OFFENSIVES IN PACIFIC

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 10 August 1942, Page 1

OFFENSIVES IN PACIFIC

STRATEGIC VALUES OF AREAS ATTACKED The most welcome news of the wai in tlie past few mouth.- has corn** from the Pacific Ocean in the in* j t 24 hows Though there is little revealed as yet about, the attack* on the Wolonion 1» lauds and on Ki*ka. In the Aleutians tin* fact that the offensive has been The Navy Department in Washing ton has stated that the attack on the Solomon Islands is “heavy” We. ip the South Pacific, should be gratified that this Is so, for the Holmms grout is most important strategically, and its continuance in Japanese hands con ► tinned a perpetual threat to the United supply line across th# Pacific, and at the same time was j potential threat to the safety of New Caledonia and New Zealand. Tin Japanese will no doubt put up * strenuous resistance against efforts t« regain the islands for these very rea sons. Thus the “heavy’’ attack seem** to be justified. If the Japanese needed the .Solomon Island* to develop their attacks a gulled United Nations shipping in the Pacific in their opponents’ hand* they would be equally important strategically, it their offensive against New Guinea th* Japanese have been using Rabaul, th* capital of tin* Bismarck Group, anc chief town of the island of New Bri lain, a* their main base. The possession of the Solomons would permit, th* United Nations forces to launch dan geroij£ attacks on this advanced base would render it almost timeless for discharge of cargo and supply assembly. It will be seen, therefore, that th# attack on the islands may, beside* :.i# advantages to New Caledonia auo New Zealand, assist in preventing th# development of Japanese attack **ti Australia through New Guinea. The Aleutians When the Japanese, at the time of their abortive and costly forward move in the Central Pacific against Midway Island, succeeded in posting a force on some of the most westerly islands and islets of the Aleutian Group, considerable unease was felt that this wa# a preliminary to an attack on Alaska and the north American mainland. No exact figures or even estimates have been reported of tin* forces used for the landings, though the Japanese them solve* have luik.-d of “division*” being concerned in the move. Whatever the strength of the occu]Nition troops, they certainly constituted a threat. With the situation on the Siberia-.Mauchukuo-Outer Mongolia borders as it is. and General Yamachita now said to be in command of the considerable Japanese army assembled there, the link between the North American continent and Siberia across the Behring Strait may beeome of great strategic importance. It may be that the Japanese move into the Aleutians was made for the very purpose of interfering with this link. The United States attack to oust the Japanese from Kiskn. presumably a preliminary to the retaking of the whole of the groups occupied by the Japanese, may its safety. Apart from the strategic effect of the new moves, there is auother aspect. jMissihly more important. The United Nations have at long last, taken a definite step toward assuming the offensive initiative. The Midway Island battle was said at the time to be of great importance in that it heavily reduced Japan’s capacity for further offensives. It is probable that history will decide that this was an understatement and evaluate ir as a turning point which not ouly marked the end of Japan’s wave of mart! in* success but also signposted the crossroads of the Pacific war ar which the United Nations were able to begin thoi# forward march to victory.