THE NELSON EXAMINER. Thursday, November 15, 1866.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XXV, Issue 142, 15 November 1866, Page 2

THE NELSON EXAMINER. Thursday, November 15, 1866.

Journa's become more necessary as men become more equal and individualism more to be feared. It would be to underrate their importance to suppose that they serve only to secure liberty 5 they maintain civilization. De Tocqi-eviixb, Of Democracy in America, vol. 6, 230.

It is a somewhat trite saying, that " Great wars are great lessons," and in the two great wars of the last few years we have an excellent illustration of its truth. The lessons of the great American struggle have scarcely had time to grow stale and to be overlooked, before they are supplemented and enforced by those of the short but decisive campaigns which have just closed in Germany. The lessons to be learnt from these great teachers are no doubt various, but we think it far from difficult to draw from their occurrences two grand ones, which cannot fail to be useful either to England herself, or to this, the youngest and most distant of her colonies. Before the American struggle, it was the custom to pooh-pooh the military pretensions of a State which, however populous, had no standing army worth mentioning, and to all appearance no military fervour amongst its people. " Tankee notions " were looked upon as hopelessly antagonistic to Yankee prowess, and the reign of cotton was supposed to exclude wholly the rule of Mars. A little experience shewed the folly of our ideas on these points; and let the world into the secret that the power and the will to carry on the most desperate and gigantic wars had little or nothing to do with the pursuits of a nation in time of peace. It was proved that what was wanted was not a great mass of soldiery kept always ready to march against an enemy, but a national life and energy which, while it looked on war as an evil, faced it as a thing to be met and made use of for great ends. The lesson of the great American contest is a clear one, and it is one which nations situated as England and all her colonies are, will do well to lay to heart. It is not a lesson in favour of free as opposed to slave states merely or even primarily, although i that lesson is not to be despised ; but it is a lesson on the power of intelligent and free nationality as opposed to any other form of Government. The Americans, Northern •or Southern, had no warlike organization worth mentioning; they had no standing armies of any size, or fleets of any strength, but the force of a strong united will in either ( section of the great Republic enabled them ' to create these things with a rapidity marvel- J ous to behold.

But with the late German struggle comes a new lesson, one too which may at first sight seem hardly consistent in some respects with the other ; yet, when fairly considered, one which will appear, as we have called it, a mere supplement to that other. If most people are asked the lesson of the German war so quickly begun and so rapidly ended, they will be found ready to reply something about needle-guns or breach-loading rifles. They will faucy that the war was won because, at Sadowa, the Prussians could fire several shots for each one of the Austrian soldiers, and they will think, as too many of the English papers appear ~to think, the explanation a satisfactory one. It is, however, a most incomplete and unsatisfactory one. It may be true that needle-guns won the battle of Sadowa, although this is far from clear ; but the question remains, How came the battle of Sadowa to be fought? How came the masses of Prussian troops so far into Austrian territory ? In the answer to this question lies the lesson of the war. The fate of Austria is said to have been sealed at Sadowa, but it was sealed long before that. Let it once be proved that the men in one army can march farther, can endure more, can risk more with safety than the men of the opposing army, and the fate of any war is practically decided. Such was the result of the first week's experience of the late German war. It was not that Prussia had great Generals, and Austria bad Generals — for to all appearance neither party had much to boast of in this way — but it was that Austria had a large army of drilled soldiery, and that Prussia had a great force of trained men. Given such a distinction as this, and it would require a very great General indeed to weigh down the scale in favour of the first party. No great General was given to Austria to perplex our ideas as to the results that ought to flow from such a state of things, and so the lesson was worked out for us in its fullness and significance. As we have said, it may be thought by some that the lessons are not consistent with one another. It may be urged that whereas a most careful training of men for fighting is taught in Germany, the utter want of a trained soldiery is held up as of no consequence in America. This, however, is hardly the case. It would be more correct to say, that while in America the root of all military strength is demonstrated, in Germany its only legitimate and perfect fruit is held up for admiration, and, bo far as need be, for imitation by other nations. The German war was too short, as the combatants were too unequal, to illustrate the principle brought out in America; the American combatants were too equal in their want of training to illustrate to any great extent the lesson taught us by Germany. Thus, as we have said, the one is the compliment of the other, and the lessons of both are to be laid to heart equally. And the position of England is one especially calling for such lessons as these. Perhaps the most warlike nation in Europe, she is always the least prepared of any for war. The very ease with which, when the occasion arises, she rises to the occasion, is now as it always has been a great snare to her. She knows that she can fight as well as, or perhaps better than any ; and she is careless about inquiring whether she is in a position to fight at all at present if suddenly called upon. Such a state of things is a state of manifest weakness, and as such is sure to catch the attention of many. Hence arises the danger of alarmists, who, seeing England's evident weakness, are not aware of her latent strength, and who often cause a world of evil by their one-sided views and over-charged statements. Prom such dangers as these the two lessons to which we have referred should preserve her. Prom some inscrutable cause England cannot maintain an army of equal size with European armies that cost half the money which she annually spends upon her own. This must now be accepted as a fact, and the only conclusion it should lead to is this, that if her army is small and costly it should at least be rendered perfect. England need be under no apprehension as to her national strength or spirit, these are sound, and these will carry her through any difficulties that may arise, be they what they may. She has, however, cause to be under the greatest apprehensions on behalf of her army if it should be called to take part in European warfare again. Like Austria she has drilled an army, only, unlike Austria's, it is but a small one. Like Austria if the need arose, she would boldly put her army in the way of danger, and feel confident in its success, and, like Austria again, she would be bitterly disappointed, while, unlike that State, one defeat would almost exhaust her little army. "We do not say that England would be prostrated by this mishap. We do not do her the injustice to compare her national life and vigour with the effete and disjointed national life of Austria ; but the evil to which we have pointed is serious enough, and it is one which England cannot be too strongly urged to ward off from herself in time. In the case of England, a small army, -perfectly trained, would answer every good purpose, while a small army, perfectly drilled, is, in our opinion, only a snare and a delusion. Round a trained body of men, the force which she could easily collect on an emergency would gather, as round a centre; round her drilled regiments it would be a pity to see them gather, as these are but too likely to be destroyed when opposed, not to automatons, but to men. And the lesson, so good for England, may be useful in its degree to us also. With us, too, there is a question about standing forces and the efforts of local militia, and the lessons of the German war may be useful to us here. We believe that the very same rule is applicable here as elsewhere, and that, if we must fight, we shall do it better, more cheaply, and with an infinitely increased certainty of success, by means of trained men than of untrained or merely drilled levies. It may be true that at Hawke's Bay, raw levies did wonders, but what is wanted is that what they did, and more than all they did, should be a matter of course and not of wonder. Properly trained men can make it so. Men trained as a small colonial force

might be trained, and, equipped as they ought to be, might not only effect such things as were done at Napier, but might do it not with two or three men to one, but with one to two or three of the enemy, and by this means save a great deal of money, and produce an eft'ect on the native mind never to be produced while we have both arms and numbers on our side.