REFUGE OF INFANTRY.

North Otago Times, Volume C, Issue 13146, 29 August 1914, Page 3

REFUGE OF INFANTRY.

FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS. ' * Rifle bullets and' shrapnel assail the soldier;fof: Uie greater part of , the time he is in the field during tho.active prof cess - of an engagement. It is tlio duty, of artillery, broadly speaking, to.utter the first- loud words of battle, and the argument is continued. with the. rifle; Cavalry and the bayonets' are tlie'con* eluding, remarks. •, While,, then,' vtliese long preliminaries and 1 discussion 'in' ' lead and iron are in progress, where is the soldier's refuge? asks a contribute! to the Wellington "Evening Post."

It has often been said that a man never knows till lie has been in action what a trifling, shelter will hide him. Ir tlie midst of an apparently level plain a good officer-will find cover for ■his-troops'behind natural, but scarcely, visible obstacles; and seemingly minute undulations will cover even mounted soldiers. But while these indefinable Blopes will hide troops from view, they will not protect them .from'the terrible, scourge of, a searching fire, and they will further keep the hidden men from being themselves on the offensive, .'Entrenchments are the cover of the aiitive soldieV, •

We will hear enough of eutrenchments before this war i 3 over to make it, worthwhile to'know what they are. They are of various kinds, with various objects, They may Ie so placed and constructed in a. special position, to be virtually. a temporary fort, a place which is'designed to be specially attacked, and which is therefore specially prepared for defence. Such an entrench-, jnent will be elaborate, difficult to

manoeuvre over even if no one were in it. It will have been carefully and ingeniously designed; its trenches will be deep, and buttressed with limber work, ami overhead cover will be provided. Ii will, be a lield fortification. And the troops in it will be in effect a fixed unit, like the men in a l'ort. '• . •:

'Oii the other h'aiul, •entrenchments may be a system of ditchings thrown uji in ihe. extreme of haste, or even of little; holes dug at speed, just to afford desperate men a trifle of shelter against a hail "oi" bullets; ami in .between these extremes there may be- all gl'ades of work,

{■. . The Havoc of Artillery, It is lccogniKOil that the grattor power ami efficiency Of modern artillery ami villus compared wilk those ot' lifty ,vein's ago makes the modern battle-field far more deadly than before. One can picture a host of men llaved by hostile lead digging furiously with little spades for a small protection from which they may reply with a similar luiil.

Before one can understand cither the liced 0/ the nature of trendies in the open Held it is necessary to realise what troops have to face, and what they must do. Shrapnel,.which after the exchange of a preliminary lire of rifles, is the first compliment the enemy will pay to any notable force, is an'a'.iominablo and deadly thing. Tho modern artillerist can drop a shell anywhere within an area measuring a few chains long and a few yards wide. But after he has found his range, he does not do that. Ho sets the fuse of his shell so that it burstß before it reaches the ground, and Bteel splinters and hundreds;,of..small round bullets fly on in' a hail which searches every square yard of ground •within an.area'iNviutii it 'is within rliis.' hands to define. '"akJ f pe enlt he can burst the shells earlier, and the; missiles, descending more steeply,' will search it with the-most certain effect. There is nothing delicate about 6lirapnel. 9 Its fragments and its round balls do not'travel at high velocities or make .tiny wounds. They punch hard, With modern quick-firing guns of dea'dly.accuracy ami great range, it is necessary to avoid, if possible, the devastating effects of shrapnel, The fire of infantry, too, is a very heavy scourge, which takes a great toll of fighting men if they have no shelter, and' it may be terribly rapid and very hard to stop, Here, again; the desirability of trenches; from 1 the defensive point of view, one may say, entrenchments must be made. They are recognised by the authorities as indispensable for troops halted under fire. It is not long since trenches were called "funkholes, '' or since officers at least were expected to walk about in full view whether their men were hidden or not; but Napoleon knew the value of the defensive line. Those,, who proscribed the use of trenches,' he said, deprived themselves gratuitously of a power and an auxiliary which were never injurious, nearly always useful, and often pensable. „ So far it may liavc appeared that trenches are to be regarded only as cover, to provide an escape from hostile fire. But they play a most important part otherwise in defence, and wlien properly used, they are powerful also in attack. Tho Balkan war showed that troops cannot remain halted for any time exposed to the immensely destructive effects of modern artillery lire; but it showed also that it is extremely diilicult to carry out an,attack upon a well entrenched position. An attack depends largely upon the success of the attackers' artillery and rifle fire in weakening the ranks of the defence; and if the fire fails.to do that, then the defence, having an advantageous position from which to fire, speedily becomes relatively more powerful ami able to become in turn attackers. But entrench-

meats li'ave serious disadvantages. The French recognise one of the chief by referring to forces entrenched as "fixed

troops," and' to others as "mobile trdo])s.". The more ellicicnt the shelter given by entrenchments, the harder it is i'or any troops but the most trust-

worthv and masoned to leave them for

the .'greater perils of the open ground. In this way, entrenched troops suffer not only the loss of mobility, but iii loss of "morale," and the value of morale is extremely high. The essential point to overcome these disadvantages is to be sure that the trenches are made subservient to the troops, not the troops to the trenches, To entrench'a position which is easily defended is hot the ideal; the position must be ilxcd to get the best effect from the troops, and the trenches ■ made accordingly. That entrenchment,is not necessarily opposed to the spirit of the offensive is shown by (lie great use the essentially aggressive •Japanese madq 'of the practice when attacking the Russians, to defend themselves against counter-attack. What I hey gained they, determined to hold; ami tiiey made "their 1 feet linn by entrenching; so that they were the harder to drive, back'. The- modern, battle .is no ,matter of "hours; , it stretches over days; and the grip of the ground,may well bo''established by night. Such night work by the Japanese was a common occurrence during the war; and (he. men were .practised i n time of peace in the use of light entrenching tools in a prone position. . v As to actual methods 'of.entrenching, tliev depend upon the circuiiistaiic.es anil upon the views of .the;pl!ic.ers directing : the operations'. If tjie positiotl reqiiires it and there is time, -thfcy may' be elabov rate; if doiicTn the heat- of; battle, 'the shelters mav be but trilling hollows. It

is a. less '.lengthy 'business for troops to s,,entrench; than inight be /sup-: (V ]ibscd..;'A ? 'inffwovei'. iif^lveyage halt' ihi hour; and -with so many workers . properly formed {reaches can be quickly tut.