PROTECTION OF PRESS CABLE MESSAGES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXVII, Issue 8374, 30 September 1890, Page 3

PROTECTION OF PRESS CABLE MESSAGES.

IMPORTANT DECISION.

At the Supreme Court in Banco yesterday, before Mr. Justice Conolly, the case of H. T. Jones (appellant) v. W. H. Atack (respondent) was heard. This was an appeal from the decision of Mr. Booth, R. M., Gisborne. The appellant is the editor of the Gisborne Standard, and published on the Ist April, 1890, certain telegrams which had been received by Mr. Atack, the respondent, as manager of the Press Association. These telegrams had been sent by Mr. Atack to the Poverty Bay Herald and Auckland Star and other papers in the colony subscribers to the Press Association for publication. The Gisborne Standard was not a subscriber to and did not have Air. Atack's or the Press Association's consent to publish the telegrams. Neither Mr. Atack nor the Press Association own or publish a newspaper in the colony. The Resident Magistrate convicted the appellant and fined him 20s. The question for the opinion of the Court was " Whether under these circumstances Mr. Atack had published the telegrams under the provisions of the Electric Lines Act, 1884, and whether the telegrams were protected by that Act." Mr. W. L. Rees appeared for the appellant, and Mr. Theo. Cooper (instructed by Mr. H. D. Bell, of Wellington) for the respondent. Mr. Rees raised the objection that the time was not alleged when the telegram was received, and he contended that the conviction must be bad, as it was drawn for three offences. Then as to printing and publishing a cablegram, there was no such word as a cablegram in the Act. His Honor said he must hold that a message coming by cable was a telegram. Mr. Rees further contended that the Press Association wa3 not entitled to any privilege unless they published the telegram, and that it must be more than giving another permission to publish. Mr. Cooper submitted that Mr. Atack had " published" the telegrams. The word was used in two senses in the Act, first in relation to telegrams " published " in a newspaper ; second in relation to a newspaper " published "in the colony. Although Mr. Atack was not the " publisher" of a newspaper, he was nevertheless the " publisher" of the telegrams in those newspapers to which he had sent the telegrams for publication. The true test was, "Assuming that these telegrams contained libellous matter, could Atack be proceeded against for libel as having published them?" Undoubtedly he could, upon the authority of Burdett v. Abbott, 5, Bow's House of Lords cases, 201 ; Adams v. Kelly, Ryan v. Moody, 157; and Parker v. Prescott, L.R., 4 Ex., 169. If he was liable for their publication as publisher, he was entitled to the protection ot the Act as publisher. Any other construction of law would work an injustice. Section 39 of the Electric Lines Act was of no effect if Mr. Rees's construction of the statute was sound. The ordinary meaning of the word must be adopted, and not its secondary meaning. Anaftthor "publishes" a book ; although, in a secondary sense, it is the tradesman who does so. So, if a man sends a letter to a newspaper for publication, he publishes that letter, although the newspaper containing it may be published by some other person. No doi'bt receipt and publication of the telegram are both required under the Act. Here the receipt is admitted, and it is submitted that the publication in its true sonse was by Atack, although the telegrams appeared in a newspaper nob owned or published by him. The matter was of the greatest importance to the Press Association. Unless the Act clearly required it the Court should not adopt a construction which would either destroy their property or compel them to adopt the expensive course of establishing a newspaper as suggested by Mr. Rees. Mr. Cooper therefore submitted that the appeal must be dismissed.

Mr. Rees replied on the question of liability, and submitted that the publication was not on behalf of the licensors and that there was no publication by themselves. His Honor said the application must be dismissed. Admitted that if there was a libellous statement the person sending it should be liable; now, if for such a message Mr. Atack was liable in a criminal or civil action he must be protected. The appeal was dismissed without costs.