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TO-DAY’S PROCEEDINGS

HEARING OF EVIDENCE CONCLUDED

Evidence for the defence was continued in the Supreme Court this morning.

Evidence as to the damage to the Ford driven by Monopoli was given by Herbert Eldon Edmondson, motor mechanic.

Gordon Stanley Harris, farmhand, living at Brightwater and employed by accused’s father, said he was driving a car behind the accused’s cor on the night of the accident. He saw the actual collision. Monopoli’s car suddenly appeared in Russell’s headlights and the impact took place almost immediately.

Under cross-examination witness said the party probably finished at about 1.30 a.m. He denied that the party finished at 12.30. Witness explained the movements of his car before the accident. He admitted to His Honour that his car was 200 feet behind when the accident happened. Evidence was given by Leslie George White, motor mechanic, who resides in the second house from the corner of Tasman and Halifax streets. He heard the crash on the morning of 22nd October. H e did not go to the scene of the accident till later in the morning. Ther e was a garage on his property just beyond where Monopoli’s car came to rest. On Sunday morning he found under his hedge a carton containing beer bottles, two full and one broken. JUST BEFORE THE COLLISION Arthur Norriss Snowden, a City Council foreman, residing at 71 Grove street, right on the corner of Tasman street, stated that his bedroom looked right on to the intersection. He heard th e crash of the collision at the Halifax street intersection. A car stopped right alongside his window. It was a Ford V 8 car. It was there four to five minutes. There was skylarking for about a minute, and then a man went to the ’phone box. He was there for two or three minutes. He returned to the car and was there about a minute, shut the door, skylarked and laughed and then all of a sudden he set off like an aeroplane taking off, there was such a noise. He could see the people plainly on the intersection. Witness explained to Mr Fell on a sketch plan wher e the car stopped. By skylarking he meant laughing—“you know what they do in cars.” He did not go to the accident. It was a few seconds between when the car moved off and the collision. He was first asked about this incident by anyone connected with this case about three months ago.

DAMAGE TO THE CARS AND THE POSSIBLE SPEEDS

John G. Ingram, motor engineer, was next called by th e defence. He said following the accident Russell’s car was brought to witness’s garage and was still in the condition in which it* arrived at th e garage. He described the damage to the car. From the nature of the damage he would say that in his opinion it indicated clearly that the impact delivered bv the Morris on the Ford car was minor compared with th P damage inflicted by th e Ford on the Morris. The damage proved to him that the Ford car struck the front of the Morris car with considerable force. His opinion was that the Ford car was travelling at a speed at least double that of the Morris.

His‘Honour asked witness whether he would not expect that to b e so, as the Ford had the right of way. Witness said he would suggest that the Ford would also need to be on the-look-out for traffic on its right. To Mr Fell, witness put the speed of the Ford at 40-50 m.p.h., double that of the Morris.

The Chief Justice: “How can you say that?”

Witness said the speed of Russell’.' car was stated to be 25 m.p.h. and he put the Ford’s speed at twice that.

To His Honour witness said that if tho Morris had been going much faster than the Ford iher e would have been greater damage to both cars.

Archibald Charles Mitchell, consulting engineer, of V.’ellinfftbn, said he had carefully examined the Morris car driven by the accused and had also inspected the Ford car. He deduced that the Ford car travelled 4ft 9ins while the Morris car moved forward 13 i inches. Witness gave de tails of th P damage to the cars. JURY INSPECTS MORRIS CAR Mr Shorland said that that conclud. ed his case except that he asked that the jury be allowed td view the Morris car. The jury then adjourned to inspect the car. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT Mr Shorland in his address to the jury said the essential element in the charge was proof beyond reasonable doubt of negligence by the accused. That meant proof that the accused was driving his car less carefully than any ordinary prudent motorist. The standard of care was not the standard of a reckless motorist on the one hand, or of the ultra-cautious motorist on the other hand. The evidence for the Crown relied on a breach of the right-hand rule. Up to the time of the impact accused drove his car carefully, and the Crown's case involved the proposition that in the last few seconds there was lack of care on the cart of the accused. Proof of breach of th e right hand rule was not conclusive proof of negligence. Counsel referred to the case of Algie I and Brown and said the fact that it had been proved that the accused should have given wav to a person was not the end of the matter. It required investigation and determination as to whether that failure was to be attributed to negligence or in the circumstances was to be attributed to something else. The speed of Monoooli’s car cam" into the question. If Monopoli's speed was not reasonable then negligence lay at the door of Mononoli’s speed. Counsel referred to credibility of witnesses and said that matters of procuring liquor and the beer carton bore °n the question of credibility Counsel suggested that the evidence on those matters affected the credibility of the evidence of the Crown witnesses in regard to the speed of Monopoli’s car. The skid marks wer e made solely by Monopoli’s car The Crown’s attempt to establish that Monopoli was travelling at a reasonable speed was insufficient to discharge the onus. Also th e evi- \ dence of the Snowdens was consis- } tent only with speed, and high speed. In the speed of Monopoli’s ear was the reason for accused not seeing it I in time. Within two seconds beforehand Monopoli’s car would be out of i sight of the accused. Unless the Crown eliminated the possibility of Monopoli’s speed accused was entitled to the benefit of the -’-'ubt CROWN PROSECUTOR’S ADDRESS For the Crown, Mr Fell said he agreed that the accused must have!

not only committed a breach of the offside rule but also have been negligent. Accused’s own statement said he did not see the lights of Monopoli’s car, but if Monopoli was travelling at a reasonable speed Russell should have seen th e lights. The evidence did not disclose excessive speed by I Monopoli. If Snowden was right and ! the car he saw was Monopoli’s then ! the occupants of that car were telling j lies. But why should they do so? What did it matter if they did use the telephone? Mr Fell said that he did not consider the beer carton had anything to do with the matter. It was not Monopoli who was carrying it, and in any case there was no suggestion of insobriety. Counsel submitted that accused was negligent in not seeing the other car in time. HIS HONOUR’S SUMMING-UP The onlv real question to consider was the question of negligence, said His Honour in summing up. The mere fact of accused’s not having a driving license was not proof of negligence. Drink had nothing really to do with the case as the evidence of everyone was that Monopoli was perfectly sober. The evidence of th e carton of beer had no direct bearing on the case. There was not even proof that the box was taken from Monopoli’s car. The defence’s submission was that that evidence discredited the evidence of Monoooli and his passengers. The same applied to thp evidence regarding storming at Groye street. Th e only evidence which would be likely to discredit those in Monopoli’s car would be that Monopoli’s deadlights WPr*. not on.

His Honour quoted an Appeal Court definition of negligence and went on to refer to the right hand rule. A breach of the rule was not conclusive proof of negligence. If Monopoli had no headlights on, the accused was not guilty. The three witnesses who were in Mono_ poli’s car stated that the lights were on and there was no evidence to the contrary. His Honour questioned whether speed was of such importance. If the accused had misjudged the speed of Monopoli’s car and had proceeded it might have been different. But the accused did not see Monopoli’s car at all. The whole question was whether there was a negligent disregard or not by the accused of the right-hand rule. His Honour suggested that that depended first and last on whether or not Monopoli’s lights were on. The evidence of the occupants of the car and also of Miss Fairhall was that the light were on. The jury retired at 12.49 p.m.

VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY

The jury returned at 2.28 p.m. with a verdict of not guilty. The accused. Russell, was thereupon discharged.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NEM19451128.2.65

Bibliographic details

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 28 November 1945, Page 5

Word Count
1,588

TO-DAY’S PROCEEDINGS Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 28 November 1945, Page 5

TO-DAY’S PROCEEDINGS Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 28 November 1945, Page 5