer advanced the . leading units to try and reach the trenches, which'were about 400 yds off: but the officers and half the men fell before a very heavy fire, which opened as soon as the men moved. About ten minutes later the Sea-

forths tried another rush, with the same result. Colonel Hughes-Hallett then con- ' sidered it best to remain where he was till orders came.

After dealing with his flanking movements Lord Methtien proceeds ■. — * At twelve noon I ordered the battalion of Gordons, which was with the supply column, to support the Highland Brigade. The trenches, even after the bombardment by lyddite and shrapnel since daybreak, were too strongly held to he cleared." The Gordons advanced in separate halfbattalions, and though the attack could not be carried home, the battalion did splendid ' work throughout the day. At 1 p.m. the Seafortli Highlanders found themselves exposed to a heavy crossfire, the enemy trying to get round to the right. The commanding officer brought his left forward. An order to "Retire" was given, and it was at this time that the greater part of the casualties occurred. The retirement continued for 500vds. and the Highlanders remained there till dusk. Lieutenant-Colonel Downman, commanding the Gordons, gave the order to retire because he found his '-position untenable, so soon as the Seafortli Highlanders made the turning movement to the right. This was an unfortunate retirement, for Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes-Hnllett had received instructions from me to remain in position till dusk, and 'lie enemy were at 'this time qv iring the 'tenches by tens and twenties. Major-General Wauchope told me. when I asked him the question, on the evening of .tho 10th, that he quite understood his orders, and made no further remark. He died at the head of the brigade, in which his > nnmo will always remain honoured and respected. His high military reputation and attainments disarm all criticism. Every soldier in my division deplores the loss of a fine ."'Her and a true comrade. The attack failed : The inclement weather was against success; tho men in the Highland Brigade were ready enough to rally, Prat the paucity of officers and non-commis-sioned officers rendered this no easy matter. I attach no blame to this splendid brigade. from noon until dark I held my own opposite to the enemy's entrenchments.

•Nothing could exceed the conduct of the troops from,, the time of the failure of the •attack at daybreak. ' There was not the coniusion, tho fighf .was

carried on under as hard conditions as one can imagine," for the men had been on the move from midnight, and were suffering terribly from thirst. ''•''.,.■'.,:, i. ■'% I decided that if I found the trenches vacated in the morning, I would advance to Brown's Drift, > occupying Magersfontein kopjo; if, on the contrary, the entrenchments j were still occupied, I would retire slowly to this place. In the morning I found the trenches still occupied, and although Major-General Sir H. Colvillo expressed his opinion that it would bo advisable to hold on, I found, after going over the position with the senior officers of my force, there was a concurrence of opinion that my judgment was sound and a retirement advisable.

GATACRE'S REVERSE.

PLAIN CRITICISM BY LORD

ROBERTS.

General Gatacro's despatch describing his reverse at Stormberg on December 10 was published in the London Gazette of March 16.

In transmitting General Gatacre's despatch to tho War Office, Lord Roberts makes the following observations: " I am of opinion that the failure of Lieu-tenant-General Gatacre's attempt to seize the Stormberg railway junction was mainly duo to relianco on inaccurate information regarding the ground to bo traversed, and the position held by the Boers, to the employment of too small a force, and to the men being tired out by a journey by train, followed by a long night march before they came into contact with the enemy. "When it became evident shortly after midnight that the guides were leading the column in a wrong direction, I consider that Lieutenant-General Gatacre should have halted, and endeavoured to find the proper road, or should have fallen back on Molteno rather than have risked the safety of the entiie force by following a route which brcight the troops into difficult ground commanded on both sides by the enemy. "Tho failure of the mounted detachment from Penhoek, with fcur 2.5 in guns and one Maxim, to join the column, doubtless, contributed to the reverse which LieutenantGeneral Gatacre experienced. This failure is ascribed in the report to the remissness of a telegraph clerk; but if, when the order was handed in for despatch, the precaution had been taken to request a telegraphic acknowledgment of its receipt, the general officer commanding would have known whether his instructions had been duly received by the officer commanding at Penhoek.

"It is stated that, when directed to retire, a large portion of the 2nd Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, and of the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, remained behind, and were eventually made prisoners. No explanation of this incident is furnished by Lieuten-ant-General Gatacre, but, presumably, it must be ascribed to the men being exhausted by their long march, and, consequently, unable to fall back with sufficient rapid!'/ under a hostile fire.

" The conduct of the officers, non-commis-sioned officers and men, brought to notice by the general officer commanding, seems deserving of acknowledgment, especially that of Band-sergeant J. Stone, 2nd Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, whose services are detailed in the accompanying memorandum, dated January 26, 1900." General Gatacre's despatch, which Lord Roberts criticises, was one of two written on the same subject, tho first having been sent to Gene-al Buller, reaching him only after receipt of the other sent to Lord Roberts. General Gatacre says in explanation of his reverse that he was aware that the column was going too far to the west. He questioned the guides, and Sergeant Morgan, of the Capo Mounted Police, who declared they knew the way perfectly, and that they wero taking the force by a road which, although slightly longer, would avoid wire and a bad piece of track which the guns would find difficulty in getting over at night. This difficult' piece of road had not been mentioned before. Further, to repeated questions, Sergeant Morgan said they were going on the right road. . , . . When the objective was in sight, it became a question of pushing on, or retiring to Molteno, and General Gatacre decided on the former, notwithstanding that tho men were fatigued. General Gatacre says, too, it was not reported to him that the men of the infantry regiments who were subsequently taken prisoners had not joined their regiments.

BOER TREACHERY. Lord Roberts, telegraphing to the War Office from Bloemfontein on March 19, savs: —

I have received the following reply to my telegram, March 11, to the Presidents Orange Free State and South African Republic:— " Your Excellency's telegram, despatched at a quarter to ten a.m. on the 11th, reached me yesterday. Assure you that nothing would grieve' me more than that my burghers should make themselves guilty of a deed such ;as that laid to their charge by you. I am, however, glad to say that you must have been mistaken. " I have made personal inquiry of General Delarey, who was in command of our burghers ■a\ the place mentioned by you. He denies entirely that our burghers acted as stated by you, but says that on Saturday (date illegible) the British troops, when they were about 50yds from our position, put up their hands, as well as the white flag, whilst at the same time your cannon bombarded the said troops as well, with the result 'that Commandant De Beer was wounded.

"Yesterday morning, at tight o'clock, the head Commandant wrote in his account of the battle as follows:—The soldiers hoisted the white flag, but were then fired at by the English cannons, and compelled to charge.' "Perhaps it is unknown to Your Excellency that the same thing happened at Spionkop, where, when a portion of the troops had hoisted the white flag, and put up their hands and whilst our burghers were busy disarming them, another portion of the troops fired on our burghers and on the troops who had surrendered, in consequence thereof not only our burghers, but some of the British troops, were killed. It has also been reported that at the last battle on the Tugda the English cannon fired on the troops who had surrendered.

"With reference to the explosive bullets fcund in General Cronie's laager and elsewhere, I can give Your Excellency the assurance that such bullets were not purchased or allowed by the Government. I Lave, however, no reason to doubt your statement, as I know that many of the burghers of this State and of the South African Republic took a large number of Lee-Metfoixl rilles and Diim-Dum and other bullets from the British troops. May I request Your Excellency, as the cable is closed to me, to make my reply known to your Government and to the neutral Powers by cable?—(Signed) State President."

As inquiry into that matter proves His Honor's allegations to be unfounded, and as I personally saw the holding up of hands, which he denies, I have not thought it desirable to continue the correspondence.