POST-WAR WORLD

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 78, 30 June 1943, Page 6

POST-WAR WORLD

WHERE DOES AMERICA STAND NEED FOB COLLABORATION Twenty years ago an American writer remarked that beneath the British desire for the best relations with the United States there was “always some reservation, a sense of doubt whether America will do what Britain thinks she ought to do. and a considerable degree otf pessimism concerning the same.” A similar and not always so friendly assessment of the British attitude was widespread in America over a long period, says a writer in “The Times. ’’ During the 1930’s some Americans became obsessed with the idea that the British object was always to get America to “pull British chestnuts out of the fire.” Recent utterances show that American suspicions of British policy are still very much alive. Fortunately, however, there is now less inclination than at any recent period to believe that British motives are purely selfish: and there is a real American readiness to credit us with an overriding adherence to the common good of the United Nations. This is therefore a most favourable time for Britain and America to examine their own and one another’s motives, and to recognise that when these differ they are not necessarily purely self-interested and may be complementary. t POPULAR CONTROL The essential fact about American foreign relations is that they are subject to the control of the people, who have some very definitely and simple ideas about their place in the world and their responsibilities. Popular control over foreign policy, as compared with the determination of policy by experts, is not based on accurate or detailed knowledge, and so may be limited in political scope. This is without doubt a disadvantage, and can only be overcome gradually by the growth of education; but there are compensating advantages, and where popular control is guided by broad principles the policy which emerges is likely to be both responsible and predictable. This is true at present of the United

States. If either outside powers or domestic authorities try to commit the American people to assuming world responsibilities of a kind they do not understand and do not feel to be their business, it is extremely probable that they will refuse to be harnessed. If. on the other hand, their sincere desire to share with other people their own advantages is given play they will gladly bear the burdens involved. Americans have strong notions—though not always notions that correspond to British preconceptions—of what is not their business; and, whatever pressure may be brought in favour of intervention in other people's business, the people as a whole are likely to refuse their support In particular, they are almost always unwilling, as they were in 1918-20, to regard other people's frontiers or forms of government as their responsibility. traditional outlook Their history has led them to believe that it is a good thing to become a nation, and that the desires of other people to form nations are worthy of applause. But other people’s frontiers and other people’s governments are their own concern; self-government is a good thing, and there is therefore a positive as well as a negative reason for refusing to interfere. American people are getting over isolationism; but they are not moving towards the nineteenth-century European conception of international relations. The present strength of American criticism of British policy in India is the best current example of American feeling that the process of becoming a nation is worthy of support. But it would be a mistake to assume that the people of the United States would allow their Government to undertake any permanent responsibility for the orderly development of Indian government. It would take a very serious change of circumstances to make America imperialist in the political sense, and though there are plenty of Americans in and out of the Government who have imperial ambitions for America it is most unlikely that they will be allowed to have their way. The history of Cuba and the Philippines and the Central American Republics does not contradict this thesis; American responsibilities there were unwillingly retained and constantly regretted. A political situation abroad must become clearly and completely intolerable before it warrants American intervention, and political responsibilities of this kind are still likely to be relinquished as soon as it is feasible to let them go.

We should be gravely mistaken if w e put down this attitude to American irresponsibility. There is in America a vigorous missionary spirit and a deep sense of moral obligation which have found frequent expression during the last century and a half, and constitute to-day driving forces of great power. Americans may be expected to undertake with enthusiasm responsibilities for all kinds of rehabilitation, both of human beings and of their material environment, and to assist economic and social development. Nutrition, health, housing, education, industrial and agricultural organisation, hydro-electric and engineering schemes, and so forth offer an outlet for American talents and technical capacity and for the American desire for adventure, which is likely to be accepted on a national scale, and with ardour if conditions are favourable. The interests of the United States Department of Agriculture, which have become world-wide in the last decade, are more truly representative of American aspirations than is the organised American farm lobby The National Resources Planning Board is capable of external as well as internal development. Through these and many other Government agencies the United States is already developing machinery suitablr for rapid expansion abroad. political invention It may be objected that none of these things is possible without the acceptance of political responsibilities The world will' need to be held steady while it is being put on its feet There can be no question that American co-operation in political responsibility is desirable, now and after the war. But politics deals with what is possible, and political inventiveness of a high order will be required if the desirable and the possible are to be reconciled. To some extent at least the British Commonwealth must supply the power of invention. One point at which political, social, and economic responsibilities may be found to meet is in the idea of an international authority guaranteeing not so much particular forms of government or frontiers as human safety and the free development of experiment in social and political order. Whatev«*- methods are discovered for linking American concepts with our actions from individual Americans

there can be no question that a con-! siderable body of political responsibilities will remain for us to shoulder in which America will not be prepared to share directly. At the same time we shall have to expect a running fire of commentary and criticism on our actions frohm individual Americans which we may not always find it easy to swallow, and there will be many policies in regard to which American public opinion will have to be taken into account. This will especially be true in those fields of action in which the United States accepts large economic and social obligations. THE TWO PEOPLES These circumstances will require a great deal of adaptability and political good sense in the organisation of Anglo-American relations. Granted that a policy meets their concept of what is good, its acceptance by the American people will be greatly eased by prior explanation, which is a political function of the greatest importauce. The long process of public education undertaken by President Roosevelt is an example of this. The British peoples have their own problems of self-education in external political responsibility. But there ir especially in Britain, a body of knowledge of, interest in, and aptiture for external political affairs of real value to the world. If we apply them wisely we can help America to assume those world responsibilities which are especially hers by inclination and capacity, and at the same time to recognise that our point of view as well as hers has its value. We may thus be able to show that our readiness to accept certain kinds of political responsibility is designed to promote, rather than to hinder, the great and humane things that Americans want to do. We shall only be able to do this if we avoid the twin pitfalls of confining ourselves to our own point of view and waiting helplessly for America to assert hers.